People v. Pike

Citation53 N.E.3d 147,403 Ill.Dec. 93
Decision Date27 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1–12–2626.,1–12–2626.
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rashon PIKE, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, Patricia Mysza, and Shawn O'Toole, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Yvette Loizon, and Amy Watroba, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice PUCINSKI

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 We hold that the admission of DNA expert testimony of a 50% probability of inclusion for a random person in the population as a possible contributor to a mixed DNA profile was error because it was irrelevant, as it did not tend to make the issue of defendant's identification more likely than not. However, the admission of this evidence was not plain error because the error was not serious and the evidence was not closely balanced because both victims identified defendant and, as such, defendant's forfeiture of both issues due to his failure to object is effective. The jury in this case was not confused by this evidence, and we believe juries generally are capable of appropriately weighing properly presented DNA evidence.

¶ 2 We also hold in this case that there is no requirement that the court recite all counts against a defendant in admonishment of a waiver of the right to counsel pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)

(Ill.S.Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984)). Rather, Rule 401(a) requires admonishment of the “nature of the charge.” There was no error in the court's second admonishment to defendant in this case where the court stated the nature of the charge and the possible maximum punishment but did not recite every count against defendant.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant, Rashon Pike, was charged by indictment with twelve counts: (1) armed robbery with a firearm; (2) habitual criminal; (3) unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon; (4) another count for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon; (5) possession/use of a firearm by a felon; (6) another count of possession/use of a firearm by a felon; (7) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (8) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (9) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (10) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (11) attempted residential burglary; and (12) aggravated unlawful restraint.

¶ 5 Defendant was arraigned on February 10, 2011, at which time defendant was appointed a public defender.

¶ 6 On June 2, 2011, defendant asked to proceed pro se. The court admonished defendant of the charges pending against him and some of the elements of those crimes. After hearing this admonishment, defendant chose to be represented by counsel.

¶ 7 On September 12, 2011, defendant, who had written a letter to his counsel indicating he wished to represent himself, informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. The court admonished defendant as follows:

“You have the right to represent yourself. You also have the right to an attorney if you couldn't afford one, but I just want to tell you that you're facing the charges of armed robbery, armed habitual criminal, a number of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charges, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, attempt residential burglary and aggravated unlawful restraint. The armed robbery charge carries with it a term in the penitentiary—a possible term in the penitentiary anywhere from 6 years to 30 years. Getting a penitentiary sentence, you'd have to serve a period of two years—excuse me, three years mandatory supervised release, which is like parole, when you get out of the penitentiary.
The armed habitual criminal also is a Class X felony. The range of sentence on that charge goes from 6 to 30 years as well. That charge also carries with it an 85 percent sentence that you'd have to serve that as—if convicted of that charge.”

¶ 8 The assistant State's Attorney interjected:

[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Judge, I don't mean to interrupt, but the armed robbery is specifically charged as armed with a firearm, which it carries an enhancement of 15 years.”

¶ 9 The court then further admonished defendant as follows:

“In addition to the term of sentences you can get an armed robbery, if the jury finds or the trier of facts [sic ] finds that you were armed with a firearm, an additional 15 years has to be added onto at that charge [sic ], so you're looking at possibly 6 years up to 45 years as a sentence that could be imposed.
The aggravated—excuse me, the unlawful use of weapon by felon are Class 2 felonies. All the Class 2 felonies that you're charged with—
Is he Class X by background?
[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: He is, Judge.
THE COURT: If you're convicted of those charges, the range of sentence on that charge goes from 6 years to 30 years also, with that same three years mandatory supervised release period.
The attempt residential burglary is a Class 2 felony, so that range of sentence applies on that charge as well.
The aggravated unlawful restraint, is that a Class 4? [ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes.

THE COURT: That's a Class 4 felony, so the range of sentence on that charge goes from—

[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Judge, I believe it's a [Class] 3. It's a 3.
THE COURT: Okay. The range of sentences on that charge goes from two years to five years, but because you have certain convictions in your background, that time can go all the way up to ten years as a maximum sentence on that sentence alone. Getting a penitentiary sentence there, that carries with it a one year mandatory supervised release period.
That's the range of sentences you could get on these charges if you're convicted on that.
Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand the nature of the charge here, too, armed robbery. You took property from the person or presence of another while armed with a firearm. The other charges, they're possession of a firearm, when you had a prior conviction of a felony and also the attempt residential burglary that you made a substantial step to enter someone's dwelling place. That's the nature of the charge and all these counts of this particular charge that's facing you.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you also understand that if you can't afford an attorney, I would appoint one to represent you. You have one right now. You also could have your attorney of your choice to represent you in open court.
Do you understand also that those options are open to you as well?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand all these particular points that I talked to you about as far as representing yourself so far?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that I'm not going to be your attorney in the case, so I can't help you try your case wherever it happens to be, and you'll be held to the same standard as you would as if you were an attorney in the case.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you sure this is what you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. The public defender is given leave to withdraw.”

¶ 10 But by December 5, 2011, defendant requested counsel and the court reappointed the public defender. Appointed counsel represented defendant on the following two court dates and filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which the court denied at a hearing on January 19, 2012.

¶ 11 Also on January 19, 2012, the court ruled that the armed robbery with a firearm, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint charges (counts I, XI and XII) needed to be severed from the other charges because the other charges required evidence of prior convictions at trial, which could potentially affect the jury's verdict on counts I, XI, and XII (armed robbery, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint). The State elected to proceed to trial first on counts I, XI, and XII of the indictment (armed robbery, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint), and the court set a date for trial.

¶ 12 On February 16, 2012, defendant again indicated he desired to represent himself. The following proceedings were on the record:

[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Judge, we had writ [defendant] in today and counsel and I [sic ] in the hopes
[DEFENDANT]: Excuse me, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Hold on one second. This gentleman who is standing right next to you is your attorney. He is a very experienced attorney. So I would suggest that you talk to him first before you say anything to the court because anything you say is being taken down by this lady, the court reporter, and this lady over here is the—who is the State's Attorney she may use it against you. She will. Okay. So talk to your attorney first.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, Mr. Pike has previously represented himself pro se. He indicates at this time that he sent a letter to me. I'm not yet in receipt of it. Although I have no reason to doubt him, and he is asking the court to consider allowing him to represent himself.
THE COURT: Okay. Is that correct, Mr. Pike? [DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Pike, you want to represent yourself. That's fine. That's your prerogative.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Resume representing himself.
THE COURT: Resume representing himself. Here is a couple of things [sic ] about that. This is not a ping-pong game that goes back and for the where you get to decide today I want an attorney to represent me. Tomorrow I don't. Okay. It is going to be the last time you make that decision. All right. You need to decide if that is what you want to do.
Let me tell you a couple of things though. I am sure you have probably heard this before if you have represented yourself. I want you to understand
...

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