People v. Pomykala

• Decision Date: 24 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 93089.,93089.
• Citation: People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 203 Ill.2d 198, 271 Ill.Dec. 230 (Ill. 2003)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Thomas POMYKALA, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

784 N.E.2d 784

203 Ill.2d 198

271 Ill.Dec. 230

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Thomas POMYKALA, Appellee.

No. 93089.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 24, 2003.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Jeff Tomczak, State's Attorney, Joliet (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin, Rita Kennedy Mertel, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Carrie B. Marche, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, John E. Nowak, Assistant State's Attorneys, Chicago, for amicus curiae Richard A. Devine, Cook County State's Attorney.

Justice GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant Thomas Pomykala was convicted of reckless homicide. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that section 9-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000)) created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of recklessness. 326 Ill.App.3d 390, 259 Ill.Dec. 855, 759 N.E.2d 916. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315. We now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with two counts of reckless homicide in the death of Taylor Nicole Pirc. Defendant's car allegedly crossed the median of a divided two-way street and struck an oncoming car containing Taylor and her grandmother, Bernadine Pirc. Eyewitnesses testified that defendant was driving too fast and that his car had crossed the median more than once prior to striking the Pirc car. No skidmarks were found at the scene. Defendant told a police officer that he had been having trouble with his brakes and that they worked only 90% of the time. The officer saw a line of black liquid on the street running to a spot under the engine of defendant's car. The officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and he found approximately 18 empty beer cans in defendant's car. Defendant admitted to drinking several beers that day. He failed field sobriety tests and an intoxilizer test showed that he had a breath-alcohol concentration level of 0.21%. At defendant's trial, an auto mechanic testified that the brake fluid chamber on defendant's car was only 80% full. The main battery feed for the brake system was disconnected and the hydraulic pressure for the system was markedly reduced. Nonetheless, the mechanic testified, defendant's car should have had 30% braking power prior to the collision and should have stopped when the brake was applied, despite the reduced braking power. Defendant presented no evidence.

Over defendant's objection, the trial court gave the following non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) instruction to the jury, which was taken from the language of section 9-3(b) of the Code:

"If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged violation, such evidence shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary."

The jury returned guilty verdicts and the trial court sentenced defendant to 14 years' imprisonment.

The appellate court agreed with defendant that section 9-3(b) of the Code creates a mandatory presumption that violates defendant's right to due process. The court found that the presumption unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to defendant to establish that he was not acting recklessly. In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied on a decision of this court, People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133, 229 Ill.Dec. 542, 692 N.E.2d 315 (1998), and noted that the trial court had relied on People v. Atteberry, 213 Ill. App.3d 851, 157 Ill.Dec. 365, 572 N.E.2d 434 (1991), which, the appellate court stated, had effectively been overruled by Watts. 326 Ill.App.3d at 394, 259 Ill.Dec. 855, 759 N.E.2d 916.

ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of a statute is subject to de novo review. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality and the challenging party has the burden of rebutting that presumption. People v. Maness, 191 Ill.2d 478, 483, 247 Ill.Dec. 490, 732 N.E.2d 545 (2000). This court has a duty to interpret a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it can reasonably be done. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill.2d 441, 448, 235 Ill.Dec. 454, 705 N.E.2d 67 (1998).

Section 9-3(b) of the Code provides that:

"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000).

A presumption is a legal device that permits or requires the fact finder to assume the existence of an ultimate fact, after certain predicate or basic facts have been established. Watts, 181 Ill.2d at 141, 229 Ill.Dec. 542, 692 N.E.2d 315. While due process requires that the State prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970)), the State may be entitled to rely on certain presumptions or inferences. These devices "play a vital role in the expeditious resolution of factual questions, with the value of the presumption or inference resting on the strength of the connection between the elemental or ultimate fact presumed or inferred and the basic or evidentiary fact." People v. Hester, 131 Ill.2d 91, 98, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797 (1989).

Presumptions may be either permissive or mandatory. A permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the fact finder to infer the existence of the ultimate or presumed fact upon proof of the predicate fact. A mandatory presumption requires the fact finder to accept the presumption. Watts, 181 Ill.2d at 142,229 Ill.Dec. 542,692 N.E.2d 315. Mandatory presumptions may be further classified as conclusive or rebuttable. The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional, as they conflict with the presumption of innocence. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2459, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 50 (1979). The Supreme Court has further held that mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant are per se unconstitutional, because they relieve the State of its burden to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524,99 S.Ct. at 2459,61 L.Ed.2d at 51. In Watts, this court held that mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of production to the defendant are also unconstitutional. Watts, 181 Ill.2d at 147,229 Ill. Dec. 542,692 N.E.2d 315. Thus, under Illinois law, all mandatory presumptions are now considered to be per se unconstitutional.

The decisions of our appellate court are in conflict on the question of the constitutionality of section 9-3(b). In addition to the Third District in this case, the Second District has found the section to be unconstitutional, although severable from the remainder of the statute (People v. Singmouangthong, 334 Ill.App.3d 542, 546, 268 Ill.Dec. 404, 778 N.E.2d 390 (2002)). In contrast, the First District has found that section 9-3(b) does not constitute a mandatory presumption (People v. Peshak, 333 Ill.App.3d 1052, 267 Ill.Dec. 751, 777 N.E.2d 554 (2002)).

Prior to 1992, section 9-3(b) read as follows:

"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be prima facie evidence of a reckless act." Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-3(b).

The General Assembly changed this language to its present form in 1991 (Pub. Act 87-1198, eff. September 25, 1992), apparently in response to the Third District's decision in People v. Atteberry, 213 Ill.App.3d 851, 157 Ill.Dec. 365, 572 N.E.2d 434 (1991). See 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1992, at 21-22 (statements of Senator Dart). In Atteberry, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide. The trial court gave the jury a non-IPI instruction that repeated verbatim the statutory language of the prior version of section 9-3(b), without providing a definition of the term "prima facie." On appeal, the defendant challenged the instruction as creating an irrebuttable presumption of recklessness in language that was either not understood or misunderstood by the jury. The appellate court stated that a presumption cannot constitutionally shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant and that the jury could have understood the term "prima facie" to mean that if the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, he was conclusively presumed to be acting recklessly. The court noted the definition of "prima facie" given in Black's Law Dictionary as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary" (Black's Law Dictionary 1189 (6th ed.1990)) and suggested that this definition should be provided to the jury in its instructions. Atteberry, 213 Ill.App.3d at 854, 157 Ill.Dec. 365, 572 N.E.2d 434.

Subsequently to Atteberry, this court, in Watts, found unconstitutional a presumption contained in the Home Repair Fraud Act. The statute contained a rebuttable presumption of intent or knowledge of nonperformance if certain specified facts were established. One of the elements of the offense was a lack of intent to perform at the time of making a contract for home repair. Thus, proof of the predicate facts removed the element of intent from the case unless the presumption was rebutted by other evidence. This...