People v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 23 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 109413.,109413. |
| Citation | 950 N.E.2d 1126,242 Ill.2d 189,351 Ill.Dec. 298 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,v.Ezekiel PHILLIPS, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
242 Ill.2d 189
950 N.E.2d 1126
351 Ill.Dec. 298
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Ezekiel PHILLIPS, Appellee.
No. 109413.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
March 24, 2011.Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Rehearing May 23, 2011.
[950 N.E.2d 1128]
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Douglas P. Harvath and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Stephen L. Gentry, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
[351 Ill.Dec. 300] This case is before us for the second time. At issue in this appeal is whether defendant waived his right to receive admonishment under section 113–4(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113–4(e) (West 2000)) based upon a signed bail bond slip, which warned him on the back of the slip of the possibility that he could be tried or sentenced in absentia if he did not appear in court as required. The appellate court vacated defendant's sentence, and remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, after concluding that the requirements of section 113–4(e) had not been met. 394 Ill.App.3d 808, 334 Ill.Dec. 513, 917 N.E.2d 110. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Defendant, Ezekiel Phillips, was charged by indictment with attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4, 9–1 (West 2000)), armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A–2(a) (West 2000)), and three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12–4(a), (b)(1), (b)(8) (West 2000)). Defendant was arraigned on July 31, 2000, and subsequently posted bond on May 3, 2001. The following notice appears, in pertinent part, on the back of the bail bond slip that was executed on the day of defendant's release on bond:
“FELONY DEFENDANTS: You are hereby advised that if at any time prior to the final disposition of the charge you escape from custody, or are released on bond and you fail to appear in court when required by the court, your failure to appear would constitute a waiver of your rights to confront the witnesses
[351 Ill.Dec. 301 , 950 N.E.2d 1129]
against you and trial could proceed in your absence. If found guilty you could be sentenced in your absence.”
On the front side of the slip, defendant's signature appears under the following language:
“STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT. I understand and accept the terms and conditions set forth below and on the reverse side of this bail bond. Further, I hereby certify that I understand the consequences of failure to appear for trial as required.”
Also on the front side of the bond slip, at the bottom, is the signature of a deputy clerk of the court under the representation that “[t]he above conditions and certification of defendant have been taken, entered into and acknowledged before me. Defendant is hereby released from custody.”
Defendant was present in court for his arraignment and on other dates prior to when he posted bond. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court provided him with section 113–4(e) admonishment at the time of his arraignment, or on any court date thereafter. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, [242 Ill.2d 193] defendant was found not guilty of attempted first degree murder, but guilty of armed violence and aggravated battery. Defendant was present during the entire course of his jury trial, but he was not present when the verdicts were returned. Following the denial of a posttrial motion for a new trial, which was presented by defense counsel in defendant's absence, defendant was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the armed violence conviction and five years' imprisonment for each of the three aggravated battery convictions, to merge and run concurrently.
The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing because the record did not reflect that defendant had been admonished by the trial judge as required by section 113–4(e) of the Code. People v. Phillips, 371 Ill.App.3d 948, 309 Ill.Dec. 582, 864 N.E.2d 823 (2007). This court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal on the issue of whether a trial court may defer ruling on a motion in limine to exclude a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment. We consolidated defendant's appeal with another case raising the same issue. See People v. Patrick, 233 Ill.2d 62, 330 Ill.Dec. 149, 908 N.E.2d 1 (2009). While that matter was pending before this court, the State located the original bail bond slip executed on May 3, 2001. The State was granted leave by this court to supplement the record with the bond slip and the document formed the basis for the State's request for cross-relief. This court affirmed defendant's convictions. We held that by not testifying defendant failed to preserve his right of appellate review of the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to rule, until after he testified, on his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Patrick, 233 Ill.2d at 79, 330 Ill.Dec. 149, 908 N.E.2d 1. We remanded the cause to the appellate court for the sole purpose of reexamining the sentencing issue in light of the bail bond slip. Patrick, 233 Ill.2d at 80, 330 Ill.Dec. 149, 908 N.E.2d 1.
[242 Ill.2d 194] The appellate court again vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court concluded that, notwithstanding the notice set forth in defendant's bail bond slip, the requirements of section 113–4(e) of the Code had not been met because the trial court had not admonished defendant, orally or otherwise, that his failure to appear in court as required could result in him being sentenced in his absence.
[351 Ill.Dec. 302 , 950 N.E.2d 1130]
394 Ill.App.3d at 812, 334 Ill.Dec. 513, 917 N.E.2d 110. We subsequently granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff.Feb.26, 2010).
The State contends that defendant's signature on the bail bond slip, which includes language on the back of the form that is consistent with that found in section 113–4(e) of the Code, should operate as a valid waiver of his right to receive the admonishment again in court because the prophylactic purpose of this section of the Code was achieved by the notice contained on the slip. The State argues that only substantial compliance with section 113–4(e) is required to legitimize a trial in absentia, which occurred in this case due to the language contained on the back of the bond slip. The State further contends that the act of defendant signing the bond slip was a more formal procedure than simply hearing the same admonishment recited by the court at the time of his arraignment and, moreover, it was signed and certified by a deputy clerk of the court. Because the question of whether defendant waived his right to receive section 113–4(e) admonishment under the circumstances of this case presents strictly a question of law, our review proceeds de novo. See In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309, 321, 261 Ill.Dec. 281, 763 N.E.2d 251 (2001).
As a constitutional matter, a defendant has a right to be present at all stages of his trial, including sentencing. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105–06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). A [242 Ill.2d 195] defendant's voluntary absence from trial may be construed as an effective waiver of his constitutional right to be present and he may be tried and sentenced in absentia, even if he is not specifically warned that this is a possible consequence of his absence. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18–20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973). As recognized by the appellate court, however, a defendant in Illinois has a statutory right under section 113–4(e) of the Code to be admonished as to the possible consequences of failing to appear in court when required. 394 Ill.App.3d at 810, 334 Ill.Dec. 513, 917 N.E.2d 110.
Section 113–4(e) is contained in article 113 of the Code, which governs arraignment. Arraignment has been defined by our legislature as “the formal act of calling the defendant into open court, informing him of the offense with which he is charged, and asking him whether he is guilty or not guilty.” 725 ILCS 5/102–4 (West 2000). Consistent with this definition, section 113–1 of the Code provides, in relevant part, that “[b]efore any person is tried for the commission of an offense he shall be called into open court, informed of the charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto.” 725 ILCS 5/113–1 (West 2000). Arraignment presents an almost certain opportunity to have the defendant present before the court. People v. Garner, 147 Ill.2d 467, 481, 168 Ill.Dec. 833, 590 N.E.2d 470 (1992).
Section 4 of article 113 of the Code governs when a defendant is called upon to plead at arraignment. This section provides, in relevant part, that “the defendant shall be furnished with a copy of the charge and shall plead guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty” and “[i]f the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the court shall have fully explained to the defendant the consequences of such plea.” 725 ILCS 5/113–4(a), (c) (West 2000). Subsection (b) addresses the consequences of when a defendant stands mute when called upon to plead while subsection (d) specifies the requirements for when a defendant pleads guilty but [242 Ill.2d 196] mentally ill. 725 ILCS 5/113–4(b), (d) (West 2000). Finally, subsection
[351 Ill.Dec. 303 , 950 N.E.2d 1131]
(e), at issue here, provides, in relevant part:
“If a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that...
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