People v. Priester

• Decision Date: 19 April 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 4-18-0644,4-18-0644
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNNY R. PRIESTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNNY R. PRIESTER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-18-0644

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

April 19, 2021

NOTICE

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from Circuit Court of Sangamon County

No. 12CF441

Honorable Leslie J. Graves, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) objection where defendant failed to establish purposeful discrimination; (2) the State used a witness's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence where the witness lacked personal knowledge of the event, but the evidence was not closely balanced; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to tender a jury instruction on accomplice-witness testimony.

¶ 2 Following a March 2018 trial, a jury found defendant, Johnny R. Priester, guilty of (1) first degree murder where during the commission of the offense of first degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another person (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2010)), (2) aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2010)), and (3) aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2010)). In August 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years' imprisonment for first degree murder to run consecutive to a 25-year sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm, and concurrent to a 5-year sentence for aggravated discharge of a firearm.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred when it denied his objection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), after the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a black perspective juror from serving on the jury; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the State used a witness's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence where the witness lacked personal knowledge of the event; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to request a jury instruction on accomplice-witness testimony. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In June 2012, the State charged defendant with (1) first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2010)) (count I), (2) first degree felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2010)) (count II), (3) aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2010)) (count III), (4) aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2010)) (count IV), and (5) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2010)) (count V). The charges stemmed from a May 28, 2012, shooting at 1229 North 14th Street in Springfield, Illinois, which resulted in the death of Quinton Harden and injured Dawn Schuster.

¶ 6 A. Pretrial Motions

¶ 7 In February 2017, defendant filed a motion to sever the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charge from the remaining charges. The State filed a motion for use immunity under section 106-2.5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/106-2.5(b) (West 2016)), asking the trial court to grant immunity to Lastacia Wright for her testimony as a witness against defendant. In the motion, the State indicated if Wright testified inconsistently with her prior statements to police, including professing memory loss, the State intended to useher prior recorded statements as substantive evidence pursuant to section 115-10.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2016)). At a May 25, 2017, hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion to sever and the State's motion for use immunity.

¶ 8 B. Defendant's Jury Trial

¶ 9 1. Voir Dire

¶ 10 In March 2018, during voir dire, the State exercised its first peremptory challenge on Yolanda W., a black female, arguing the strike was race-neutral where Yolanda W.'s nephew currently faced murder charges in Sangamon County, Illinois, and her responses indicated possible bias against police. Defense counsel argued the challenge was not race-neutral where Yolanda W. indicated she had no bias against police. The parties learned about the situation involving Yolanda W.'s nephew when Yolanda W. accepted an invitation to speak with the parties outside the presence of the other potential jurors. When in chambers with the trial court and the parties, Yolanda W. expressed concerns regarding how some police officers treat people unfairly and the unique challenges she believed a black male faced when on trial. In addition, Yolanda W. stated she knew police officers who were good people. Yolanda W. stated unequivocally that she could be fair and impartial if she served on the jury. Following their initial discussions, the court again instructed Yolanda W. to join the parties in chambers where Yolanda W. responded to additional questions. Yolanda W. indicated her nephew's case was in the beginning stages and she understood each case was unique—involving specific facts and evidence.

¶ 11 Once Yolanda W. was excused from the room, the State again sought to exercise a peremptory challenge against Yolanda W. Defense counsel objected arguing the State's reasonfor challenging Yolanda W. was not race-neutral. The State maintained it offered a race-neutral reason based on her potential bias. Specifically, the State asserted,

"[Her nephew was] [f]acing similar charges that's being prosecuted by this office. She's made commentary in regards to officers and the manner in which at least she believes, she made statements in regards to whether they're good or bad. I think she comes in with bias. I don't think that she is at this point in time fair and impartial to the case, and I don't believe that based on where we're at that she should sit on this jury."

¶ 12 The trial court responded,

"I think her statement about officers, people in law enforcement being good or bad is the same thing anyone else would say. She has indicated she's not been to any proceedings. There have been very few proceedings. She's not indicated that she is—we've already asked her if she knew anybody in the courtroom.

I think if her nephew's case were two years old and it had been heavily discussed among the family, I think—I—her answers do not reflect your argument, and I'm going to deny it."

¶ 13 After a discussion off record, the trial court allowed the parties to make further arguments on the issue. However, the court stated,

"Before you make your arguments, another thing I want to point out for the record is that we do have already, you know, ifit's about—well, we already do have a person who is a convicted felon on the jury who—Michael G., who was not interrogated to this degree, and I believe that there are—when you think about it, he could very well have been."

¶ 14 Defense counsel pointed out that Michael G. was a white male per Batson. The State then argued defense counsel had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination against Yolanda W. under Batson. Rather, the State provided several race-neutral reasons for challenging Yolanda W. Defense counsel responded, "[The State] passed on Michael G., a convicted felon. Who's white. And this is the first challenge, and they come to a black female, and they take their first challenge on her? I don't know how else you read it."

¶ 15 In response to defense counsel, the trial court stated, "[Yolanda W.] and [defendant] are African American and that, yes, the victim, victims are white. I'm going to—I am reconsidering my decision after slowing down and taking some time with this. And I don't think you've met your burden."

¶ 16 After completing the impaneling of the jury, the parties presented the following relevant evidence.

¶ 17 2. Dawn Schuster

¶ 18 Dawn Schuster testified that in May 2012 she resided at 1229 North 14th Street in Springfield with her sisters—Monica Hutchens and Elizabeth Pillischafske—and their eight children. At the time, Pillischafske's boyfriend, Quinton Harden also lived at the residence. Schuster described the residence as a one-story home with two bedrooms and a large front porch.

¶ 19 On May 27, 2012, Schuster hosted a birthday party for her daughter at the residence. That evening, after the party ended, Schuster, Harden, Pillischafske, Keonna Tucker,some friends, and the children remained at the residence. Acquaintances of Harden arrived at Schuster's residence in a red vehicle to talk with Harden, a tattoo artist. Schuster testified that at some point one of the acquaintances, Julio—a light-skinned, heavier gentleman—"looked mad and kind of just distraught-looking and pac[ed] around [the front porch]. And we—I asked him to sit down because it was getting late, and I didn't want that in front of our house." In response, Julio sat down and then left the residence on foot. The other acquaintances eventually left in the red vehicle.

¶ 20 Schuster testified that, around 2 a.m. on May 28, 2012, Hutchens returned home to the group hanging out on the front porch. At that time, Schuster looked down the street and observed two gentlemen standing under a streetlight on the corner of Reservoir and North 14th Street. Schuster described the two men as a "heavyset light-skinned guy with a white shirt and black pants, [and] a tall dark-skinned black male also standing there." Schuster identified Julio as the heavyset light-skinned man who had been at her house earlier in the evening.

¶ 21 At first, the two men just stood on the corner. Eventually, Schuster observed the tall, dark black man cross the street toward her residence and as he got closer, he started shooting at the porch. Schuster testified she heard more than eight gunshots. Schuster stated once the gunshots stopped, "Everyone was on the ground on the porch. And I was shot in both of my legs. And I tried to get up, and I walked two steps, and then I realized I was...