People v. Pendleton

Decision Date21 December 2006
Docket NumberNo. 100493.,100493.
Citation861 N.E.2d 999,308 Ill.Dec. 434,223 Ill.2d 458
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Philbert PENDLETON, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and John B. Roe, State's Attorney, Oregon (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Anderson M. Gansner, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, Office of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.

Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Philbert B. Pendleton.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant, Philbert Pendleton, pled guilty in the circuit court of Ogle County to two counts of home invasion and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the State agreed not to charge petitioner with an unrelated offense. No agreement was reached as to sentence. The circuit court subsequently sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 15 years for the first count of home invasion, 30 years for the second, and 30 years for one of the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts. Neither a postjudgment motion nor a notice of appeal was filed. Nearly a year after sentencing, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Counsel was appointed for defendant and subsequently filed an amended petition on his behalf. The circuit court denied defendant postconviction relief, and he appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded. 356 Ill. App.3d 863, 292 Ill.Dec. 967, 827 N.E.2d 496. The appellate court found that an admonishment issue, which was raised for the first time on appeal, had been forfeited, but the court concluded that remand was nonetheless necessary because postconviction counsel had rendered deficient, unreasonable assistance in postconviction proceedings. 356 Ill.App.3d at 870-71, 292 Ill.Dec. 967, 827 N.E.2d 496. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court. The following facts are pertinent to our disposition.

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2001, defendant pled guilty to two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2000)) and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2), (a)(5) (West 2000)) in exchange for the State's agreement not to charge him with an unrelated offense he allegedly committed in 1997. No agreement was reached as to sentence.

Prior to taking defendant's guilty pleas, the circuit court conducted meticulous inquiries and admonishments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill.2d R. 402) in order to ensure that defendant's guilty pleas were informed, knowing, and voluntary. We set forth, at length, portions of the colloquy between defendant and the court.

The circuit court first asked defendant if he was "in good health physically and mentally," to which defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant said he was not taking any prescription drugs or medication. The court then read the charges to defendant and asked if he understood them. Defendant indicated he understood; in fact, he took exception to the language of count I, and that charge was amended to comport with defendant's version of events.

Thereafter, sentencing options were explained to defendant. The court told defendant:

"First three [counts] you could be subject to an extended term in the Department of Corrections, also that would be from 30 to 60 years based on the aggravating factor of the age of the victims being over 60 years * * *. There is a minimum mandatory six-year prison sentence involved in regard to all of these offenses, do you understand that?"

Defendant indicated he understood. The court then advised defendant "there would be a three year mandatory supervised release period" upon his release from prison. Defendant again indicated he understood. Pursuant to the State's request, the court addressed the possibility of consecutive sentencing:

"THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton. If, in fact, it is determined that under Counts II and III, were [sic] part of a single course of conduct, there's no substantial change in the criminal objective, and whether there is either severe bodily injury or criminal sexual assault then under Counts II and III it would be required of me if those findings are shown at the sentencing hearing [that] you receive consecutive sentences, that means one sentence ends, the other begins, you will not serve them at the same time. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

* * *

THE COURT: Also discretionary consecutive sentences in regard to all charges, that would be up to the court at the time of the sentence, do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."

After giving defendant those admonishments, the court proceeded, first, to inform defendant of the rights he would give up by pleading guilty and, second, to ascertain that defendant had consulted with counsel:

"THE COURT: All right. You also understand that if you plead guilty today you give up certain rights? You give up the right to have a trial before a judge or jury; you give up the right to meet and confront the witnesses against you and present evidence in your own behalf; and the right to remain silent and make the State prove this charge against you beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand the rights you'd be giving up today if you plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand there will be no trial in any of these charges if you plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Have you had a chance to talk to [defense counsel] about this?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you've had some considerable time with him talking about it over the days?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions you want to ask [defense counsel] today before we proceed any further?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: You have a clear understanding where we're at right now?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."

With that, the court asked defendant, successively, with respect to each charge, how he pled, guilty or not guilty. Defendant, without hesitation, pled guilty to each charge. The court then asked defendant whether he was pleading guilty to each of those charges of his "own free will," and defendant again responded affirmatively. When asked if anyone had threatened him to get him to plead guilty, defendant stated, "Not at all." When the court inquired whether there had been any promises made to him to get him to plead guilty, defendant responded negatively. At that point in the proceedings, the State interrupted for purposes of clarification, noting the State's agreement not to charge defendant with an unrelated offense he allegedly committed in 1997. The court then asked defendant, "That's been told to you Mr. Pendleton?" Defendant confirmed that was part of the plea agreement.

At the court's request, the prosecutor provided a factual basis as to each charge. Defense counsel stipulated that would be the State's evidence. Thereupon, the circuit court found factual bases for the guilty pleas, found that the defendant's pleas were knowing and voluntary, and accepted defendant's guilty pleas, setting the matter over for a sentencing hearing.

Since defendant raised no sentencing issue in the appellate court, and he advances no claim of sentencing error in briefs or oral argument before this court, there is no need to recount the events of defendant's sentencing hearing. Suffice it to say that a sentencing hearing was conducted on November 8, 2001, and, at the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court imposed a 75-year aggregate prison sentence, consisting of consecutive terms of 15 years for the first home invasion count, 30 years for the second home invasion count, and 30 years for one of the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts. After sentencing defendant, the circuit court advised him as follows:

"You have the right to appeal the sentence which I have imposed here today. You have the right to ask me to reconsider the sentence. You have the right to file a motion within 30 days and [defense counsel] can assist you in that. If you want me to reconsider the sentence, you file the motion within 30 days.

If you want to appeal the sentence you have the right to have a lawyer and a transcript of everything I've done here. If you can't afford those you can have those free of charge.

Any claim of error that you want to raise on appeal has to be put into that written motion filed within the next 30 days or you can't bring it up on appeal. That's all for today."

Defendant did not file a postjudgment motion or a notice of appeal. However, the common law record indicates that defendant sent a letter to the circuit clerk of Ogle County in June of 2002, inquiring about the status of his appeal. In that letter, defendant stated that he had instructed his public defender "to appeal" his "conviction and sentence." Defendant said he had not heard from the Office of the State Appellate Defender and he was thus "concerned" because he did not know whether his case was "under appeal." Defendant asked the circuit clerk to send him a status report of his case. In his letter of June 2002, defendant did not mention a motion to withdraw guilty plea or suggest that he had asked trial counsel to file one.

The next document appearing in the common law record is defendant's pro se postconviction petition, which bears a file stamp of October 30, 2002. In that petition, defendant alleged that improper evidence was presented at his sentencing hearing and that trial counsel was ineffective insofar as counsel did not object to that evidence. Defendant also claimed he had "informed his counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea...

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