People v. Peyton

• Decision Date: 28 July 2022
• Docket Number: B314992
• Citation: 81 Cal.App.5th 784,297 Cal.Rptr.3d 469
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Franklin PEYTON et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

81 Cal.App.5th 784

297 Cal.Rptr.3d 469

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Franklin PEYTON et al., Defendants and Appellants.

B314992

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed July 28, 2022

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing August 16, 2022

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Franklin Peyton.

Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Randee Grassini.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Viet H. Nguyen, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HOFFSTADT, J.

Franklin Peyton (Peyton) and Randee Grassini (Grassini) (collectively, petitioners) have been civilly committed under our State's Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act) ( Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600 et seq. ).¹ A person committed under the Act may be unconditionally discharged (if they no longer meet the definition of a "sexually violent predator" (SVP)) (§ 6604.9, subd. (d)), or conditionally released into the community under supervision of the Director of State Hospitals (the Director) (if they still meet the definition of a "sexually violent predator," but the community can be "adequately protect[ed]" because they are being supervised and treated) (ibid. ; § 6608, subd. (g)). If the Director's annual psychological evaluation of an SVP indicates that they no longer meet the SVP definition, the SVP may directly petition for unconditional discharge. (§ 6604.9, subds. (d) & (f).) But what if there is no such finding by the Director's evaluating psychologist? May the SVP still directly petition for unconditional discharge, or must the SVP instead follow the usual, two-step process for obtaining unconditional discharge—that is, by seeking conditional release for a year and then petitioning for unconditional discharge (§ 6608, subd. (m))? Our colleagues in People v. Smith (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 332, 336, 344, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 ( Smith 2022 ) held that the Act does not authorize an SVP to directly petition for unconditional discharge without a favorable evaluation from the Director, and that this construction of the Act did not deny an SVP due process. We agree with Smith ’s statutory and constitutional holdings, and publish to add further arguments supporting this conclusion as well as to respond to additional points raised by the petitioners in this case. We accordingly affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Underlying Criminal Conduct

A. Peyton

Peyton was born in May 1947.

In 1986, he pled guilty in a California court to 11 counts of lewd and lascivious acts. ( Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) ). These counts grew out of Peyton's sexual molestation of children, in 1983 and 1984, who were between the ages of 5 and 11 and who had been entrusted to the care of Peyton's then-wife, who often babysat for friends and neighbors. Peyton was sentenced to prison for 26 years.

Also in 1986, Peyton was convicted of three counts of sexual assault on a child in a Colorado court. These counts grew out of Peyton's sexual molestation of three children who were 7 and 8 years old. He was sentenced to prison for 16 years, to be served concurrently with his California sentence.

Peyton completed his criminal sentence and was transferred to a California mental health facility in September 2005.

B. Grassini

Grassini was born in December 1954.

In 1976, Grassini was convicted in a Nevada court of gross lewdness and anal intercourse with a 9-year-old child. He was sentenced to six years in prison.

In 1987, Grassini pled no contest in a California court to 12 counts of lewd and lascivious acts. The counts grew out of Grassini's conduct with three children between the ages of 4 and 12. He was sentenced to 26 years in state prison.

Grassini completed his criminal sentence and was transferred to a California mental health facility in 2001.

II. SVP Commitment Proceedings

A. Peyton

In June 2009, the People filed a petition to commit Peyton as an SVP under the Act.

In August 2015, Peyton admitted the petition's allegations over his counsel's objection, and, on the basis of that admission, was found to be an SVP and committed to the Director's custody.

Peyton has thereafter refused all treatment.

The Director conducted a psychological evaluation of Peyton every year between 2016 and 2020, and each of those evaluations concluded that Peyton was not suitable for unconditional discharge or conditional release. In light of these conclusions, the trial court continued Peyton's commitment as an SVP every year.

B. Grassini

In 1999, the People filed a petition to commit Grassini as an SVP under the Act. In 2001, a jury found the petition true, and Grassini was committed to the care of the Department of State Hospitals for a two-year commitment.

In March 2007, the People filed a petition to recommit Grassini under the Act. The matter proceeded to a three-day bench trial in January 2015. The trial court ruled that Grassini still qualified as an SVP, and recommitted him to the Director's custody.

The Director conducted a psychological evaluation of Grassini every year between 2016 and 2020, and each of those evaluations concluded that Grassini was not suitable for unconditional discharge or conditional release. In light of these conclusions, the trial court continued Grassini's commitment as an SVP every year.

C. Marriage

In May 2014, while living in the same mental health facility, Peyton and Grassini married.

III. Petitioners’ Motion for Unconditional Discharge

In March 2021, petitioners filed a joint petition directly seeking unconditional discharge. To their petition, they attached four psychological evaluations—two opining that Peyton no longer met the SVP definition and two opining that Grassini no longer did.² Petitioners thereafter filed a supplemental petition arguing that denying them the right to directly petition for unconditional discharge violated due process.

While this petition was pending, the Director conducted its annual psychological evaluation of Peyton for 2021, which concluded that he was not suitable for unconditional discharge or conditional release.

The People opposed the joint petition.

At a July 2021 hearing, the trial court denied the joint petition insofar as it requested unconditional discharge. The court reasoned that "[a] petition for an unconditional discharge may only be made when the [D]irector ... authorizes such a petition ... or at least one year after the SVP committee has been on a conditional release." Because no authorization from the Director had been shown, the court denied the petition for unconditional discharge but, with petitioners’ consent, construed it as a petition for conditional release.³

IV. Appeal

Petitioners filed this timely appeal of the denial of their joint petition for unconditional discharge.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners argue that the trial court erred in denying their joint petition for unconditional discharge. In examining these arguments, we must interpret the Act, interpret the due process clause, and apply our legal determinations to undisputed facts; our review is accordingly de novo. ( Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 505 P.3d 212 [statutory interpretation]; California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49 [constitutional interpretation]; Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 109, 422 P.3d 552 [application of law to undisputed facts].) Before addressing the merits of petitioners’ arguments, we start by providing an overview of the Act.

I. The Act

The purpose of the Act is twofold. The "primary" objective of the Act is to "protect the public from ‘a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators ...’ " who are "mentally ill." ( People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1192, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116 ( Hurtado ), quoting Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1 ; People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 214, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d 1061 ( Otto ); State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 344, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013 ( State Dept. ). A secondary objective is "to provide mental health treatment for their [mental] disorders." ( State Dept. , at p. 344, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013.)

A. Initial commitment as an SVP

1. Screening for possible SVP status

When an inmate is nearing the end of his or her prison term and may qualify as an SVP, the State Department of State Hospitals (the Department) must "evaluate" that inmate "in accordance with a standardized assessment protocol ... to determine whether the [inmate] is [an SVP]" as defined by the Act; if the Department so determines, it must ask the People to file a petition to have the inmate formally declared an SVP under the Act. ( §§ 6601, subds. (a), (c) & (h)(1).)

2. Formal proceedings to determine SVP status

If the People elect to file a petition to have the inmate declared an SVP, the trial court conducts two proceedings.

First, the court holds a "probable cause hearing," the goal of which (and as its name suggests) is to "determine whether there is probable cause to believe that" the inmate may be an SVP. ( § 6602, subd. (a).) Second, if the court determines that probable cause so exists, the court conducts a trial on the question of whether the inmate is an SVP. At this trial, the People bear the burden of proving SVP status to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( §§ 6603, subds. (a) & (b), 6604.)

For purposes of both proceedings, an inmate qualifies as an SVP if (1) the inmate "has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims," (2) the inmate "has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes [him or her] a danger to the health and safety of others," and (3) the mental disorder makes it "likely" that the inmate "will engage in future predatory...