People v. Pickett
| Decision Date | 19 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40379,40379 |
| Citation | 39 Ill.2d 88,233 N.E.2d 560 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. John PICKETT, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Geter & Geter, Chicago (Howard D. Geter, Sr. and Howard D. Geter, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Joel M. Flaum, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.
The defendant, John Pickett, was tried in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County for gambling on an indictment which charged him with possession of policy tickets and other similar devices in violation of section 28--1(a)(8) of the Criminal Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 28--1.) He was found guilty and sentenced to 5 years probation, the first 30 days to be served in the county jail. Because of the constitutional issues raised defendant appealed directly to this court.
The defendant contends that there was an illegal search made of his person and effects, that the trial court made an unconstitutional interpretation of section 108--1(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 108--1(d)); that the offense for which he was convicted was a misdemeanor; and that, evidence having been previously taken against him before a magistrate in the municipal division, his trial in the circuit court of Cook County constituted double jeopardy.
On March 18, 1966, the defendant presented a plea in bar and a petition to suppress evidence before the judge who heard the case. The plea in bar was overruled. On the motion to suppress the defendant testified that on October 29, 1965, he was arrested by Officers Waller and Watson, that the arrest took place at Central Park and Jackson Boulevard in Chicago about 9:30 P.M. after the officers had been following him in his automobile several blocks. He stated that the officers pulled him over to the curb and said, 'Hello, John,' to which he said, 'Hi,' and that Officer Waller asked him if he had anything on him and he didn't reply. He was not searched but they searched the car and found certain 'evidence' stuck in between the seats of the car; thereupon they put him in the squad car and searched his person and recovered some more 'evidence.' He was then arrested and taken to the station. He said he was traveling on Jackson Boulevard at approximately 30 miles per hour at the time of the arrest; that the officers didn't ask him to nor did he produce a driver's license. They issued a ticket to him for no driver's license and speeding. He stated that the officers found the policy slips stuck down in the seat of the car and that the officers couldn't see them.
Officer Watson testified that he was working with Officer Waller in an unmarked squad car when they stopped the defendant after they had clocked him at 41 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour speed zone; that he asked the defendant for his driver's license but he didn't produce one. Watson stated that he approached the passenger side and flashed a light into the vehicle and saw a package of policy writings or tickets on the front seat between him and the passenger side. He then asked the defendant if he had any more policy tickets or money and the defendant said he did. He also testified that both he and Officer Waller knew the defendant, and that Waller had arrested him before, that the stop was made for an ordinary traffic violation; that they took him back to the squad car after seeing the contraband on the front seat; and that the personal search of the defendant was made at the squad car after he, Watson, had recovered the contraband from the car.
Officer Waller testified that they chased defendant's automobile on Jackson Boulevard and after signalling him to stop he observed the defendant use his hand as if pushing something back and that he told his partner to watch him. The defendant had stepped out of the automobile when Waller asked him for his driver's license, and defendant said he had none. At that time Officer Watson came over with a large quantity of policy tickets. Upon questioning, the defendant stated that the money in his possession was policy money and the defendant was taken to the station. Officer Waller, however, testified that after the defendant got out of the automobile, he asked for his driver's license and since he didn't have any, he searched him and arrested him, but the search was for his own protection and revealed a bulge in defendant's pocket which felt like papers and money; that he thereupon removed it. He said the search of the automobile was conducted by his partner, Watson. He testified that prior to this action he knew the defendant from previous gambling arrests. The court found the arrest was valid and held the search valid under section 108--1(d) and denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced as heretofore mentioned.
Section 108--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 108--1) reads in part as follows: 'When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of: (a) Protecting the officer from attack; or * * * (d) Discovering any instruments, articles, or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense.'
Defendant contends that this section must be interpreted as applying only to instruments, articles or evidence which are connected with the purpose for which the person is arrested and states that the trial judge interpreted the section to permit a general search for any instruments, articles, or things which may be used in the commission of an offense and which may constitute the evidence of another offense for which the defendant was not arrested. He then argues that such an interpretation means that whenever an arrest is made, even for a traffic violation, that officer has the right under this section to search for evidence of any crime whether or not it is related to the offense for which he is arrested and even though the search is not made for the protection of the police officer, and that as so interpreted the section is unconstitutional.
We said in People v. Brown, 38 Ill.2d 353, at pages 356--357, 231 N.E.2d 577, at pages 579--580:
'In the Lewis case (People v. Lewis, 34 Ill.2d 211, 215 N.E.2d 283) a majority of the court felt compelled by the language of the United States Supreme Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, to invalidate a search of an automobile without a warrant after a defendant has been taken into custody and the car impounded.
'Subsequent to Lewis, however, the United States Supreme Court clarified the Preston rule in Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730. In Cooper the court upheld the search of the glove compartment of an automobile which had been impounded by the police despite the fact that the search occurred one week after the defendant had been arrested for a narcotics violation. The search was upheld, according to the court, because it 'was closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being retained.' While the facts in Cooper are distinguishable from those in Lewis and in the present case, we believe that decision is a clear indication that the mere fact that the defendant is in custody or his automobile impounded does not in itself make a search unreasonable. We have reached the same conclusion in People v. Jones (38 Ill.2d 427, 428) 231 N.E.2d 580, decided this term.
'We therefore feel free to consider the reasonableness of this search even though it occurred after defendant was arrested and taken into custody. As stated in Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 733--734: Accordingly we have examined all the facts concerning the arrest and the search in an effort to determine the...
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People v. Bailey, 2-05-1260.
...a person incident to a lawful arrest * * * does not * * * depend solely upon the provisions of our statute"); People v. Pickett, 39 Ill.2d 88, 96, 233 N.E.2d 560 (1968) ("we do not believe the search was unreasonable and conclude that the trial court did not interpret section 108-1(d) as pe......
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