People v. Pine
| Decision Date | 19 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | 67440,67455,67468,Nos. 67436,67475 and 67476,s. 67436 |
| Citation | 542 N.E.2d 711,129 Ill.2d 88,134 Ill.Dec. 365 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 134 Ill.Dec. 365 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois v. Sharon L. PINE, et al., Appellees (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant). |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield , for appellant in 67436.
No appearance for appellee Sharon L. Pine in 67436.
Larry A. Davis, Davis & Riebman, Skokie, and Mark A. Mosby and Dennis A. Rendleman, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Bar Association in 67436.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield , for appellant in 67440, 67455 & 67475.
No appearance for appellee Bobby L. Barbee in 67440.
No appearance for appellee Joseph J. Hazel in 67455.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield , for appellant in 67468.
No appearance for appellee John Stewart in 67468.
No appearance for appellee James L. Kindred in 67475.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor Gen., and Karen S. Rosenwinkel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant in 67468.
No appearance for appellee Keith O. Diveley in 67468.
These consolidated appeals present the issue of whether the Secretary of State has standing to appeal an order of a trial court directing the Secretary to issue a judicial driving permit (JDP) pursuant to section 6-206.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1). The appellate court, relying on People v. Bluett (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 593, 117 Ill.Dec. 234, 520 N.E.2d 395, held that the Secretary lacked standing and dismissed the appeals. We granted the Secretary's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and allowed the Illinois State Bar Association to file a brief as amicus curiae because the various defendants did not file responses in this court or the appellate court on the issue presented. We conclude that it was improper to dismiss the appeals. The Secretary of State is granted broad authority over matters within the Illinois Vehicle Code and is intricately involved in the judicial driving permit proceedings held pursuant to section 6-206.1. We therefore reverse and remand.
This issue arises as a result of circuit court orders which granted JDPs to drivers whose licenses had been summarily suspended. The driving privileges of a driver who has been arrested for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI) are suspended pursuant to our statutory summary suspension law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1). Section 6-206.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that the first-time offender, as defined in section 11-500 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-500) (one who has not had a previous DUI conviction within five years), may petition the circuit court for a judicial driving permit to avoid undue hardship. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1.) Subject to certain conditions, the court may issue the JDP and allow the person to drive to and from work during certain times, or to drive for the purpose of receiving medical care or drug treatment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1(B)(a).) After the court enters the order, it is submitted to the Secretary. The statute requires that any submitted JDP form which "contains insufficient data or fails to comply with this Code shall not be * * * entered to the driver record but shall be returned to the issuing court indicating why the JDP cannot be so entered." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1(B)(d).) Drivers who are not first-time offenders may also receive a hardship license, but they must proceed in an administrative proceeding before the Secretary of State. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-205.) Section 6-201(c) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in Section 6-206.1, the Secretary of State shall have exclusive authority to grant, issue, deny, cancel, suspend and revoke driving privileges, drivers' licenses and restricted driving permits." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-201(c).
In these six cases, the Secretary sought to appeal the circuit court orders which directed him to issue the JDPs but his appeals were dismissed by the appellate court for lack of standing. In this court, the Secretary seeks review of only the standing issue and not a review of the factual basis for the decisions of the various circuit courts ordering him to enter the JDPs. It is thus unnecessary to present the facts of each of the consolidated cases. However, the facts of the lead case, People v. Pine (No. 67436), is illustrative of how the issue arose in these cases, and presumably numerous other cases which, we are informed, are pending in the appellate court.
On September 10, 1983, Sharon Pine was arrested for DUI and placed under supervision. In March 1988, she was again arrested and convicted for DUI. She petitioned the court for a JDP so that she could drive to and from her place of work. In April, the circuit court of Vermilion County entered an order directing the Secretary of State to issue her a JDP. The Secretary returned the order to the court and, in a letter, stated that Pine was not eligible for a JDP because she had a previous DUI conviction in the last five years and, therefore, did not qualify as a first-time offender under the Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-500). The court resubmitted the order to the Secretary on May 12, 1988, and from that renewed order the Secretary attempted to appeal. On June 10, 1988, the appellate court, citing People v. Bluett (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 593, 117 Ill.Dec. 234, 520 N.E.2d 395, ordered the Secretary to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Following submission of the Secretary's response, the rule was enforced and the appeal dismissed on June 20, 1988. The Secretary then filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court. Although the facts in the other cases differ somewhat from those in People v. Pine, for the purpose of this consolidated case, it is not necessary to set them forth in detail.
The issue of standing before us involves the Secretary of State, a public official and member of the executive branch of the government, and not a private citizen. In In re Estate of Tomlinson (1976), 65 Ill.2d 382, 3 Ill.Dec. 699, 359 N.E.2d 109, we dealt with the standing of another public official, the Attorney General, to bring an appeal in a case where he was not a party in the lower court proceeding. In Tomlinson we stated (65 Ill.2d at 387, 3 Ill.Dec. 699, 359 N.E.2d 109.) Tomlinson involved a dispute in regard to a charitable trust, and this court found that the Attorney General was statutorily vested with authority to enforce and supervise charitable trusts and, in spite of the fact that he had not participated in the proceeding in the lower court, had sufficient interest to appeal the circuit court decision. Likewise, in Pioneer Processing, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1984), 102 Ill.2d 119, 79 Ill.Dec. 640, 464 N.E.2d 238, we granted the Attorney General standing to appeal a decision of the Pollution Control Board, even though he had not participated in the administrative proceeding. The holding was based on the "strong public interest in a healthful environment" and the Attorney General's duty and authority, as the State's chief legal officer, to represent the people for the protection of that interest. (102 Ill.2d at 138-39, 79 Ill.Dec. 640, 464 N.E.2d 238.) Just as the Attorney General is involved in and responsible for a number of areas of public interest, the Secretary is intricately involved in the area of driving privileges and protecting the public from violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
The Secretary has broad authority to administer the State's laws governing the conduct of drivers on the roads, and is statutorily directed to observe, administer and enforce the provisions of the Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 2-101, 2-104.) As noted, this authority includes the exclusive right "to grant, issue, deny, cancel, suspend and revoke driving privileges, drivers' licenses and restricted driving permits," except as provided in section 6-206.1. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-201(c).) One of the important responsibilities of the Secretary is protecting our citizens from the hazards of drunk drivers. (See People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar (1986), 112 Ill.2d 101, 110, 96 Ill.Dec. 945, 492 N.E.2d 187 ().) In conjunction with this role, the Secretary has authority to revoke and reinstate the driving privileges of persons convicted of DUI. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-205, 6-206, 6-208.
Until January 1, 1986, sole authority to suspend and revoke drivers' licenses and privileges, as well as authority to grant hardship relief or reinstatement, was vested in the Secretary. Effective January 1, 1986, the legislature created the statutory summary suspension law, which provided for the withdrawal of the license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle from a person convicted of DUI. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 1-203.1, 2-118.1, 6-206.1, 6-208.1, 11-501.1.) The law vested the circuit court with authority to grant relief to first offenders from a...
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...by its reversal." (Layfer v. Tucker (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 333, 336, 27 Ill.Dec. 440, 389 N.E.2d 252; see also People v. Pine (1989), 129 Ill.2d 88, 134 Ill.Dec. 365, 542 N.E.2d 711.) An interest which is "speculative, theoretical, inconsequential or remote" is not sufficient to provide a no......
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