People v. Pearson

Decision Date08 March 1976
Docket NumberNo. 26250,26250
Citation546 P.2d 1259,190 Colo. 313
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Noel PEARSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gregory L. Williams, Joseph M. Goldhammer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.

Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellant.

HODGES, Justice.

Defendant Pearson was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder 1 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The allegations of error which the defendant asserts in this appeal have no merit as a basis for reversal of his conviction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are undisputed. In responding to a missing persons report on John Henry, Northglenn police officers found him stabbed to death in his apartment. His nude body was tied to a chair. The officers sent out a teletype description on the victim's truck which was missing from his residence. Defendant was arrested in New Mexico the following day. He was driving the victim's truck at the time. After being advised of his rights, he chose to remain silent. However, he signed a consent form for a search of his motel room where several items belonging to the victim were found. Defendant's shirt bore a bloodstain identified at trial as being of the same type of blood as the victim's.

A Northglenn police officer traveled to New Mexico to return the defendant who had waived extradition to Colorado. This officer, while examining the impounded truck, seized a fishing knife which was lying on the front seat. After his return to Colorado, defendant made unsolicited statements to police officers who were booking him into jail. These statements were introduced by the prosecution at trial to link the defendant to the crime.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Following a court-ordered psychiatric examination, defendant withdrew the insanity plea and proceeded to trial on the first-degree murder charge.

I.

The defendant argues that first-degree murder for which he was convicted is indistinguishable from second-degree murder and therefore his due process and equal protection rights were violated. He asserts that the requisite mental state, 'premeditated intent,' in the first-degree murder statute 2 is no different than the mental state, 'intentionally,' as required in the second-degree murder statute. 3

We rejected this exact argument in People v. Sneed, 183 Colo. 96, 514 P.2d 776 (1973), in which we found the first-degree murder statute to be constitutional. In Sneed, we held that a premeditated act required the formulation of a design before the commission of the act, or in other words, an appreciable length of time must elapse between the forming of the intent to do the act and the doing of the act itself to allow deliberation, reflection and judgment. In this manner, this court concluded that 'premeditated intent' and 'intentionally, but without premeditation' were sufficiently different elements to be a constitutionally acceptable basis for defining two distinct crimes.

The trial court did not have the benefit of Sneed at the time of trial, however. The defendant in his brief asserts the jury was not properly instructed on premeditation as pointed out in Sneed. The murder instructions were phrased in statutory language and included the statutory definition of 'premeditation,' which is 'a design formed to do something at any time before it is done.' 4

We held in Sneed that when a defendant is charged with first-degree murder under the present murder statutes, a trial court must, when requested, give an instruction which explains for the jury the difference between 'premeditated intent' as required in the first-degree murder statute and 'intentionally' as required in the second-degree murder statute. We pointed out that where the issue in the trial of a first-degree murder charge is premeditation or not, the failure of the trial judge to properly instruct the jury in this respect would be reversible error. However, there is no error in this case because whether there was premeditation or not was never an issue. From the record of this case, and particularly from the defense closing argument, the only theory of defense was that the prosecution had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that The defendant committed this murder. The closing argument for the defendant stresses the proposition that in many respects the evidence is indicative of the possibility that some individual other than the defendant committed this crime. The manner in which it was committed establishes a considerable period for premeditation as defined in Sneed.

The instructions here were worded in the language of the statutes and included the statutory definition of 'premeditation.' We hold that, for the reason set forth in the preceding paragraph, these instructions were adequate under the facts of this case, and that the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to give the instruction suggested by the defendant on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Dago, 179 Colo. 1, 497 P.2d 1261 (1972); Blincoe v. People, 178 Colo. 34, 494 P.2d 1285 (1972); Simms v. People, 174 Colo. 85, 482 P.2d 974 (1971).

II.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence taken from his motel room. Defendant testified that he was told by the New Mexico police officers that a search warrant could be obtained regardless of his consent to a search of his motel room, and he maintains that this threat invalidated his consent, and hence, the search.

We initially observe that where, as here, there is a disputed factual issue concerning the voluntariness of a consent, it is the province of the trial court, as the fact finder, to weigh the credibility of witnesses and resolve the questions in light of the circumstances surrounding that consent. Capps v. People, 162 Colo. 323, 426 P.2d 189 (1967). The trial court's finding of voluntariness, if supported by adequate evidence in the record, must be upheld on review. People v. Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 513 P.2d 452 (1973).

In this case, the evidence clearly supports a knowing and voluntary consent. The defendant was advised of his rights; he read and signed a written consent form; and both officers present at the time of the consent testified that they never threatened the defendant with the possibility of obtaining a warrant. See e.g., People v. Hancock, Colo., 525 P.2d 435 (1974); People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342 (1971). Under such circumstances, the defendant cannot prevail on the assertion that his consent to the search of his motel room was involuntary.

III.

Defendant next challenges the constitutionality of the warrantless search of the truck which he was driving, which search resulted in the seizure of a fishing knife lying on the front seat. He maintains that the search was unlawful because it was not conducted for purposes of an inventory, or justified because of exigent circumstances. We do not address these issues because defendant lacks standing to contest the constitutionality of this search of this truck which he stole.

To establish standing to challenge a search and seizure, the challenger has the burden of alleging and proving that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy against nonconsensual police intrusions. The party contesting the search has no standing unless he has an ownership or possessory interest in the premises. A possessory interest may be established by one lawfully in possession at the time of the search, or by one reasonably believing he has a claim of title to, or a colorable interest in the premises or vehicle. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291, 516 P.2d 423 (1973). In this case, defendant makes no allegation or showing that he had any colorable right, title, or interest in the victim's truck, or that at the time and place of the search he was lawfully in possession of the vehicle. The truck's registration was in the name of the victim and the evidence persuasively indicates that the truck was stolen. Since the evidence here strongly points to the fact that the defendant stole this vehicle, it must be concluded that he has no proprietary or possessory interest in the vehicle upon which he can base standing to challenge the legality of its search. See, e.g., Meade v. Cox, 310 F.Supp. 233 (W.D.Va. 1970), Aff'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 323, (4 Cir.); Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294 (1974); People v. Henenberg, 55 Ill.2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27 (1973); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294 (1975); State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me. 1974); State v. Damico, 513 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.1974); State v. Maloney, 111 R.I. 133, 300 A.2d 259 (1973); Miller v. State, 520 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn.1975).

IV.

Defendant also states that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to suppress certain statements he made to the police. These statements were made by the defendant several hours after he had been advised in New Mexico by the Colorado officers of his rights and after he had elected to remain silent before consulting with his attorney. Upon returning to Colorado, and during the booking procedure, defendant unexpectedly asked one of the officers if he could ask a question, to which the officer assented. Defendant then asked what time the victim died because if it were after a certain hour, he had an alibi. He then admitted to having been in the victim's apartment on the day of the murder. These...

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