People v. Piasecki

• Decision Date: 07 April 1952
• Docket Number: No. 180,180
• Citation: 52 N.W.2d 626,333 Mich. 122
• Parties: PEOPLE v. PEOPLE v. PLASECKI. Motion
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 626

52 N.W.2d 626

333 Mich. 122

PEOPLE v. PEOPLE v. PLASECKI.

Motion No. 180.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 7, 1952.

Frank G. Millard, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Gerald K. O'Brien, Pros. Atty. Wayne County, Ralph Garber, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Garfield A. Nichols, Asst. Pros. Atty., Chief, Appellate Division, George W. Miller, Asst. Pros. Atty., Appellate Division, all of Detroit, for the People.

Henrietta E. Rosenthal, Detroit, for Hon. Donald E. Holbrook.

O'Leary & O'Leary, Detroit, for defendant Piasecki.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

Defendant was prosecuted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit under an information charging a violation of C.L.1948, § 750.520, Stat.Ann. § 28.788. On June 28, 1950, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of rape and the trial court set July 10 following for imposition of sentence. Counsel for the defendant then filed a petition under the provisions of P.A.1939, No. 165, as amended by P.A.1947, No. 242, and P.A.1950 Ex.Sess. No. 25 ¹, which measure makes provision for the commitment of criminal sexual psychopathic persons and the procedure to be observed in connection therewith. The last amendatory act cited became effective on June 9, 1950. In accordance with the terms of the statute the court appointed three qualified psychiatrists to examine defendant and to make the required statutory report as to their findings and conclusions. Following the filing of such report a hearing was had before the court without a jury. It was determined that defendant was a criminal sexual psychopathic person, and he was committed to the care of the State Hospital Commission in accordance with the statute.

Following the action above referred to, the prosecuting attorney of Wayne county filed a motion in the cause to set aside the order of commitment, together with the determination on which it was based, and for sentence of defendant on the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury in the criminal prosecution. Said motion was based on the claim that P.A.1950 Ex.Sess. No. 25, by which sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the criminal sexual psychopathic act were amended, was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to impose the mandatory duty upon the court, after conviction in a criminal case, to proceed under the statute and to commit the defendant to the care of the State Hospital Commission if found, on hearing, to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person. The provisions questioned were claimed to 'constitute an encroachment upon the judicial powers of the court' by the legislative department of the State government, in violation of Art. IV, §§ 1 & 2, of the State Constitution relating to the division of governmental powers. The trial judge came to the conclusion, after listening to the argument of counsel, that the objection to the validity of the statute was not well founded and denied the motion. On behalf of the people an appeal had been taken, on leave granted, to this Court. It is urged that the order of the trial court was erroneous for the reason alleged in the motion and that it should in consequence be set aside.

While the arguments advanced in the instant case are directed primarily to the validity of the amendatory act of 1950, it appears that other provisions of the statute are also open to objection if appellant's claim is well founded. As originally adopted in 1939 the statute defined the expression 'criminal sexual psychopathic person', vested jurisdiction over such persons in the circuit courts of the State, the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit and the Superior Court of the City of Grand Rapids, and provided for the filing of a statement by the prosecuting attorney of the county or the attorney general of the State in a criminal proceeding pending in any of said courts setting forth facts tending to indicate that the defendant in the case was a criminal sexual psychopathic person within the meaning of the term as defined by the legislature. On the filing of such statement it was made the duty of the trial court to appoint two qualified psychiatrists to make a personal examination of the defendant and to file a written report of the results thereof together with their conclusions and recommendations.

In the event that such reports indicated defendant to be subject to the provisions of the statute, the court was required to conduct a hearing, before a jury if demanded, to determine whether defendant was in fact suffering from the mental disorder referred to in the statute. If such issue was determined affirmatively cimmitment of such person to the State Hospital Commission to be confined in an appropriate State institution under the jurisdiction of the commission, or of the department of corrections, until full and permanent recovery from such psychopathy, was mandatory. Further provisions of the statute related to the matter of paroles in certain cases and to proceedings for the discharge of one claimed to have recovered from the condition leading to his commitment. The act also prohibited any further proceeding in the criminal prosecution following a finding that the defendant was a criminal sexual psychopathic person.

The amendments to the statute made by P.A.1947, No. 242, expressly authorized the filing of a petition by the prosecuting attorney of the county or the attorney general in a criminal proceeding, after conviction and before sentence or if the defendant had been placed on probation, and the right to present the question as to the defendant's alleged mental disorder was extended to defendant or to one acting in his behalf. However, the court, while in terms required to act on the petition of the prosecutor or the attorney general, was granted discretion with reference to proceeding under a petition filed on behalf of the accused. See People v. Hilles, 327 Mich. 124, 126, 41 N.W.2d 343. Other modifications made by the act of 1947 are not material in the instant controversy. Under the amendment of 1950, directly challenged in the instant case, the court is required to proceed with the appointment of three psychiatrists on the filing of a sufficient statement on behalf of the defendant as well as on such filing by the prosecutor or the attorney general. If the proceeding results in a finding of the existence of the mental disorder referred to in the statute, commitment is required to be made to the State Hospital Commission.

By the adoption of the act here in question the legislature sought to provide for the protection of the public against persons who, while not insane or feeble-minded, present a serious problem. The method prescribed for the care and treatment of such persons rests on the theory that because of their mental condition they should not be classed as criminals in the ordinary sense of the term, nor subjected to punishment as such for acts resulting from the psychopathic condition or mental disorder. In keeping with such conclusion a method of inquiry, wholly separate and apart from proceedings under the criminal law of the State, was prescribed for determining the situation with reference to the existence of the psychopathy in question on the part of one accused of a criminal act, with further provision for commitment and treatment in a suitable institution of the State until the mental disorder is cured, or alleviated to such an extent as to permit the release of the one so detained without endangering the public safety or welfare. Obviously we are dealing with an exercise of the police power of the State, and the question presented is in substance whether, in exercising such power in the manner indicated, the legislature has violated any constitutional limitation or mandate by an unwarranted interference with the exercise by the courts of inherent judicial functions.

The exercise of the inherent police power of the State is vested in the legislative department. That legislation of the character in question here is within the scope of such power is not open to question. The measure of control exercised in connection with the prevention and detection of crime and prosecution and punishment of criminals is set forth in the statutes of the State pertaining thereto, particularly the penal code ² and the code of criminal procedure ³. The powers of the courts with reference to such matters are derived from the statutes. The prosecution of the defendant in the instant case on the criminal charge against him was based thereon. A like situation obtains with reference to the protection of the public against the acts of persons suffering from mental disorders.

Having asserted the invalidity of the statute, or certain provisions thereof, the burden rests on the appellant of pointing out the limitations on the power of the legislature that have been exceeded. In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 335, 289 N.W. 493. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the action of the legislature. In Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 505, 286 N.W. 805, 807, it was said: 'A statute will be presumed to be constitutional by the courts unless the contrary clearly appears; and in case of doubt every possible presumption not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of legislation. Scott v. Smart's Executors, 1 Mich. 295; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Thompson v. Auditor General, 261 Mich. 624, 247 N.W. 360. Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution, that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. A statute is presumed to be constitutional and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so, or so beyond a reasonable doubt. Attorney General, ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524, 145 N.W. 98; ...