People v. Petrella
| Decision Date | 10 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | 73731,Docket Nos. 71556 |
| Citation | 380 N.W.2d 11,424 Mich. 221 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry PETRELLA, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice Raymond SIMPSON, Defendant-Appellant. 424 Mich. 221, 380 N.W.2d 11 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
State Appellate Defender Office by Karla K. Goodman, Lansing, for petrella.
State Appellate Defender Office by Peter Jon Van Hoek, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for Simpson.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Fred R. Hunter, III (P 15276), Pros. Atty., Michale A. Nickerson (P 25138), Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys., Appellate Service, Peter D. Houk, Ingham County Prosecutor, Robert B. Ebersole, Chief Appellate Atty., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.
In these consolidated cases, we consider the appellant's claim that the term "mental anguish," as included in the definition of "personal injury" in the criminal sexual conduct (CSC) statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520a(j); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(1)(j), 1 is unconstitutionally vague. 2
In addition, both cases present the question whether there was sufficient evidence of mental anguish produced at trial to support defendants' first-degree CSC convictions. Petrella presents an issue regarding the Criminal Jury Instruction defining "mental anguish," CJI 20:2:11(5), and in Simpson there is a question whether the spousal privilege statute, M.C.L. Sec. 600.2162; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2162, which contains an exception for a prosecution for a crime committed against either or both spouses' child, should be limited to minor children.
We hold:
--The statutory scheme that permits elevation of a criminal sexual conduct offense from a lesser to a higher degree, upon the basis of proof of personal injury in the form of mental anguish, offends neither the United States nor the Michigan Constitutions.
--The term mental anguish, as used in M.C.L. Sec. 750.520a(j); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(1)(j), means extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering of the mind.
--The evidence produced at the trial of defendant Petrella was sufficient to support his conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. However, the evidence of mental anguish presented in Simpson was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
--We disapprove the Criminal Jury Instruction defining "mental anguish" in CJI 20:2:11(5).
--Our resolution of the mental anguish issue in Simpson makes it unnecessary to decide the spousal privilege issue.
We undertake a somewhat detailed description of the facts in both cases because both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of mental anguish, the element that raises the crimes from third-degree to first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
On October 3, 1980, following a four-day jury trial in Ingham Circuit Court, defendant Jerry Petrella was convicted of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.110; M.S.A. Sec. 28.305, and of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(f); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(f). He was sentenced to seven and one-half to fifteen years imprisonment for the breaking and entering conviction, and ten to twenty years for the first-degree CSC conviction, with credit given for 694 days served. 3 At trial, the complainant testified that she awoke on the morning of March 9, 1977, to find defendant standing in the doorway of the bedroom in her apartment. She testified that she recognized him as the mechanic who had previously repaired her car. The evidence established that defendant had entered the victim's apartment with a key. The victim testified that defendant sexually assaulted her and then left the apartment, locking the door from the outside.
After defendant left, the victim testified that she was very upset, frightened, and was crying as she telephoned a friend, who then came over to her apartment and called the police. Two police officers arrived and immediately took the victim to the gasoline station at which defendant worked in order to permit her to identify her assailant. Defendant was not there, and they proceeded to the hospital. After the examination at the hospital, they returned to the service station where the victim saw the defendant, but stated that there was something different about him which she could not articulate at the time. She testified that she was very upset at this time. She further testified that she had trouble sleeping after the incident and continued to have such trouble at the time of the trial. She testified that she missed three days from work immediately after the incident, and then periodically missed time from work due to the incident.
On cross-examination, the victim testified that she had lived at the apartment in question from July, 1976, until March 9, 1977, but that she never stayed there another night after the assault occurred.
On redirect examination, the victim testified that what was different about the defendant when she saw him at the gasoline station after the incident occurred was that he was clean shaven and his hair was cut short. On the two or three occasions that she had seen him before this time, he had had long hair and a moustache. The victim testified that, besides a rug burn on her knee, she experienced pain in her ribs and face after her assailant forced her to the floor and sexually assaulted her.
The victim's friend testified that when she spoke with the victim on the telephone following the assault, the victim was screaming and her voice was very hysterical. At first she did not recognize the victim's voice, even though she had talked to her on the phone almost daily before that. When the friend arrived at the victim's apartment, the victim was very upset and crying. The victim seemed "frightened" and "uncomfortable" when taken to the gas station to identify the defendant. On cross-examination, the friend testified that the victim was not a person who cried easily.
Officer Theodore Rahl testified that he and his partner, Officer Helen Perry Janson, arrived at the complainant's apartment at approximately 8:50 a.m. on the day of the incident. Officer Rahl further testified that when they arrived, the complainant was wringing her hands, and was "very agitated, and very upset." Officer Janson described the emotional state of the complainant as "extremely upset and very, very nervous."
Following the close of the prosecution's proofs, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on two grounds. The first was that the CSC statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and does not define the term "personal injury" with sufficient definiteness to survive constitutional challenge. 4 The second basis for the directed verdict request was that there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of the offense. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant presented a misidentification-alibi defense. Both defendant and his wife testified as to the defendant's whereabouts on the morning of the assault, and defendant denied being at the victim's apartment complex at any time on the day of the offense.
After the defense rested, defense counsel requested that no lesser included offense instructions be given. The prosecutor agreed, and none were given.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor contended that the element of personal injury had been established. He argued that The prosecutor reminded the jury of the complainant's testimony that she still had trouble sleeping as a result of this incident, and that she had lost a lot of time from work. He contended that this loss of sleep and absence from work were two things to be considered in determining whether mental anguish was proven.
Defense counsel argued that the complainant was mistaken in her identification of defendant. He stated:
Following arguments, the court instructed the jury. Discussing the elements of the CSC count, the trial judge stated:
"If I use the phrase 'personal injury,' ... it means bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ. I hesitate a moment to point out personal injury then includes mental anguish.
* * *
(Emphasis supplied.) 5
The defendant made no objection to the jury instructions.
After deliberating for a little over four hours, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions. People v. Petrella, 124 Mich.App. 745, 336 N.W.2d 761 (1983). We granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal, "limited to defendant's claim that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to consider mental anguish as an aggravating factor because the term 'mental anguish' is unconstitutionally vague, the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of the term, and the evidence of...
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...prosecution, was sufficient to establish the elements of armed robbery and carjacking beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 268-270, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985). Further, the jury's verdict was not internally inconsistent. Whereas the weapons offenses required proof of an a......
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...jury in understanding the issues does not preclude other considerations that argue for limitation.55 This Court in People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 267, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985), expressly recognized that "[d]espite the behavioral patterns of rape victims that have been observed (labeled by s......
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...of him at the preliminary examination. See People v. Petrella, 124 Mich.App. 745, 756, 336 N.W.2d 761 (1983), aff'd 424 Mich. 221, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985). Because there was no impropriety in the complainant's pretrial identifications of defendant, there was no need to establish an independent......
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