People v. Plunkett

• Decision Date: 30 March 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 138123.
• Citation: People v. Plunkett, 780 N.W.2d 280, 485 Mich. 50 (Mich. 2010)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald James PLUNKETT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

780 N.W.2d 280

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Ronald James PLUNKETT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 138123.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 30, 2010.

Opinion

YOUNG, J.

This case requires this Court to determine whether a defendant who transported another person to make a drug purchase, supplied the money for this purchase, and intended that the drug purchase occur may be bound over for trial for violating laws prohibiting the delivery of heroin and the delivery of heroin causing death.We hold that evidence of such conduct provides probable cause to believe that defendant aided and abetted the violation of these laws and, therefore, that he may be bound over for trial on those counts.Under MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the district court's bindover for trial on these counts, and remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for trial.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts were established through testimony at defendant's preliminary examination.In February 2006, defendantRonald James Plunkett, then an attorney living in Ann Arbor, met Tracy Ann Corson, a Livonia prostitute, after defendant allegedly told a Detroit drug dealer that he"wanted the company of a girl who would be provided drugs to go and to get high at his house."By May 2006, Corson had moved into defendant's apartment.They would "get high a lot" from crack cocaine and heroin that they purchased for $200 "just about every day" from a Detroit drug dealer named Harold Spencer.Because Corson did not have the financial resources to purchase drugs, defendant bankrolled their drug habits.A typical day for defendant and Corson included driving from Ann Arbor to a parking lot in northwest Detroit to purchase drugs from Spencer.

June 25, 2006, was no exception.After defendant arrived home from work, he and Corson drove to Detroit.As usual, defendant provided Corson with the drug money and drove her to meet their drug dealer, where Corson completed the drug transaction.The drug purchase routine was structured "so that when she and defendant met their drug dealer in the parking lot Corson could just jump out and hop in the dealer's car, get the drugs and come back."While driving back to Ann Arbor after the drug transaction, defendant smoked crack cocaine with Corson, and Corson injected herself with heroin.Both of them partied into the night with defendant's ex-girlfriend at defendant's apartment.The three smoked crack cocaine together, and Corson gave defendant's ex-girlfriend heroin.

Around 3:00 a.m. on June 26, Corson received a phone call from a childhood friend, Tiffany Gregory, who was seeking drugs.Corson invited Gregory to defendant's apartment.Gregory arrived at defendant's apartment appearing visibly intoxicated but able to walk and talk.After the four smoked crack cocaine in the living room, Corson and Gregory went into a bedroom and injected themselves with heroin.Subsequently, Corson left the bedroom to use the bathroom.Upon her return, Corson observed that Gregory had passed out and was unresponsive and blue.Emergency medical services were summoned.While waiting for emergency personnel to arrive, Corson and defendant hid the remaining drugs.Attempts by paramedics to resuscitate Gregory failed, and she was pronounced dead at 5:14 a.m.

A forensic pathologist performed an autopsy on Gregory and determined her cause of death to be an accidental drug overdose.The toxicology report indicated that Gregory had ingested a lethal amount of heroin.Gregory also had cocaine metabolites in her system, as well as a blood alcohol level of 0.115 percent.The forensic pathologist testified that the combination of alcohol and drugs in Gregory's system had a synergistic effect on her body, but that heroin was the ultimate cause of death.

Defendant was arrested on four related drug charges: (I) delivery of a controlled substance causing death,¹(II) delivery of less than 50 grams of a controlled substance (heroin),²(III) delivery of less than 50 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine),³ and (IV) maintaining a drug house.⁴The district court bound defendant over for trial on all four counts.

Defendant moved in the circuit court to quash the bindover.Relevant to this appeal, defendant claimed with regard to counts I and II that Corson purchased the heroin for her personal use and, moreover, that he did not even know that Corson had purchased the heroin.Accordingly, defendant claimed that he could not be bound over for trial on these counts.

The prosecutor argued that defendant's conduct met the elements of counts I and II under two independent theories that the prosecutor claimed did not require defendant's physical transfer of the heroin to Corson.First, the prosecutor asserted that defendant aided and abetted the delivery of the heroin from Spencer to Corson.Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that the defendant effected a "constructive delivery" of the heroin from himself to Corson.The circuit court agreed with defendant, ruling that the district court had abused its discretion by binding defendant over on counts I and II because defendant's actions did not constitute delivery of heroin to Corson.The court affirmed the district court's bindover on counts III and IV, and these charges are not at issue in this appeal.

The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's delayed application for leave to appeal and affirmed the circuit court's decision to quash counts I and II.⁵The majority concluded that neither of the prosecution's theories supported a bindover on the two counts related to the delivery of heroin.The majority held that "no evidence was presented to support a finding that defendant aided and abetted the drug dealer in delivering the drugs to Corson" and that at most "the evidence in this case could support a finding that defendant aided and abetted Corson in receiving the heroin. . . ."⁶It further held that "a defendant constructively delivers a controlled substance when the defendant directs another person to convey the controlled substance under the defendant's direct or indirect control to a third person or entity."⁷It thereby concluded that "the heroin purchased by Corson was not under defendant's control, nor did defendant direct the drug dealer to transfer the drugs to Corson."⁸

Judge SCHUETTE dissented, concluding that probable cause supported the prosecution's theory that defendant aided and abetted Spencer's delivery of the heroin to Corson.He reasoned that "there is evidence that defendant`performed acts . . . that assisted the commission of the crime,' i.e., he provided the buyer and the money" and "knew that Spencer intended the crime at the time defendant gave aid."⁹

This Court scheduled argument on whether to grant the prosecution's application for leave to appeal or take other peremptory action and directed the parties to address "whether MCL 750.317a encompasses the defendant's actions in this case."¹⁰

II.PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS

Neither the United States Constitution nor the Michigan Constitution requires a preliminary examination.¹¹Rather, the Legislature has mandated preliminary examinations for felony charges:

Except as provided in MCL 712A.4,¹² the magistrate before whom any person is arraigned on a charge of having committed a felony shall set a day for a preliminary examination. . . .At the preliminary examination, a magistrate shall examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution, on oath. . . .¹³

The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether "a felony has been committed and whether there is probable cause for charging the defendant therewith. . . ."¹⁴If there is probable cause, the magistrate must "bind the defendant to appear before the circuit court. . ., or other court having jurisdiction of the cause, for trial."¹⁵

As this Court explained in People v. Yost,"probable cause requires a quantum of evidence `sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief' of the accused's guilt."¹⁶This standard is less rigorous than the requirement to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a criminal defendant, and "the gap between probable cause and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is broad. . . ."¹⁷

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent an abuse of discretion, reviewing courts should not disturb a magistrate's decision to bind a criminal defendant over for trial.¹⁸In the instant case, defendant argues that the district court's decision to bind him over on the two counts relating to the distribution of heroin was an abuse of discretion because his alleged conduct does not fit within the scope of the appropriate criminal statutes.Determining the scope of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation and as such is reviewed de novo.¹⁹

When interpreting a statute, courts must "`ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.'"<sup>20</sup>This requires courts to consider "the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as `its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.'"²¹

IV.ANALYSIS

Defendant was charged with violating MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(delivery of a schedule 1 or 2 narcotic controlled substance) and MCL 750.317a(delivery of a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance causing death).As an initial matter, the facts adduced at the preliminary examination suggested that two separate deliveries of a schedule 1 controlled substance (heroin) occurred during the evening of June 25 to 26, 2006: when Spencer sold the heroin to Corson and when Corson gave the heroin to Gregory.The prosecution's allegations against defendant are premised solely on the delivery of heroin from Spencer to Corson.Accordingly, this Court's analysis only examines defendant's involvement in the delivery of...