People v. Petty
Citation | 665 N.W.2d 443,469 Mich. 108 |
Decision Date | 17 July 2003 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 121564, Calendar No. 3. |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Gregory PETTY, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael E. Duggan, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Joseph A. Puleo, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Valeroe R. Newman), Penobscot Bldg., Detroit, MI, for the defendant-appellee.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Because defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, the trial judge held a dispositional hearing, as required by M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n), which was combined with defendant's sentencing hearing. The judge sentenced defendant as an adult to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for the felony-murder conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial judge failed to explicitly consider each factor articulated in M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n), as indicated in People v. Thenghkam, 240 Mich.App. 29, 610 N.W.2d 571 (2000) ( ). Defendant also argues that he was denied the right to allocute before the imposition of his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, but remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence and for resentencing. In response to the prosecutor's appeal, we reject the approach utilized by Thenghkam, vacate relevant portions of the Court of Appeals decision, and remand to the trial court for resentencing in accord with this opinion.
At the age of fifteen, defendant Gregory Petty encouraged his twelve-year-old companion to commit armed robbery. In the course of the robbery, the twelve-year-old child shot and killed the victim, Calvin Whitlow. In a statement to the police, the younger companion indicated that defendant gave him the gun. When asked why he shot the victim, the twelve-year-old stated, "Greg threatened to kill me if I didn't."1
As permitted by M.C.L. § 712A.2d, defendant's case was designated for trial in the family division as an adult criminal proceeding. The jury found defendant guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm.
Following a combined dispositional and sentencing hearing,2 the court imposed an adult sentence, one of three options available to the court under M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n). Defendant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the felony-murder conviction, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(b), and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction, M.C.L. § 750.227b.
Before imposing the sentence, the trial judge articulated his rationale in the following statement:
On appeal, defendant alleged several errors, including a violation of M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n), which mandates consideration of the enumerated criteria, and a violation of his right to allocute before sentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for resentencing in light of the court's failure to specifically articulate factual findings regarding each criterion listed in §§ 18(1)(n)(i)-(vi) and its failure to provide defendant with an opportunity to allocute.3 We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. 467 Mich. 896, 654 N.W.2d 328 (2002).
Because we must clarify the proper interpretation of M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n), this issue of law is subject to review de novo. In re MCI, 460 Mich. 396, 413, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999).
Further, we review de novo the scope and applicability of the common-law right to allocute, also a question of law. People v. Petit, 466 Mich. 624, 627, 648 N.W.2d 193 (2002).
Following a judgment of conviction in a designated case, M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n) provides a judge with the option of imposing either a juvenile disposition, an adult sentence, or a blended sentence, i.e., a delayed sentence pending defendant's performance under the terms provided by a juvenile disposition. To understand the appropriate method of inquiry a judge is required to undertake, we must examine the statute, M.C.L. § 712A.18(1)(n), to determine the Legislature's intent.
The first step in discerning legislative intent requires review of the statutory text adopted by the Legislature. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to have intended the meaning expressed. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). Should reasonable minds differ with respect to a statute's meaning, judicial construction is appropriate. Sam v. Balardo, 411 Mich. 405, 418-419 n. 9, 308 N.W.2d 142 (1981).
MCL 712A.18 provides in part:
(1) [I]f the court finds that a juvenile is within this chapter [i.e., subject to the juvenile code], the court may enter any of the following orders of disposition that are appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view of the facts proven and ascertained:
* * *
(n) If the court entered a judgment of conviction under section 2d4 of this chapter, enter any disposition under this section or, if the court determines that the best interests of the public would be served, impose any sentence upon the juvenile that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense for which the juvenile was convicted. If the juvenile is convicted of a violation or conspiracy to commit a violation of ... M.C.L. § 333.7403,5 the court may impose the alternative sentence permitted under that section if the court determines that the best interests of the public would be served. The court may delay imposing a sentence of imprisonment under this subdivision for a period not longer than the period during which the court has jurisdiction over the juvenile under this chapter by entering an order of disposition delaying imposition of sentence and placing the juvenile on probation upon the terms and conditions it considers appropriate, including any disposition under this section. If the court delays imposing sentence under this section, section 18i of this chapter applies. If the court imposes sentence, it shall enter a judgment of sentence. If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, the juvenile shall receive credit against the sentence for time served before sentencing....
The discretionary authority to choose among three alternatives is plainly stated in this portion of the statute; the court may ...
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