People v. Pruden

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: EBERSPACHER
• Citation: People v. Pruden, 322 N.E.2d 501, 25 Ill.App.3d 47 (Ill. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 28 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73--10,73--10
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott PRUDEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 501

322 N.E.2d 501

25 Ill.App.3d 47

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott PRUDEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73--10.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Jan. 28, 1975.

Robert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, Mt. Vernon, William J. Becker, Robert I. Wrigley, Research Assts., for defendant-appellant.

Ronald A. Niemann, State's Atty., Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.

EBERSPACHER, Justice:

This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty and sentence of four to ten years in the penitentiary on a guilty plea entered in the circuit court of Marion County.

Appellant's first contention is that the indictment to which he entered his plea failed to properly charge the offense of burglary. That the indictment was carelessly and inartfully drawn cannot be denied. The indictment reads in part:

'Scott Pruden, David Hough, and Sally Myers committed the offense of burglary in that on said date at about 4:00 a.m. the said Scott Pruden, David Hough and Sally Myers without authority, knowingly entered a building occupied by Williams Implement located in the Village of Alma, in Marion County, Illinois with intent to commit therein a theft, in violation of paragraph 19--1, chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes.'

The insufficiency of the indictment is contended in two respects; (1) because it does not reveal who or what type of entity occupied the burglarized premises, and (2) because the indictment does not sufficiently identify the burglarized premises.

The test of sufficiency of an indictment is whether it: (1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant to enable him to prepare a defense, and (3) would sustain a plea of acquittal or conviction in bar of any further prosecutions of the same offense. People v. Harvey, 53 Ill.2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269; People v. Grieco, 44 Ill.2d 407, 255 N.E.2d 897; People v. Rife (Fourth Dist.1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 602, 310 N.E.2d 179.

The applicable statute, Illinois Revised Statutes 1971, chapter 38, paragraph 19--1(a), provides that,

'A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, * * *, or any part thereof with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft. * * *'

It is evident that the instant indictment contains all of the elements of the offense prescribed by statute. It is less clear, however, whether the specificity and particularity of the language within this indictment was certain enough to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and prevent the possibility of double jeopardy for the instant offense. Much of the uncertainty arises from the description of the building alleged to have been entered by the defendant as 'occupied by Williams Implement located in the village of Alma, in Marion County, Illinois * * *.' The defendant contends that this language 'renders the indictment fatally defective in that it neither sufficiently identifies the premises allegedly entered nor does it reveal who or what type of entity occupied the premises.' We do not agree.

The defendant premises much of this contention upon the proposition that a person named 'Williams Implement' could own both a residence and business in Alma. According to this argument the fact that there could be such a person creates the possibility of double jeopardy and could hamper defendant in his preparation of a defense by forcing him to speculate as to who or what 'Williams Implement' was. We consider it highly improbable that defendant believed 'Williams Implement' to be the name of a person. If there was any question in his mind during any of the proceedings a simple oral inquiry would have resolved it, without resort to discovery or bill of particular procedures. The record in this cause is also available to the defendant to bar any future prosecution based upon the same offense. Such being the case we hold that whatever ambiguity was created by the use of 'Williams Implement' did not render the instant indictment fatally defective.

We also hold that neither the absence of a street address (People v. Campbell, 40 Ill.2d 463, 240 N.E.2d 635; People v. Reed, 33 Ill.2d 535, 213 N.E.2d 278) nor the failure to allege ownership in some person other than the defendant (People v. Gregory, 59 Ill.2d 111, 319 N.E.2d 483; People v. Whittaker, 45 Ill.2d 491, 259 N.E.2d 787; People v. Stewart, 23 Ill.2d 161, 177 N.E.2d 237), Ipso facto, renders the instant indictment invalid. Consequently, these deficiencies are waived by the defendant's plea of guilty (see, People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 475, 179 N.E.2d 9), unless such deficiencies evidence the failure of the indictment; to sufficiently apprise defendant of the offense charged, to enable him to prepare a defense or to protect him against the possibility of future prosecution for the same offense (People v. Harvey, 53 Ill.2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269.)

Despite the foregoing deficiencies in the instant indictment, the allegations contained therein are sufficient, in our opinion, to fulfill the due process requirements set forth above. Although the allegations contained in the indictment lack a certain degree of specificity, which may require the granting of a bill of particulars (People v. Reed, 33 Ill.2d 535, 213 N.E.2d 278), it is not invalid. In People v. Gregory (1974), 59...