People v. Platte Pipe Line Co.

• Decision Date: 05 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 5666,5666
• Citation: People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. PLATTE PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 208

649 P.2d 208

The PEOPLE of the State of Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. PLATTE PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 5666.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 5, 1982.

Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Walter Perry, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Marion Yoder, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellants.

Morris G. Gray, Patrick G. Pitet (argued), and R. Patrick Dixon of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee.

Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, Justice.

This appeal is taken from the dismissal of a complaint that sought to recover the damages suffered by the People of the State of Wyoming as a result of an oil spill into state waters. The basis for the dismissal was the failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The question for us to decide is whether the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act § 35-11-101, et seq., W.S.1977, imposes strict liability for civil penalties upon the operator of a crude oil pipeline which discharges oil into state waters.

We will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

When a court is called upon to decide whether a claim has been stated, it must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view the entire matter in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733 (1979). Since this appeal is from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we will treat the facts stated in the complaint as proven and set them out accordingly.

On April 8, 1980, a high-pressure crude oil pipeline owned and operated by appellee in Converse County, Wyoming, ruptured. As a result, an estimated eight thousand, five hundred fifty-two barrels of crude oil were discharged into the North Platte River. The specific location of the oil spill was in the south-east one-quarter of the northwest one-quarter (SE1/4 NW1/4) of section thirty-three, township 34 north, range 75 west, in Converse County. The river itself was contaminated from the town of Glenrock to Glendo Reservoir, a distance of approximately sixty-eight miles.

Numerous federal, state, and county agencies responded to the crisis and worked to clean up the spill. By May 2, 1980, it was estimated that ninety-five percent of the oil that had spilled into the river had been recovered. Nevertheless, considerable harm had been done to the area's wildlife and ecosystem. The known and tangible casualties included: one thousand, seven hundred fifty-two muskrats, four beavers, a raccoon, nineteen geese, one hundred nine ducks, and one hundred eighty-three goose eggs. Further, the clean up effort had required the expenditure of substantial sums of money by the state. By March 25, 1981, the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission had expended forty-eight thousand, three hundred twenty-five dollars as a result of the spill, while the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality had expended four thousand, two hundred ninety dollars.

On March 25, 1981, the Wyoming Attorney General, as the representative for the People of the State of Wyoming, initiated an action against appellee, as the owner and operator of the pipeline which discharged the crude oil. The theory of the complaint was that, because oil had been discharged from appellee's pipeline into waters of the state, appellee had violated § 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii), W.S.1977, and was thus liable for the civil penalties set out in § 35-11-901(a) and (b), W.S.1977. Section 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii), supra, provides:

"(a) No person, except when authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the provisions of this act, shall:

"(i) Cause, threaten or allow the discharge of any pollution or wastes into the waters of the state;

"(ii) Alter the physical, chemical, radiological, biological or bacteriological properties of any waters of the state."

Section 35-11-901(a) and (b), supra, provides: ¹

"(a) Any person who violates any provision of this act, or any rule, regulation, standard or permit adopted hereunder or who violates any determination or order of the council pursuant to this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit, license, or variance is liable to a penalty of not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) for each day during which violation continues, which may be recovered in a civil action, and such person may be enjoined from continuing the violation as hereinafter provided. Damages are to be assessed by the court.

"(b) Any person who violates this act, rule, regulation, and thereby causes the death of fish, aquatic life or game or bird life is, in addition to other penalties provided by this act, liable to pay to the state, an additional sum for the reasonable value of the fish, aquatic life, game or bird life destroyed. Any monies so recovered shall be placed in the general fund of Wyoming, state treasurer's office. All actions pursuant to this article (§§ 35-11-901, 35-11-902) shall be brought in the county in which the violation occurred or in Laramie county by the attorney general in the name of the people of Wyoming."

On April 16, 1981, appellee moved to have the complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim. On May 22, 1981, appellee filed its brief in support of its motion. The main thrust of its argument was that (1) § 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii), supra, did not bar the discharge of oil into waters of the state, and (2) even if it did, the statute required a person charged with a violation to have been at fault in some manner, in permitting the discharge to occur. The Wyoming Attorney General responded that the discharge of oil into Wyoming waterways was prohibited, and that whoever allowed a discharge of oil was strictly liable, regardless of fault.

On February 18, 1982, the district court granted appellee's motion. In its opinion letter, it indicated that it did not believe that the legislature intended to "impose strict liability for an oil spill." We are now called upon to review the district court's interpretation of § 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii), supra.

We first address the question as to whether § 35-11-301 is violated when oil is discharged into state waters. This court has observed frequently that where a statute is clear on its face, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Board of County Commissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 (1981); State v. Sinclair Pipeline Company, Wyo., 605 P.2d 377 (1980); Matter of North Laramie Land Company, Wyo., 605 P.2d 367 (1980).

Here the statute in essence states that no person shall allow the discharge of any pollution into state waters, nor shall any person alter the physical, chemical, or biological properties of state waters. In § 35-11-103(c)(vii), W.S.1977, "discharge" is defined for our purpose here to mean "any addition of any pollution or wastes to any waters of the state." In § 35-11-103(c)(i), W.S.1977, "pollution" in regard to water quality, is defined to mean:

" * * * (C)ontamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any waters of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity or odor of the waters or any discharge of any acid or toxic material, chemical or chemical compound, whether it be liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive or other substance, including wastes, into any waters of the state which creates a nuisance or renders any waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wildlife or aquatic life, or which degrades the water for its intended use, or adversely affects the environment. This term does not mean water, gas or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil, or gas or water, derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the state, and if the state determines that such injection or disposal well will not result in the degradation of ground or surface or water resources."

We must conclude that crude oil comes within the definition of pollution for water quality as set out in § 35-11-103(c)(i), supra. Further, since discharge is defined in § 35-11-103(c)(vii), supra, to mean any addition of pollution to state waters, when oil spills and mixes into a Wyoming river, pollution has been added to the water. Therefore, in terms of § 35-11-301(a)(i), a discharge of pollution has occurred.

Also, oil's addition to water will definitely alter the physical, chemical or biological properties of the water. This includes a change in taste, color, turbidity or odor of the water. Also the oil will render the water harmful to public health, livestock, wildlife, and aquatic life. Though none of these facts were alleged in the complaint, they are so well known that they come within the scope of matters a court should take judicial notice of when considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Bon v. Lemp, Wyo., 444 P.2d 333 (1968). We take judicial notice of the effect on water when crude oil is added to it. Clearly then oil spilling into a Wyoming river comes within the scope of § 35-11-301(a) (ii), supra, since it clearly alters the water's physical, chemical and biological properties.

Appellee tries to avoid the clear import of the statutory language by categorizing it as a permitting statute. Focusing upon the language in § 35-11-301, supra, which exempts from compliance with its terms activities for which a permit has been issued, appellee maintains that the statute only prohibits that activity for which a permit could have been obtained but was not. Since a permit could not have been issued to cover an accidental oil spill, appellee argues that it should not be read as barring such a spill. That approach is...