People v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 04 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71--139,71--139
• Citation: 281 N.E.2d 422,4 Ill.App.3d 462
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie PEARSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 422

281 N.E.2d 422

4 Ill.App.3d 462

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie PEARSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 71--139.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

April 4, 1972.

Ralph Ruebner, Donald L. Dudycha, Elgin, for defendant-appellant.

Philip G. Reinhard, State's Atty., Rockford, for plaintiff-appellee.

THOMAS J. MORAN, Justice.

Defendant appeals after a jury found him guilty of the offense of aggravated battery in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, Ch. 38, Sec. 12--4(b)(1).

Defendant was indicted under two counts, attempted murder and aggravated battery, but convicted of only the latter charge. His petition for probation was denied, and he was sentenced to a term of three to seven years in the penitentiary.

On appeal, defendant contends that: 1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in that the State failed to successfully rebut the issue of self-defense; 2) he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence; 3) the trial court improperly denied his petition for probation; 4) the trial court imposed a maximum sentence in excess of the statutory penalty; and 5) the minimum sentence is excessive and should be reduced.

The charges arose out of the shooting of John Cooley on the night of July 18, or early morning of July 19, 1970. Defendant admits the act, but contends it was one of justifiable self-defense. There is considerable conflict in the evidence given by the three principal witnesses--defendant, Cooley, and one Oak Malone. Since the jury apparently relied upon the version presented by Cooley, we first reconstruct the occurrence from his testimony.

It appears that Cooley and Oak Malone had been together for most of the night in question. At approximately 11:00 P.M., they came to the parking lot of a tavern in the City of Rockford and, while in the car, had a 'couple beers.' During this time, Cooley's girlfriend came out of the tavern to ask if he was ready to leave. When Cooley said no, defendant, who was present, suggested that Cooley take her home. Cooley told defendant to mind his own business, and defendant then drove his car out of the lot. Cooley denied that he was intoxicated or angry at the time. Within five or ten minues defendant returned to the lot, parking his car near Cooley's. Cooley was standing outside of his car when defendant got out of his car, stood in its doorway and immediately shot Cooley twice. Cooley denied any provocation on his part, or that he had a gun at that or any prior time.

The testimony given by defendant refutes the above version of events on several material points. In particular, defendant testified that Cooley was 'high' as well as angry, and had been acting boisterously throughout the night. He also testified that upon his return to the parking lot, he parked away from Cooley and never got out of his car; that Cooley started walking toward him using abusive and threatening language, and that he shot to protect himself when Cooley pulled a gun out of his hip pocket.

The testimony of Oak Malone affirmed that he had been with Cooley for the evening and substantially corroborated defendant's portrayal of Cooley being 'high' and talking loudly during the events leading up to the shooting. He testified that on defendant's return to the parking lot, it was Cooley who started walking toward defendant while the latter never left his car. He was, however, unable to state unequivocally whether Cooley had a weapon during the incident. No weapon was ever found near the scene of the incident or on the person of Cooley.

Defendant's first argument is that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State did not successfully rebut the issue of self-defense, primarily due to its failure to introduce rebuttal testimony. It is true that when a defendant introduces evidence tending to prove an affirmative defense (as here with the theory of self-defense), the State has the burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue as well as every other element of the offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, Ch. 38, Sec. 3--2(b)). However, the determination of whether justifiable self-defense has been established is the province of the trier of fact, and the decision of the jury on that issue will not be disturbed unless its finding is so contrary to the evidence that a reasonable doubt of guilt remains. The People v. Jordan, 18 Ill.2d 489, 492--493, 165 N.E.2d 296 (1960). In the present case, while the testimony of Cooley and defendant was substantially opposite on the issue of self-defense, Cooley's testimony given during the State's case in chief did, in itself, rebut the defendant's contention that he acted in justifiable self-defense. The jury was entitled to base its verdict solely on Cooley's testimony if it so chose. The People v. Gipson, 29 Ill.2d 336, 341, 194 N.E.2d 318 (1963); The People v. Johnson, 24 Ill.2d 195, 198, 181 N.E.2d 164 (1962). Under the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary for the State to introduce rebuttal evidence in order to defeat defendant's claim of self-defense. People v. Hill, 116 Ill.App.2d 157, 160, 253 N.E.2d 617 (1969); People v. Johnson, 112 Ill.App.2d 148, 151--153, 251 N.E.2d 393 (1969).

Defendant's second contention is that he was deprived of a fair trial by admission of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, i.e., testimony of the extent of injuries suffered by Cooley and introduction of his blood stained clothing. Defendant relies on The People v. Nickolopoulos, 25 Ill.2d 451, 185 N.E.2d 209 (1962), which reversed a conviction on the ground that similar evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. We feel, however, that the present case is distinguishable from Nickolopoulos. There, the defendant being charged with the sole offense of assault with intent to commit murder, the only issue was whether defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime, or whether he was incapable of forming that intent because of intoxication. It has been held that if particular evidence is relevant, it will not be withheld from the jury merely because of its inflammatory nature. The People v. Roy, 49 Ill.2d 113, 116--117, 273 N.E.2d 363 (1971); The People v. Kolep, 29 Ill.2d 116, 124, 193 N.E.2d 753 (1963); The People v. Jenko, 410 Ill. 478, 482, 102 N.E.2d 783 (1952). In the present case, defendant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery. Unlike Nickolopoulos, where the extent of injuries was irrelevant to the possible effect intoxication may have had on intent, the extent of the injuries here inflicted was relevant to defendant's intent to murder, People v. Cunningham, 73 Ill.App.2d 357, 364, 218 N.E.2d...