People v. Peraza

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Citation: 733 N.Y.S.2d 510,288 A.D.2d 689
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>HECTOR PERAZA, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 21 November 2001

288 A.D.2d 689
733 N.Y.S.2d 510

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,
v.
HECTOR PERAZA, Appellant.

Peters, J.

Decided November 21, 2001.

Mercure, J. P., Crew III, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

Peters, J.

On several occasions between September 1997 and June 1998, defendant, then aged 50, had sexual contact with a female child less than 17 years of age (hereinafter the victim). On July 6, 1998, the Town of Colonie Police Department (hereinafter the Department) received a referral from the Child Protective Hotline regarding the suspected abuse of the victim. She was subsequently interviewed by a counselor with the Juvenile Division of the Department along with Investigator Stephen Tanski. On the evening of July 8, 1998, Tanski and another officer went to defendant's home to speak with him. Defendant agreed to accompany them to the police station and, while at the station, he began to make admissions. Tanski interrupted him and administered Miranda warnings from memory. Defendant thereafter provided extensive, detailed information concerning his contacts with the victim and later signed a three-page confession.

On August 25, 1998, a Supreme Court Grand Jury handed up a 12-count indictment charging defendant with two counts of rape in the first degree, three counts of rape in the third degree, two counts of sodomy in the first degree, four counts of sodomy in the third degree and one count of endangering the welfare of a child. Following his arraignment in County Court, a Huntley hearing was held at which Tanski testified to the circumstances under which defendant's statement was obtained; County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress.

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all charges and was sentenced to determinate prison terms of 20 years each on

[288 A.D.2d 690]

his convictions of two counts of rape in the first degree and two counts of sodomy in the first degree, 4 years each on his convictions of three counts of rape in the third degree and four counts of sodomy in the third degree, and one year in jail for his conviction of endangering the welfare of a child. All such sentences were to run concurrently, except the sentence imposed for sodomy in the first degree under the third count of the indictment for which defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender. Such term was to run consecutive to the terms previously imposed. In addition, as to the fifth count of the indictment, rape in the first degree, defendant's 20-year sentence was to run consecutive to the terms previously imposed. Defendant appeals.

We first address defendant's contention that the transfer of his indictment from Supreme Court to County Court, by order dated August 25, 1998, contravenes NY Constitution, article VI, § 11.^[1] Attempting to establish that County Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendant interprets this provision narrowly so as to limit County Court's jurisdiction only to those cases which "originated in such county court" (NY Const, art VI, § 11 [a]). We cannot condone such circumscribed construction. While County Court is decidedly a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction (see, People ex rel. Dold v Martin, 284 App Div 127), Supreme Court is wholly authorized to transfer an indictment to such court (see, NY Const, art VI, § 19 [a]; CPL 230.10 [a]; 22 NYCRR 200.14).

Next, defendant asserts that his written confession should have been suppressed because Tanski did not read him his Miranda warnings from a written form and, therefore, the People failed to meet their burden of proving that proper warnings were received before defendant waived his constitutional rights. There is no rule, statutory or otherwise, requiring that Miranda warnings be read to a suspect. With no dispute that oral warnings were...