People v. Del Prete
| Decision Date | 27 October 1936 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 23648. |
| Citation | 364 Ill. 376,4 N.E.2d 484 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. DEL PRETE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Hugo M. Friend, Judge.
Cosmo Del Prete was convicted under an indictment charging him with armed robbery and previous conviction of grand larceny, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
WILSON, J., dissenting.John B. Boddie, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and A. B. Dennis, of Danville (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Richard H. Devine, and Melvin Rembe, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county on an indictment which charged him with armed robbery and which also charged that he had previously been convicted of grand larceny. The judgment imposed the lief sentence which the statute in such case makes mandatory, and this writ of error is prosecuted.
The complaining witness was John Korenevich. On September 7, 1934, at about 4 p. m., this witness went to the Bank of Napoli, located on the corner of Halsted and Forquer streets, in Chicago, to draw some money. He testified that he left the bank with $92 in cash, got in his car and drove west; that two men in a car stopped him, one of whom jumped on the running board of his car and rodered him to drive into an adjacent alley and then stop. During this time the holdup man who ‘had on a handkerchief’ got into the back seat of the car and after the witness had stopped in the alley completed the robbery by taking $92 from the witness. Korenevich further testified that a week later, at about the same place, he saw the defendant standing on the street, at which time he called the police; that the squad car came and the defendant was arrested; that the defendant was placed in the squad car and taken to the police station, where, in his own words, ‘they asked me if this is the man and I said, ‘Yes”; that the defendant said nothing. On this point the statement contained in the brief for the people is materially wrong. It is there stated that the complaining witness was asked if the defendant was the man that held him up, and the complaining witness said, ‘Yes.’ It is necessary to point out that the record does not disclose that either the complaining witness or any policeman accused the defendant of robbery or apprised him of the reason for his arrest while the complaining witness was present. There was no corroborating evidence of any kind, leaving the conviction to rest solely on the identification by Korenevich. On his own behalf the defendant denied any knowledge of the crime and gave a reasonable account of his whereabouts at the time it was committed. His testimony accounted for a more or less idle day and no witnesses were offered in corroboration.
There are several errors assigned, but it will only be necessary to consider the rulings of the court in connection with the people's cross-examination of the defendant. Over repeated objections of counsel for the defendant the court permitted the assistant state's attorney to cross-examine the defendant about the details of his former conviction of grand larceny in 1927. On that cross-examination he was asked if at that time he was indicted for burglary, and he admitted it. He was asked if he was guilty of the burglary, and he admitted it. He was then asked, ‘But you plead guilty to grand larceny, didn't you?’ He replied, ‘It amounted to the same thing; I don't understand.’ He was then asked, ‘It is a grand larceny charge, isn't it?’ and replied, ‘I don't understand the terms of law.’ A colloquy then followed between the state's attorney and the witness, interspersed with objections from defendant's counsel as to whether grand larceny or burglary was the lesser charge, and was required by the court to answer if he knew, and replied that he did not know and did not understand. He was then asked if at the time he pleaded guilty he knew which was the lesser charge, and said that he did not; that all he knew was that he was guilty and pleaded guilty because he was. The prosecutor then started to ask a question concerning the money that was found in connection...
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People v. Fields
...expert may be cross-examined for the purpose of explaining, modifying, or discrediting the expert's testimony. (People v. Del Prete (1936), 364 Ill. 376, 380, 4 N.E.2d 484, 486; People v. Conrad (1967), 81 Ill.App.2d 34, 47-48, 225 N.E.2d 713, 720, aff'd (1968), 41 Ill.2d 13, 241 N.E.2d 423......
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Davis v. International Harvester Co.
...that a criminal defendant may not preclude the introduction of evidence by admitting certain facts). But see People v. Del Prete (1936), 364 Ill. 376, 379, 4 N.E.2d 484 (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to examine the defendant in detail regardi......
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People v. Latimore
...the defendant's right in a criminal case, must not be unduly restricted. People v. Pelletri, 323 Ill. 176, 155 N.E. 591; People v. Del Prete, 364 Ill. 376, 4 N.E.2d 484. See also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956. In a prosecution for rape, the defendants must be......
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People v. McCorry
...cross-examination is improper when it introduces immaterial or collateral matters and substantial prejudice results. (People v. Del Prete (1936), 364 Ill. 376, 4 N.E.2d 484.) The prosecutor's questions were not immaterial or collateral to the issue of defendant's guilt. Nor can we say that ......