People v. Petruso

• Decision Date: 14 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39771,39771
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Dominick PETRUSO, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 276

221 N.E.2d 276

35 Ill.2d 578

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Dominick PETRUSO, Appellant.

No. 39771.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 14, 1966.

John W. Nielsen, Rockford, appointed by the Court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and William R. Nash, State's Atty., Rockford (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Alfred W. Cowan, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellee.

SOLFISBURG, Justice.

Defendant, Dominick Petruso, was tried in the circuit court of Winnebago County and convicted of rape. He has appealed and contends, as he did in a pretrial motion to dismiss the charge, that he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a preliminary hearing, that the grand jury which indicted him was illegally selected and drawn and that the indictment was defective.

The record discloses that defendant was arrested on May 21, 1965. Four days later he was brought before a magistrate at which time the complaint was read to him and he was advised of his right to counsel and of his right to remain silent. The hearing was terminated and nothing further was done when defendant indicated he would like to seek counsel. When he was interviewed by his parole officer several days later, defendant stated his sister was attempting to employ an attorney from Pennsylvania who had previously represented him. On June 29, 1965, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with rape, and upon his subsequent arraignment an attorney was appointed to defend him when he informed the court that he had no counsel. The record of his trial which followed reveals that he was convicted by the testimony of witnesses who testified against him in open court and in his presence.

Due to the nature of the preliminary hearing, defendant, who reasons that such hearing is a step in the 'prosecution' for a crime, contends that he was deprived of State and Federal guarantees that an accused in all criminal prosecutions shall have the right to meet and confront the witnesses against him. This contention, however, has been long and soundly rejected, (see: Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 16 S.Ct. 216, 40 L.Ed. 343; Green v. Bomar, (6th cir.) 329 F.2d 796; United States ex rel. Dilling v. McDonnell, (7th cir.) 130 F.2d 1012; McDonald v. Hudspeth (10 cir.) 129 F.2d 196,) the Ratio decidendi being that the constitutional mandate refers to and is satisfied by confrontation at the trial where guilt or innocence is decided.

Nor, in the absence of any showing of prejudice which would do violence to the concept of fundamental fairness, was defendant denied due process of law because a preliminary hearing was not held in accordance with section 109--1(b) (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 109--1(b)(3).) Despite the enactment of the statute there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing prior to indictment or trial. (Clarke v. Huff, 73 App.D.C. 351, 119 F.2d 204,) and we have consistently adhered to the view that where an indictment is returned containing full information of the crime with which an accused is charged, a preliminary hearing is not necessary. People v. Jones, 9 Ill.2d 481, 138 N.E.2d 522; People v. Long, 415 Ill. 599, 114 N.E.2d 666; People v. Jones, 408 Ill. 89, 96 N.E.2d 515; Boone v. United States (6th cir.) 280 F.2d 911; Green v. Bomar, (6th cir.) 329 F.2d 796.

Since defendant's basic constitutional rights have not been violated, we do not believe that the failure to grant him a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 109--1(b)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes reversible error. No substantial prejudice appears from the record and it is apparent that the reason no preliminary hearing was conducted was because defendant was seeking a lawyer of his own choosing. In the absence of a showing of prejudice we will not reverse the present conviction for the failure to afford defendant a preliminary hearing.

Defendant next urges that the charge against him should have been dismissed due to the alleged lack of compliance with the provisions of the Jury Commissioners Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 78, pars. 24--35,) in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him. This lack of compliance, he reasons, serves to vitiate constitutional guarantees of a fair and impartial jury.

The parties are agreed that the provisions of the Jury Commissioners Act have been held to be directory--not mandatory, so far as they relate to the selection of grand jurors (People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423, 436, 192 N.E. 331), and the concluding section of the act itself provides that no objection shall be allowed because of any failure to comply with the act or rules promulgated pursuant thereto, 'unless the party urging the same shall show to the court that actual and substantial injustice has resulted or will result to him, because of the error or defect charged.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 78, par. 35.) In People v. Mack, 367 Ill. 481, 488, 11 N.E.2d 965, 969, however, this court held that: 'The rule that mere irregularities in the selection of a jury will not constitute reversible error is applicable only where there has been an attempt to follow the law and there has been some irregularity in doing so.', and that: 'When the substantial parts of provisions for the selection of jurors are violated such violations are those of substance and not merely of form amounting only to irregularities.' It is the contention of ...