People v. Pike
Citation | 53 N.E.3d 147,403 Ill.Dec. 93 |
Decision Date | 27 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 1–12–2626.,1–12–2626. |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rashon PIKE, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, Patricia Mysza, and Shawn O'Toole, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Yvette Loizon, and Amy Watroba, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 We hold that the admission of DNA expert testimony of a 50% probability of inclusion for a random person in the population as a possible contributor to a mixed DNA profile was error because it was irrelevant, as it did not tend to make the issue of defendant's identification more likely than not. However, the admission of this evidence was not plain error because the error was not serious and the evidence was not closely balanced because both victims identified defendant and, as such, defendant's forfeiture of both issues due to his failure to object is effective. The jury in this case was not confused by this evidence, and we believe juries generally are capable of appropriately weighing properly presented DNA evidence.
¶ 2 We also hold in this case that there is no requirement that the court recite all counts against a defendant in admonishment of a waiver of the right to counsel pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a)
(Ill.S.Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984)). Rather, Rule 401(a) requires admonishment of the “nature of the charge.” There was no error in the court's second admonishment to defendant in this case where the court stated the nature of the charge and the possible maximum punishment but did not recite every count against defendant.
¶ 4 Defendant, Rashon Pike, was charged by indictment with twelve counts: (1) armed robbery with a firearm; (2) habitual criminal; (3) unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon; (4) another count for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon; (5) possession/use of a firearm by a felon; (6) another count of possession/use of a firearm by a felon; (7) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (8) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (9) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (10) another count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on a prior conviction; (11) attempted residential burglary; and (12) aggravated unlawful restraint.
¶ 5 Defendant was arraigned on February 10, 2011, at which time defendant was appointed a public defender.
¶ 6 On June 2, 2011, defendant asked to proceed pro se. The court admonished defendant of the charges pending against him and some of the elements of those crimes. After hearing this admonishment, defendant chose to be represented by counsel.
¶ 7 On September 12, 2011, defendant, who had written a letter to his counsel indicating he wished to represent himself, informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. The court admonished defendant as follows:
¶ 8 The assistant State's Attorney interjected:
“[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Judge, I don't mean to interrupt, but the armed robbery is specifically charged as armed with a firearm, which it carries an enhancement of 15 years.”
¶ 9 The court then further admonished defendant as follows:
¶ 10 But by December 5, 2011, defendant requested counsel and the court reappointed the public defender. Appointed counsel represented defendant on the following two court dates and filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which the court denied at a hearing on January 19, 2012.
¶ 11 Also on January 19, 2012, the court ruled that the armed robbery with a firearm, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint charges (counts I, XI and XII) needed to be severed from the other charges because the other charges required evidence of prior convictions at trial, which could potentially affect the jury's verdict on counts I, XI, and XII (armed robbery, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint). The State elected to proceed to trial first on counts I, XI, and XII of the indictment (armed robbery, attempted residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint), and the court set a date for trial.
¶ 12 On February 16, 2012, defendant again indicated he desired to represent himself. The following proceedings were on the record:
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