People v. Pryor
| Decision Date | 22 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-04-3434.,1-04-3434. |
| Citation | 865 N.E.2d 279 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phabian PRYOR, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Ginger Leigh Odom, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, May L. Boland, Laura Boedeker, Natosha Cuyler-Sherman, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Phabian Pryor, was convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2002)) and vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2002)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent prison terms of nine years. Defendant now appeals, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with a firearm; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to properly respond to a note that the jury sent out during its deliberations; (3) whether defendant's vehicular hijacking conviction must be vacated under Illinois' one-act, one-crime rule, where, based on defendant's contention, it was carved from precisely the same act as the aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction; (4) whether the mittimus should be corrected to reflect defendant's conviction of one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking and one count of vehicular hijacking; and (5) whether defendant's sentence of nine years for vehicular hijacking was excessive.
The record contains the following pertinent facts. Defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2002)) and two counts of aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1(a) (West 2002)). The State proceeded on the aggravated vehicular hijacking counts. One count alleged that on September 19, 2002, defendant knowingly took a 1996 Chevrolet Cavalier from the person or immediate presence of Marquis Bonner, by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force, and that defendant was armed. The other count alleged that on September 19, 2002, defendant knowingly took a 1996 Chevrolet Cavalier from the person or immediate presence of Tamika Bonner "by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force and that he carried on or about his person or was otherwise armed with a firearm."
The State's evidence at trial included the testimony of Marquis Bonner, Tamika Bonner and Officer Joseph Hodges. According to Marquis Bonner, sometime after 1:40 a.m., on September 19, 2002, he and Tamika left Tamika's house in the Western suburbs of Chicago to drive to their cousin's house at 79th Street and California Avenue. Tamika drove her car, a green Chevrolet Cavalier. After driving for 10 or 15 minutes on an expressway, Marquis and Tamika realized they were lost so they stopped at a pay phone at a gas station on the corner of 113th or 115th and Halsted Street in order to call her cousin to ask for directions. Tamika got out of the car to call her cousin. When she realized that the phone was not working, she told her brother. Marquis got out of the car to help her. Marquis noticed two men walking around nearby, one of whom Marquis identified as defendant. While Marquis was attempting to use the phone, defendant and his companion walked toward Marquis and Tamika and told Marquis to get in the car. At the same time, defendant pulled a silver object, which appeared to be a gun, from his waistband and pressed it against Marquis's stomach. Marquis testified that the object felt like "a circle object" against his stomach and "he felt like it could have been a gun," but he could not see the entire object. Defendant threatened to shoot Marquis if he did not get in the car. Marquis refused and defendant backed him up against the car and pulled his shirt over his head. Marquis's shirt came off and he ran while his sister ran in the opposite direction.
Marquis ran down the street away from the car, but returned to the gas station a few minutes later and noticed that the car was gone. He recovered his T-shirt and flagged down two nearby police officers. He told them what happened, and the police car took off in the direction that Marquis thought the car had gone. A few minutes later two other police officers picked up Marquis and drove him to the scene where Tamika's car had been crashed. The police took Marquis to a paddy wagon and asked him if the person inside was the same person who took his sister's car. Marquis identified the defendant as the same man who took his sister's car, and he identified the defendant in court.
According to the testimony of Tamika Bonner, in the early morning hours of September 19, 2002, she was going to drop her brother off at their cousin's house at 79th Street and California Avenue. She was not familiar with the area and, as a result, she and her brother got lost. They stopped at a gas station at 115th and Halsted to call their cousin. Tamika tried to use the telephone. However, the phone was inoperable, so her brother got out of the car to help her. Two men approached them and told them to take a ride with them. When one of the men grabbed her brother's shirt, Tamika ran. She identified the defendant as one of the two men that approached her and her brother that night. She called her father from a pay phone a few blocks away. Tamika's father picked her up, and they drove around looking for her brother. When they could not find him, they went home. After she returned home, she received a phone call from a woman who claimed that Tamika had hit her truck. Later that day Tamika received a phone call from her brother and the police and she went to the police station to view a lineup. Tamika identified the defendant as one of the men who took her car the night before.
According to the testimony of Chicago police officer Joseph Hodges, he and his partner were on patrol on 115th Street in a marked squad car. As they approached Halsted Street they noticed a young African-American, shirtless male trying to flag them down. The man told the officers that he had just been held up by two black males and they drove his car southbound on Halsted Street. The man told the officers that he had been with his sister but he did not know where she was. Officer Hodges told the man to remain where he was and the officers drove off in the direction the man thought the car had gone.
Approximately one minute later, the officers saw a green Chevrolet Cavalier approaching a stoplight at Halsted and 119th Streets. Officer Hodges pulled the police car in front of the Cavalier so that it could not move forward and he saw two black males inside. The driver of the car proceeded to drive the car in reverse attempting to get away. After driving approximately 30 feet in reverse, defendant hit a minivan parked on the street. Both offenders fled on foot. Officer Hodges chased the men on foot while his partner stayed with the Cavalier. Both offenders ran into an alley and then they split up. Officer Hodges chased defendant out of the alley, then defendant turned left on 118th Street, where Officer Hodges lost sight of him for 5 or 10 seconds.
As soon as the offenders exited from the vehicle, Officer Hodges broadcasted a description of the two men over his police radio. When he approached Halsted Street, he saw the defendant run across Halsted and observed another squad car approaching defendant. The other officers had defendant on the ground and Officer Hodges went back through the alley but was unable to find the other offender. Officer Hodges saw defendant in the back of a paddy wagon and he also observed that Marquis Bonner was near the paddy wagon.
Officer Hodges recalled that defendant went to the hospital after the incident, but he did not recall who transported him to the hospital. In addition, he did not recall seeing defendant injured in any way.
Keisha Winston testified that on the night of September 19, 2002, several individuals including herself, Ronald Pierre Thatch, and defendant were hanging out and drinking at her residence. At around 2:30 or 3 a.m., Winston, Thatch and defendant left her house and drove around looking to buy marijuana from someone on the street. They saw a couple of men standing around, so Thatch pulled over and defendant got out to ask if they had any marijuana. Defendant disappeared into the alley with the men and then he came running out of the alley. After Winston observed the defendant running out of the alley, she saw a police car back up and hit defendant, knocking him down and striking him twice. A paddy wagon pulled up and the police put defendant in the paddy wagon. Finally, the police brought a man to the paddy wagon and the man looked up and shook his head.
Winston and her boyfriend went to the police station to get more information, but they were sent home. They observed all of the activity from the car's rearview mirror from approximately one-half block away and defendant's face looked like it was bruised and bleeding when he was put into the paddy wagon.
Thatch testified that he was at Winston's residence with several other people on the night of September 19, 2002, after midnight. They were all drinking and some were smoking marijuana. Around 2:30 a.m., Thatch, Winston and defendant drove around for approximately 30 minutes to look for more marijuana. At around 118th Street and Green, Thatch pulled over and defendant went into the alley with three or four men for 30 or 40 seconds. Defendant then ran out of the alley and was hit by a police car that was chasing him in reverse. Defendant fell to the ground and got up, and the police car hit him again. The police then put defendant in a paddy...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Jones
...People v. Smith, 406 Ill.App.3d 879, 886–87, 347 Ill.Dec. 106, 941 N.E.2d 975 (2010) (citing People v. Pryor, 372 Ill.App.3d 422, 432, 309 Ill.Dec. 916, 865 N.E.2d 279 (2007) ).¶ 111 The record clearly demonstrates that the court specifically explained the second-degree-murder instruction t......
-
People v. Gonzalez
...abuse, he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the jury's factual findings. See People v. Pryor , 372 Ill. App. 3d 422, 430, 309 Ill.Dec. 916, 865 N.E.2d 279 (2007) ("By questioning whether the evidence proved an element of the offense of aggravated vehicular hijackin......
-
People v. Jermaine Ross
...witnesses. As a result, this court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. People v. Pryor, 372 Ill.App.3d 422, 309 Ill.Dec. 916, 865 N.E.2d 279 (2007). Thus, the issue presented is a question of fact and not of law, and the standard of review is whether, after vi......
-
People v. Jackson
...with another decision from this court that reached the opposite conclusion. As the State notes, in People v. Pryor, 372 Ill.App.3d 422, 309 Ill.Dec. 916, 865 N.E.2d 279 (2007), this court held that a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of aggravated vehicular hijacking when more t......