People v. Pugh
| Decision Date | 22 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 70615,70615 |
| Citation | People v. Pugh, 623 N.E.2d 255, 157 Ill.2d 1, 191 Ill.Dec. 10 (Ill. 1993) |
| Parties | , 191 Ill.Dec. 10 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie C. PUGH, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John P. Buckley, Chicago, and James F. Martin, Highland Park, for appellant.
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago and Renee Goldfarb and Kathleen Bom, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), Chicago, for the People.
On January 20, 1987, defendant, Willie C. Pugh, Jr., was charged by indictment in Cook County with two counts of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1)(a)(2)), two counts of felony murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)), one count of armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)), two counts of forcible detention (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 10-4(a)(1)), one count of unlawful use of a weapon (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(7)), and three counts of aggravated unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 10-3.1(a)).Defendant subsequently entered blind pleas of guilty to all counts.The trial court accepted defendant's guilty pleas and entered findings of guilt on all counts.Finding that certain counts merged with others, the trial court entered judgment on felony murder (count IV), armed robbery (count V), forcible detention (counts VI and VII), and unlawful use of weapons (count VIII).Defendant's convictions for intentional and knowing murder were vacated.Defendant waived his right to a jury at his death penalty hearing.Defendant stipulated to his eligibility for the death penalty.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6).)After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to death on the felony-murder conviction and to terms of imprisonment on the remaining convictions.Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether his guilty plea was involuntary by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) whether his guilty plea was involuntary due to his inability to understand; (3) whether his claim of accidental shooting during the sentencing hearing indicated his plea was not voluntary; (4) whether the finding of death penalty eligibility must be vacated because he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) whether the finding of death penalty eligibility must be vacated due to insufficient admonishments; (6) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at all phases of the proceedings due to defense counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation; (7) whether he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; (8) whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider additional evidence in mitigation; (9) whether the death sentence is excessive in his case; and (10) whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutional.
As part of the factual basis for the pleas, the State recited the proposed testimony of two South Chicago Heights police officers.Sergeant Richard Wolff would testify that at about 9:30 p.m. on December 16, 1986, he proceeded to the Clark gas station located at 2601 Chicago Road in South Chicago Heights in response to a radio dispatch of an alarm at the station.Upon entering the station, Wolff saw defendant standing behind a counter and next to a man, later identified as 19-year-old Brian Douglas.Defendant pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and pointed it at Wolff and then at Douglas.Defendant said, "Don't push me, I want out."Douglas indicated he was being robbed.Wolff holstered his own revolver and told defendant not to shoot anyone.
Officer Michael Haskins entered the station and both he and Wolff told defendant not to shoot and to let Douglas go.While holding Douglas with one hand and the shotgun in the other, defendant walked Douglas out of the front door toward 26th Street.Defendant ordered Haskins and Wolff to stay inside the station.Wolff called for a backup.The officers yelled to defendant to let Douglas go and the officers would not follow him.
Wolff stayed in the station and Haskins pursued defendant, who was walking around the corner of the service station near a telephone booth.Defendant had turned westward on 26th Street.When defendant stopped, Haskins was about 100 feet from him.Haskins observed defendant move about 1 1/2 steps backwards from Douglas, lower the shotgun and fire a shot into Douglas' chest area.Douglas was pronounced dead from the gunshot wound at 10:20 p.m. Haskins chased defendant about 100 feet before losing him when defendant turned the corner at 120 West 26th Street.
In an area southwest of the station, Wolff found a purple school jacket with "Central" in white lettering on the back.In the jacket sleeves he found three cartons of cigarettes identified as property from the gas station.
The victim's mother, Loretta Douglas, would testify that the purple jacket belonged to her son.She would also testify as a life-and-death witness for Douglas.Haskins would testify that upon entering the station he observed another male, later identified as Ingram Rush, exit the station carrying a coat similar to the one Wolff found.
Anthony Sapit of the Cook County sheriff's department would testify that he took defendant into custody about three quarters of a block west of Chicago Road at 26th Street.
Detective Larry Dujsik and Assistant State's Attorney John Murphy would testify regarding defendant's statement made about 4:15 a.m. on December 17, 1986.After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant said that Ingram Rush was the "setup" man who was to distract the store attendant.As Rush talked to Douglas, defendant picked up some chips and soda pop.Defendant went to the cash register, pulled out a gun and told Douglas to give defendant the money and no one would get hurt.Defendant saw Douglas push the alarm button.Defendant said that when the police arrived he told them to stay there.Defendant left the store with Douglas, but had to tell the police to get back inside the station.
Defendant said that he had the gun pointed at the store as he walked with Douglas.Initially, defendant said two other men were involved in the crime and one of them shot Douglas.Defendant changed this part of his statement and said only Rush and he were involved.Defendant admitted shooting Douglas and stated, "The gun went off while it was in my hand."
Dujsik was directed by defendant to the shotgun, a spent casing and a hat.The shotgun had been dismantled--one part had been hidden under some leaves and another part had been placed in a car trunk.Testimony from a forensic expert, Karen Vander Werff, would indicate the shell came from the shotgun and pellets from Douglas' body were consistent with being fired from the shotgun.State testing showed the trigger pull was normal to medium-heavy.Autopsy results would show Douglas died from a gunshot wound to his chest about five inches to the right of the midline.
Before the factual basis was presented, the trial judge admonished defendant of the effects of his guilty plea.Defense counsel frequently referred to "technical" pleas of guilty until the trial judge advised counsel that he did not know what a "technical" plea was.At one point defendant stated with respect to his right to remain silent, "Yes, I understand, but I would like to testify in my own behalf."Defendant's attorney then told the court, "Phase 3."The judge later questioned defendant regarding the voluntariness of his pleas.The judge noted the charges against defendant, including the fact that the State would be seeking the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961(Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)).The judge recited the provisions of section 9-1(b)(6) and defendant acknowledged that he understood.Following the recitation, defendant agreed that the asserted facts were true.The trial judge accepted defendant's guilty pleas and adjudged defendant guilty of those offenses previously enumerated.
The trial judge moved immediately to the first phase of the death penalty hearing, eligibility.The assistant State's Attorney indicated that this phase would be by way of stipulation.Then, the following exchange occurred:
"MR. SIMMONS [Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, it will be stipulated that the Court take judicial notice of the findings of the blind plea that was just entertained by the Court as to the murder, and the felonies that the court entered judgment on.
And it would also be a stipulation between the parties that the defendant is twenty-two years of age at this time or twenty-one.
MR. RAGO [Defense attorney]: So stipulated.
Aggravating and mitigating evidence was presented in the second phase of the death penalty hearing a few days later.In aggravation Officer Haskins elaborated on his stipulated testimony presented at the guilt phase.Particularly, he described how defendant released Douglas, took about two steps to the side, lowered the shotgun, put his other hand under the stock and, about four seconds later, shot Douglas.Officer Dujsik's testimony and the stipulated testimony of Assistant State's Attorney John Murphy showed that defendant did not indicate, nor did it appear, that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol when he gave his statements in the early morning hours of December 17, 1986.The State also presented the...
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People v. Manning
... ... 366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 209 (1985); People v. Brown, 309 Ill.App.3d 599, 604, 243 Ill. Dec. 330, 723 N.E.2d 362 (1999). To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 14, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993). In the context of a guilty plea, "prejudice" means that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's deficient performance. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 15, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 ... ...
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People v. Johnson
... ... Defendant concludes that the absence of a finding of the requisite intent would necessarily preclude the death sentence imposed for his conviction of felony-murder. See People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 17, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993) ... The defense theory at trial was that defendant played no role in the offenses for which he was charged. An argument such as the one defendant proposes here would have directly contradicted that theory by admitting ... ...
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People v. Gutierrez, 1–09–3499.
... ... 2052. 20 For a defendant to satisfy the prejudice requirement in the plea bargaining context, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 15, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)). The record should demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the error, the defendant would have rejected the plea agreement. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at ... ...
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People v. Dodds
... ... Rather, according to the State, the defendant's claim must be accompanied by either a claim of actual innocence or the articulation of a plausible defense that could have been raised at trial. Hall, 217 Ill.2d at 335, 299 Ill.Dec. 181, 841 N.E.2d 913; see also People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 15, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366). ¶ 43 The defendant acknowledges the holding in Hall, but nevertheless contends that in imposing the aforementioned requirement, the Illinois Supreme Court improperly relied ... ...