People v. Peay

Decision Date08 December 1971
Docket NumberDocket No. 10774,No. 3,3
Citation37 Mich.App. 414,195 N.W.2d 75
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel PEAY, Defendant-Appellant
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James K. Miller, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Johnston, III, Chief Appellate Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before R. B. BURNS, P.J., and LEVIN and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with willfully and without authority taking possession of and driving away a motor vehicle belonging to another, M.C.L.A. § 750.413, M.S.A. § 28.645. He was tried by a jury, found guilty of the offense, and sentenced to a term of 4 1/2 to 5 years in prison. Defendant brings this appeal as of right.

Defendant first contends that during an attempt by the prosecutor to impeach his credibility, he was improperly questioned about a prior arrest which did not result in a conviction. This Court has recently held that a defendant may only be questioned, for credibility purposes, about crimes of which the defendant has been convicted. See People v. Brocato, 17 Mich.App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969).

Defendant was asked about a crime of which he had not been convicted; he was asked whether he was convicted of attempting to obtain merchandise by false pretenses. It appears that this was inadvertently done due to an incorrect 'rap sheet' which had been provided for the prosecution by the state police. The prosecutor immediately stopped questioning the defendant about prior convictions as soon as defendant stated that he had already related all of his previous convictions. The defendant had admitted prior arrests and convictions for larceny in a building and possession of stolen property and to having been involved in a 'raid'. We are convinced from our examination of the record that the defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's inadvertent error; and therefore, since there was no objection on the part of the defendant, we will not review the question further.

The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the element of intent. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

'Now what are the elements necessary for the People to prove? Well, the statute says: any person who shall willfully and without authority take possession of and drive away a motor vehicle belonging to another; so the first element is that the party being charged must take possession of an automobile belonging to another; that is the first element, possession of an automobile belonging to another.

'The second is that he drove it away or took it away from the place where it was located.

'Three, that he did it willfully and wantonly and without the authority of the owner. Those are the three elements.

'One, he took possession of it; two, he took it and drove it away from the possession of the owner; three, that he did it willfully and wantonly without the authority of the owner. Those are the three elements.

'Now, willfully and wantonly means with intent. Now, what do we mean by intent? Well, intent is something purely subjective in one's mind. You people may leave here and you intend to do something, go home or go shopping or something, and we can't determine what is in your mind. But if a few of you leave here and go into Wurzburg's or Herpolsheimer's, we know that you intend to do some shopping or go in there for some purpose because your acts carry out your intent. In other words, a person's intent is governed by his overt acts. If I left here this noon and any of you followed me and you wondered where I was going and you couldn't read my mind, but if you saw me go into the Pantlind Hotel and have lunch, then you knew that I intended to go to the Pantlind to have lunch because the overt act that I performed carried out my intention. That is how simple intent is. You govern intent by the overt out-side...

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8 cases
  • People v. Charles
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • February 10, 1975
    ...inadvertent error caused no prejudice to the defendant; and since no objection was made, we find no reversible error. People v. Peay, 37 Mich.App. 414, 195 N.W.2d 75 (1971), lv. den., 388 Mich. 795 Of the many photographs taken by the police at the scene of the murder, two were admitted int......
  • People v. Sanders
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • November 27, 1972
    ...been arrested. Even when the answer was in the negative the prosecutor continued to pursue the area of arrest only. People v. Peay, 37 Mich.App. 414, 195 N.W.2d 75 (1971), is also distinguishable from the present case. There the trial court allowed the prosecution to question the defendant ......
  • People v. Szczytko
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • April 26, 1972
    ...People v. Gill, 8 Mich.App. 89, 153 N.W.2d 800 (1967); People v. Morgan, 27 Mich.App. 388, 183 N.W.2d 617 (1970); People v. Peay, 37 Mich.App. 414, 195 N.W.2d 75 (1971). Although defendant now suggests that 'the taking off of her clothes could have been for some other reason than to commit ......
  • People v. Tooks
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • September 24, 1974
    ...to the defendant. Given the absence of an objection, we cannot say that manifest injustice has been demonstrated. See People v. Peay, 37 Mich.App. 414, 195 N.W.2d 75 (1971), leave to appeal den., 388 Mich. 795 (1972); People v. Sanders (concurring opinion), 43 Mich.App. 698, 204 N.W.2d 706 ......
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