People v. Pierce

• Citation: 226 Ill.2d 470,877 N.E.2d 408
• Decision Date: 18 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 103272.,103272.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Antonio D. PIERCE, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

877 N.E.2d 408

226 Ill.2d 470

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Antonio D. PIERCE, Appellant.

No. 103272.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 18, 2007.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, John M. McCarthy, Rosalee Dodson, Jennifer S. Walsh, Assistant Defenders, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Jon Barnard, State's Attorney, Quincy (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Retha Stotts, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

In this case, we must determine whether the modified jury instructions given at defendant's trial accurately stated the law when they defined the offense of theft from the person to include a taking from the "presence" of the person. To make this determination, we must decide whether one commits the offense of theft "from the person" in Illinois when he steals property that is not in physical contact with the person. The appellate court held that one commits the offense of theft from the person even if the property is not in physical contact with the person from whom it is taken. 367 Ill.App.3d 203, 304 Ill.Dec. 969, 854 N.E.2d 311. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Background

On September 13, 2004, Robert Gallaher was sitting at the bar in the Silver Moon Tavern in Quincy, Illinois, drinking beer. Gallaher had placed $50 on the bar in front of him and, after he paid for his drinks, several bills remained on the bar. Gallaher testified he had his hand on the money while he sat at the bar.

Defendant entered the Silver Moon and walked up to Gallaher, the only patron in the tavern. Gallaher testified that defendant offered to sell him cigarettes, but he declined. The two then engaged in conversation for several minutes. At one point, Gallaher removed his hand from the money to light a cigarette. Defendant then grabbed the money and ran out of the tavern. The bartender, Linda Sheehan, essentially confirmed Gallaher's testimony. A surveillance tape from the bar also confirmed the events.

At trial, in the circuit court of Adams County, defendant denied taking Gallaher's money. He testified that he had never seen Gallaher or Sheehan before and that he had never been in the Silver Moon Tavern. Defendant claimed to have been in Joliet at the time of the theft.

At the jury instruction conference, the State proffered modified versions of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 13.09 and 13.10 (4th ed.2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The State's proffered modification added the phrase "or presence" to the two instructions. The modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 13.09 read:

"A person commits the offense of theft from the person when he knowingly obtains unauthorized control over the property by taking said property from the person or presence of another and intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property." (Emphasis added.)

The modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 13.10 read:

"To sustain the charge of theft from the person, the state must prove the following propositions: First proposition, that Robert Gallaher was the owner of the property in question, and second proposition, that the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control over the property in question, and third proposition, that the defendant intended to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property in question, and fourth proposition, that the defendant took the property in question from the person or presence of Robert Gallaher." (Emphasis added.)

The court gave the modified instructions to the jury over defendant's objection. Also, the trial court refused defendant's request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft, i.e., theft not from the person. The jury found defendant guilty of theft from the person and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

The appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill. App.3d 203, 304 Ill.Dec. 969, 854 N.E.2d 311. Looking to the plain language of the statute, the court found that "[a] reasonable reading of the statute applies to the situation here. The money was directly in front of the victim, and the money was snatched just after the victim removed his hands from it." 367 Ill.App.3d at 206, 304 Ill.Dec. 969, 854 N.E.2d 311.

The appellate court rejected defendant's argument that, pursuant to People v. Williams, 42 Ill.App.3d 134, 355 N.E.2d 597 (1976), property must be taken from the victim's body or clothing in order to be theft from the person. Instead, the court relied on three cases decided after Williams: People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App.3d 904, 277 Ill.Dec. 354, 795 N.E.2d 1022 (2003), People v. Sims, 245 Ill.App.3d 221, 185 Ill.Dec. 452, 614 N.E.2d 893 (1993), and People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App.3d 394, 110 Ill.Dec. 746, 511 N.E.2d 923 (1987). 367 Ill.App.3d at 207-09, 304 Ill.Dec. 969, 854 N.E.2d 311. Each of these cases held that the property need not be in contact with the victim to constitute theft from the person.

The appellate court concluded that theft from the person includes the taking of property from the person "or presence" of another and, consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury using the modified IPI instructions. We thereafter granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

Analysis

The function of jury instructions is to provide the jury with accurate legal principles to apply to the evidence so it can reach a correct conclusion. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill.2d 1, 8, 282 Ill.Dec. 173, 805 N.E.2d 1190 (2004). In a criminal case, fundamental fairness requires that the trial court fully and properly instruct the jury on the elements of the offense, the burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence. People v. Williams, 181 Ill.2d 297, 318, 229 Ill.Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998).

This case requires us to determine whether the modified jury instructions defining theft from the person to include a taking from the "presence" of another accurately stated the law. Although the giving of jury instructions is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, when the question is whether the jury instructions accurately conveyed to the jury the law applicable to the case, our review is de novo. People v. Parker, 223 Ill.2d 494, 501, 308 Ill.Dec. 371, 861 N.E.2d 936 (2006).

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Pack, 224 Ill.2d 144, 147, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938 (2007). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent, and we give that language its plain and ordinary meaning. Pack, 224 Ill.2d at 147, 308 Ill.Dec. 735, 862 N.E.2d 938. In addition, we must consider the entire statute and interpret relevant provisions together. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill.2d 380, 389, 307 Ill.Dec. 669, 860 N.E.2d 323 (2006). We should not construe words and phrases in isolation. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill.2d 103, 117, 310 Ill.Dec. 416, 866 N.E.2d 227 (2007).

The Criminal Code of 1961, under the heading of "Offenses Directed Against Property," defines theft as follows:

"(a) A person commits theft when he knowingly:

(1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; [and]

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(A) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property[.]

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(b) Sentence.

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(4) Theft of property from the person not exceeding $300 in value, or theft of property exceeding $300 and not exceeding $10,000 in value, is a Class 3 felony." 720 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2004).

Initially, defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving the modified jury instructions, which included the phrase "or presence," because theft requires a taking from the actual person of the victim. According to defendant, because the theft statute does not include the phrase "or presence," it must be construed to exclude takings from a person's presence.

There is a split in Illinois, as well as other jurisdictions, as to whether the phrase "from the person," when used with respect to the offense of theft, includes a taking from the "presence" of that person. One line of cases holds that, with respect to theft or larceny from the person, the property taken must be in contact with the victim. These cases rely on the purpose behind the original larceny from the person statute, Statutes of 8 Elizabeth (8 Eliz. c. 4 § 2 (1565)),¹ which was to prevent pickpocketing and purse snatching. This meant the property had to be connected to or in contact with the victim at the time of the theft. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 42 Ill.App.3d 134, 355 N.E.2d 597 (1st Dist. 1976); Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 413-14, 442 P.2d 465, 465-66 (1968).

Another line of cases holds that, as long as the property is in the person's possession or within the immediate custody and control of the person, a taking is sufficient to constitute theft from the person. These cases reason that, at common law, the phrase "from the person," when used with respect to robbery, included the presence of the person from whom the property was taken. In addition, at common law, theft or larceny was considered a lesser-included offense of robbery. Thus, because the phrase "from the person" in the context of robbery included a taking from the presence of another, the phrase must have had the same meaning in connection with theft. See, e.g., People v. Harrell, 342 Ill.App.3d 904, 277 Ill.Dec. 354, 795 N.E.2d 1022 (2d Dist.2003); People v. Sims, 245 Ill.App.3d 221, 185 Ill.Dec. 452, 614 N.E.2d 893 (3d Dist.1993); People v. Jackson, 158 Ill.App.3d 394, 110 Ill.Dec. 746, 511 N.E.2d 923 (5th Dist.1987); In re D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d 831, 832-33 (Minn.1986); State v. Shepard, 726 A.2d...