People v. Picard

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COOKE
• Citation: People v. Picard, 284 Ill. 588, 120 N.E. 546 (Ill. 1918)
• Decision Date: 21 October 1918
• Docket Number: No. 12127.,12127.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. PICARD.

284 Ill. 588

120 N.E. 546

PEOPLE

v.PICARD.

No. 12127.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 21, 1918.

Error to Circuit Court, Champaign County; Franklin H. Boggs, Judge.

Oscar J. Picard was convicted of burglary and larceny. Motions to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and he brings error. Reversed.Enochs & Kerker, of Champaign, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., and Louis A. Busch, State's Atty., and Edward C. Fitch, both of Chicago, for the People.

COOKE, J.

Oscar J. Picard, plaintiff in error, was convicted in the circuit court of Champaign county of the crime of burglary and larceny and sentenced to the penitentiary. Motions to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment were overruled. By this writ of error the sufficiency of the indictment only is questioned.

The record contains no bill of exceptions. The plaintiff in error was charged with having broken into a railroad freight car and having stolen a quantity of meat. The sole contention is that the indictment was faulty because it did not allege the ownership of the car or of the property stolen.

The first count of the indictment charged that the plaintiff in error ‘unlawfully, feloniously, burglariously, willfully, maliciously and forcibly did break and enter a certain railroad freight car then and there being used by and in the possession of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, a corporation, said railroad freight car then and there being a Cudahy Milwaukee Refrigerator Line car numbered two thousand thirty-five (2035), which said railroad freight car was there situate, with intent the personal goods, chattels, money and property in the said railroad freight car and in the possession of the Illinois Central Rairoad Company, a corporation, in the said railroad freight car then and there being, then and there feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry away, and [describing certain goods and chattels] all of said goods, chattels and property then and there being in the possession of the said Illinois Central Railroad Company, a corporation, and in the said certain railroad freight car then and there being found, then and there feloniously and burglariously did steal, take and carry away,’ etc. The second count is substantially the same as the first. The third count is the same as the first, except that it alleges that the doors of the freight car were open and that the car was known as a Cudahy Milwaukee Refrigerator Line freight car.

[3][4][6] An indictment or information must allege all the facts necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged, and if it does not set forth such facts with sufficient certainty it will not support a conviction. People v. Stoyan, 280 Ill. 300, 117 N. E. 464. Except in so far as the rule may be changed by statute, an indictment for burglary, whether it comes under the common law or under a statute, must allege the ownership of the building broken or entered, if it is known, or it will be fatally defective. 6 Cyc. 209. This indictment contains no allegation of the ownership of the freight car alleged to have been entered or broken into. The allegation that the car was in the possession of and being used by the Illinois Central Railroad Company is not a sufficient allegation of ownership. Had the indictment expressly alleged that the car was owned by the Illinois Central Railroad Company, proof that it was in the possession of that corporation would have been sufficient prima facie to sustain the allegation of ownership. In an indictment for burglary the ownership of the building entered may be laid in the occupant, whose possession is rightful as against the burglar. Smith v. People, 115 Ill. 17, 3 N. E. 733. It is not sufficient, however, in the indictment to merely plead the evidence of ownership, but the ownership must be specifically alleged.

The people contend that the indictment sufficiently alleges the ownership of the car in the Cudahy Milwaukee Refrigerator Line. Assuming that the allegation that the car ‘then and there being a Cudahy Milwaukee Refrigerator Line car’ designates the ownership in that line, the indictment is still insufficient in failing to correctly describe the character of the refrigerator line. In Wallace v. People, 63 Ill. 451, the indictment charged that the property alleged to have been stolen was the property of the American Merchants' Union Express Company, and it was there held that the ownership of the property was defectively stated because there was no averment that the express company was a corporation. The recognized and well-settled rule is that property vested in a body of persons ought not to be laid, in an indictment charging a party with the larceny of the same, as the property of that body unless such body is incorporated but should be described as belonging to the individuals composing the company. People v. Brander, 244 Ill. 26, 91 N. E. 59,135 Am. St. Rep. 301,18 Ann. Cas. 341;People v....