People v. Pope
| Decision Date | 18 February 1896 |
| Citation | 66 N.W. 213,108 Mich. 361 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. POPE. |
Error to recorder's court of Detroit; William W. Chapin, Judge.
Nellie W. Pope appeals from a conviction of murder. Affirmed.
Henry M. Cheever, John Atkinson, and George X. M Collier, for appellant.
Allan H. Frazer, Pros. Atty., and Henry A. Mandell, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
The respondent was convicted of murder in the first degree. The victim was her husband. One Brusseau, who was at the time a servant and nurse in the house, killed Mr. Pope with a hatchet. The theory of the prosecution was that the murder was committed under an arrangement agreed to between the respondent and Brusseau. Brusseau confessed the crime, told how it was done, and testified to the arrangement between respondent and himself. The motive was claimed to be to obtain a large insurance on Mr. Pope's life in favor of respondent.
1. Complaint is made that the assistant prosecuting attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, said that Mrs. Pope had all the policies of insurance, with the exception of $3,000 assigned to herself, and that, on a certain occasion, when the officers went to her house, "she pretended she was sick, and couldn't understand the officers' questions"; also, that the prosecuting attorney was permitted to express his opinion as to the guilt of the prisoner; and, also, argued to the jury that "the relations between the prisoner and Brusseau were filthy and improper." The opening statement to the jury was made in good faith. It was shown that certain polices were assigned to Mrs. Pope, and the deed of assignment introduced in evidence. Even if it were true that she was the beneficiary in all the policies, the statement that they were assigned to her could not have prejudiced the jury. The argument of the prosecuting attorney is not given in the record. The court, at the request of the respondent's attorneys, instructed the jury that After giving this request the court further explicitly charged them that they must disregard the opinions of the attorneys, and be guided solely by the evidence, and also instructed them that there was no testimony to show improper relations between Brusseau and Mrs. Pope, and that the argument of the assistant prosecutor upon this point must be rejected. Under this charge, it is unnecessary to determine whether there was any testimony to justify the comments. It is doubtful if the court was correct in so stating. We find nothing upon this branch of the case to justify further comment or a reversal.
2. Once Crawford, an attorney, was introduced on the part of the defense, and produced an affidavit, made by Brusseau, which contradicted his confession, and his testimony in court. The prosecutor subjected this witness to a rigid cross-examination, which is now claimed to have exceeded proper bounds. No objection was made to the admission of the testimony, and it is now too late to object. We think, also, that the examination was proper.
3. One Werzel testified that he was called by Brusseau, at the request of Mrs. Pope, to go to Mr. Pope's house on the Saturday night prior to the murder; that Mrs. Pope wanted him, as a notary public, to acknowledge some papers made out by her attorney; that he saw and read the paper, and left it in the hands of Mrs. Pope. Some discussion arose between counsel, in the court, about the paper in which counsel for the respondent said he did not insist upon a written notice to produce the paper, whereupon the court stated they might produce it the next morning. On the following morning, one of the attorneys for the respondent stated that he was unable to find any such paper, whereupon the court allowed parol evidence of its contents. We think it was admissible; but the point becomes comes immaterial, because the paper was afterwards produced and admitted in evidence.
4. Mr. Frank P. Guise testified that he was an attorney, and acted for an insurance company which had a $10,000 policy on Mr. Pope's life; that a note for $253 was given for the first payment, signed by Mrs. Pope; that in 1891 he went to her, and demanded this policy of Mrs. Pope, and also one for another company. He was then asked, "What reason did you give why you demanded the polices back?" Respondent's counsel objected to the question, but stated no grounds therefor. An assignment of error based upon such an objection will not be considered by this court. People v. Moore, 86 Mich. 134, 48 N.W. 693. As a preliminary question it was proper. If the answer contained incompetent or immaterial matter, the proper practice would have been a motion to strike it out, which was not done.
5. When prosecution rested, respondent's counsel called the...
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