People v. Perkins
| Citation | 2018 IL App (1st) 133981,163 N.E.3d 148,444 Ill.Dec. 23 |
| Decision Date | 24 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–3981,1–13–3981 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Alvin PERKINS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Benjamin A. Wolowski, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 The State charged defendant, Alvin Perkins, with the first degree murder of his ex-girlfriend and neighbor, Teresa Iacovetti, who was shot in the face on June 26, 2007. Teresa died from her injuries several days later. Within hours after being shot, Teresa identified defendant as the shooter to three police officers, and those three identifications were all admitted into evidence at defendant's jury trial. The Cook County circuit court admitted one of those identifications under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. Following the trial, the circuit court of Cook County convicted defendant of first degree murder and sentenced him to 35 years in the penitentiary for the murder and a consecutive sentence of 35 years for personally discharging the firearm that caused Teresa's death. Defendant appealed his conviction arguing, inter alia , the trial court improperly admitted all three of Teresa's statements identifying him as her shooter and, in particular, the court erred when it applied the wrong standard to determine whether the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applied to admit one of the victim's statements. We retained jurisdiction of defendant's appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for the court to determine whether the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant shot Teresa with the intent of preventing her from testifying as a witness against him. On remand, the trial court held a hearing, after which it found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant intended to prevent Teresa from testifying. Defendant filed a supplemental brief concerning the hearing on remand but withdrew it. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 The State charged defendant by indictment with the first degree murder of his ex-girlfriend and neighbor, Teresa Iacovetti, who was shot on June 26, 2007, and died several days later. At the time he was charged, defendant faced the possibility of being sentenced to death if convicted.
¶ 5 During court appearances prior to trial, defense counsel expressed concern about defendant's mental status. On April 15, 2009, defense counsel indicated to the court that defendant's fitness and sanity may be an issue at trial. Counsel also stated that defendant had a mental health history. On July 9, 2009, defendant's attorneys tendered a package of information relating to defendant's psychological history. At that time, defense counsel indicated that defendant still needed to undergo psychological testing. The State also informed the court that defendant was schizophrenic, questioned whether defendant was on medication, and indicated that defendant would need to be tested. Defense counsel confirmed that defendant was on medication.
¶ 6 On September 23, 2009, just as defense counsel presented a motion to preclude the death penalty, defendant objected to his counsel's representation and indicated that he wanted to represent himself. Specifically, defendant stated: When the judge asked defendant whether he understood "what's involved in a death penalty case," defendant responded, During this exchange, defense counsel advised the court that Defense counsel then concluded, "So we're not anywhere near setting this case for trial." The court then denied defendant's request to represent himself.
¶ 7 Later, in May 2010, in response to defendant's filing of pro se speedy trial demands, the trial court informed defendant that it could not accept motions from him because he was represented by counsel. In March 2011, after the parties agreed to a continuance, defendant interrupted, saying that he had already complained to his lawyer about being locked up for three years and nine months and that he wanted to go to trial. The court advised defendant that he was represented by an attorney and the court would only accept motions from his attorney. The court also stated the case could not proceed to trial until defendant's attorney filed a certificate of readiness because this was a death penalty case. Defendant responded, "Well, I am the one on trial here." Defendant again demanded trial, and the trial court judge responded that his request was "[n]ot valid."
¶ 8 At the request of defense counsel, the trial court ordered a fitness evaluation of defendant at the end of 2009. In January 2010, defendant refused to participate in the evaluation, but the evaluation was conducted on February 19, 2010. From that evaluation, it was reported that defendant was fit for trial and sane at the time of the offense. However, the report noted that fitness to stand trial while medicated would be assessed in a separate evaluation since defendant was on medication. Defense counsel then indicated that he would not be pursuing an insanity defense.
¶ 9 The second evaluation found defendant fit for trial with medication, as he was taking some psychotropic medications like Risperidone
, Zyprexa, and Hydroxine. The doctor evaluating defendant deferred any opinion as to defendant's sanity at the time of the offense since defendant had insisted he was not raising an insanity defense.
¶ 10 In March 2011, the trial court indicated that the death penalty was no longer an option in the case since the death penalty had been abolished in Illinois. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant renewed his request to represent himself after he was found fit for trial.
¶ 11 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude as hearsay three statements by Teresa, now deceased, to police identifying defendant as the person who shot her. The shooting itself occurred at approximately 12:20 a.m. on June 26, 2007. The first statement was made to Officer Alfredo Salinas while Teresa was in the emergency room trauma center at approximately 1:46 a.m. In this statement, Teresa identified defendant as her shooter. The second statement was made to Officer Daniel Riegler at approximately 2 a.m. Officer Riegler asked Teresa who shot her, and she named defendant. Teresa then twice stated, "I can't believe Alvin shot me." The third statement was made later that day, between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m., to Detective Mikal El–Amin. Detective El–Amin asked Teresa what happened, and Teresa told him that she was watering plants in the yard when she saw defendant enter the yard from the alley. She stated when defendant came to the yard, he said, "I told you what was going to happen, b* * *." She stated he then pointed a gun at her and shot her in the face.
¶ 12 The parties argued the admissibility of the statements in two discrete motions: the first concerning the identifications Teresa made to Officers Salinas and Riegler, and the second regarding Teresa's statement later in the day to Detective El–Amin, which was more detailed.
¶ 13 At the hearing on the admissibility of the statements, the parties proffered statements contained in the police reports and did not present any witnesses. With respect to the first two statements, the defense argued that to admit those hearsay statements would violate defendant's sixth amendment rights. The State in turn argued the statements were admissible as either excited utterances or dying declarations. The trial court admitted the first two statements as either dying declarations or excited utterances, finding that there was not enough time for Teresa to fabricate a story. With respect to the third, more detailed statement to Detective El–Amin, the State argued the identification was admissible pursuant to the statutory forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay found in section 115–10.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( 725 ILCS 5/115–10.7 (West 2012) ).
¶ 14 At the hearing on defendant's motion in limine , the State argued that pursuant to subsection (d) of the statute, if it proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant murdered Teresa, the State was not required to show that defendant's purpose in committing the murder was to create the unavailability of a witness for the exception to apply and the statement to be admitted. Even if the State did have to show a motive, the State contended that defendant was motivated to kill Teresa to silence her from testifying about the fact defendant violated an order of protection by contacting her on the night of the shooting and that he had a previously stricken criminal damage to property case, which alleged defendant attempted to pry open Teresa's door about a month earlier.
¶ 15 The defense responded by arguing the State's argument as to defendant's motive was illogical—it did not make sense for defendant to create a situation where he...
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...failed to understand the nature of the charges against him.¶ 70 The case at bar bears no resemblance to People v. Perkins , 2018 IL App (1st) 133981, 444 Ill.Dec. 23, 163 N.E.3d 148, a case relied on by defendant. There, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying ......
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