People v. Purcell
| Decision Date | 30 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-01-1053.,2-01-1053. |
| Citation | 758 N.E.2d 895,259 Ill.Dec. 487,325 Ill. App.3d 551 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willard PURCELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
The defendant, Willard Purcell, has filed the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(c) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(c)), seeking review of the September 10, 2001, order of the circuit court of Winnebago County denying bail. On appeal, the defendant argues (1) that section 110-4(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-4(b) (West 2000)) is unconstitutional; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for pretrial bail.
In August 2001, the defendant was arrested and indicted on four counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(19) (West 2000)). The defendant was alleged to have killed his wife, Barbara Purcell, by striking her repeatedly in the head with a blunt object. If convicted of the charged offense, the defendant may receive a sentence of life imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2000).
Following his arrest, the defendant filed a motion requesting bail. The defendant also filed a motion seeking a determination that section 110-4 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-4 (West 2000)) is unconstitutional. Section 110-4(a) provides that a defendant may not obtain bail where "the proof is evident or the presumption great" that the defendant committed a capital offense or an offense for which he may be sentenced to life imprisonment. 725 ILCS 5/110-4(a) (West 2000). Section 110-4(b) places the burden of demonstrating that the proof of guilt is not evident and the presumption of guilt not great upon the individual seeking release on bail. 725 ILCS 5/110-4(b) (West 2000). In his motion before the trial court, the defendant argued that subsection (b) violates the presumption of innocence accorded to criminal defendants while awaiting trial. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951).
On August 15, 2001, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to declare section 110-4(b) of the Code unconstitutional. Then, on September 10, 2001, following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for pretrial bail. The trial court found that the defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the proof of his guilt was not evident and that the presumption of his guilt was not great. The defendant then filed the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(c).
We will first address the defendant's constitutional argument. The right of an accused to obtain pretrial bail is governed by article I, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 9. That section provides:
"All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except the following offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great: capital offenses and offenses for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed as a consequence of conviction * * *." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 9.
Section 110-4 of the Code is a codification of this constitutional provision. That section provides:
Subsection (b) goes beyond the language of article I, section 9, and was added to clarify the issues of proof that might arise during bail proceedings. 725 ILCS Ann. 5/110-4, Committee Comments—1963, at 48 (Smith-Hurd 1992). The language contained in this subsection was taken from section 68(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1930. ALI Code of Criminal Procedure § 68(2) (1930). Under this provision, the burden falls upon the defendant seeking pretrial bail to establish that the proof of his guilt is not substantial.
As the defendant correctly notes, the due process clauses of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions guarantee the accused that he will not be convicted on proof less than reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 187-88 (1993). The complement to this guarantee is that the State bears the burden of proof and that the accused is presumed innocent. People v. Devine, 295 Ill.App.3d 537, 544, 229 Ill.Dec. 796, 692 N.E.2d 785 (1998). The presumption of innocence attaches to the accused from the onset of the proceedings and is one of the underpinnings of an accused's right to bail. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3, 96 L.Ed. at 6. The traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3, 96 L.Ed. at 6.
The question of whether section 110-4(b) infringes upon an accused's presumption of innocence has not previously been addressed by an Illinois court. However, Illinois' constitutional bail provision is not unique; the constitutions of most states contain similar provisions guaranteeing bail to the accused, except in cases punishable by death or life imprisonment where the proof is evident or the presumption great. As a result, there are a number of reported cases nationwide in which courts have considered the question of whether the State or the accused bears the burden during a bail hearing for an offense for which death or life imprisonment may be imposed, to show, or to disprove, that the proof is evident or the presumption great. See H. Hirschberg, Annotation, Upon Whom Rests Burden of Proof, Where Bail is Sought Before Judgment But After Indictment in Capital Case, as to Whether Proof is Evident or the Presumption Great, 89 A.L.R.2d 355 (1963). The decisions in these cases have been conflicting, some holding that the State has the burden, and others holding that the burden falls on the accused.
In those cases placing the burden upon the State to prove that the accused's guilt is evident or that the presumption of such guilt is great, the courts have relied upon the presumption of innocence. See Orona v. District Court, 184 Colo. 55, 518 P.2d 839 (1974); In re Steigler, 250 A.2d 379 (Del.1969); State v. Arthur, 390 So.2d 717 (Fla.1980); Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629 (Ky.1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev. 495, 406 P.2d 713 (1965); Fountaine v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 262, 366 A.2d 1138 (1976). These courts have explained that the presumption of innocence precludes any inference that the accused committed the charged offense. Finding that an indictment has no evidentiary value, these courts have held that the indictment does not raise a presumption, prima facie or otherwise, that the accused is guilty. See, e.g., Arthur, 390 So.2d at 719-20
. Additionally, in placing the burden of proof on the State, these courts have explained that the right to bail is constitutionally guaranteed, subject only to exceptions for certain designated offenses. These courts hold that the State has the burden to show the existence of one of the exceptions and prove that the defendant is not entitled to bail. See Beck v. State, 648 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
For example, in Arthur, the Florida Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence protected the accused for all purposes while awaiting trial and that it was the State's burden to prove the facts which removed the accused's entitlement to bail. Arthur, 390 So.2d at 719-20. The court explained that, under the State's constitution, bail could only be denied when the accused was charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment and that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption great. The court therefore held that the indictment or information, standing alone, could not serve as proof or a presumption of guilt. Arthur, 390 So.2d at 719. Rather, the court held that the State was required to come forward with an independent showing that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption of guilt great. Arthur, 390 So.2d at 720. The court also noted that, as a matter of convenience, fairness, and practicality, it was preferable that the State carry the burden of proof, as it was presumably in a better position to present to the court the evidence upon which it intended to rely. Arthur, 390 So.2d at 720.
In Wheeler, the Nevada Supreme Court similarly concluded that the State bears the burden to show that the accused should not be admitted bail. Wheeler, 81 Nev. at 499, 406 P.2d at 716. The Nevada constitution provides that "[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties; unless for Capital Offenses when the proof is evident, or the presumption great." Nev. Const., art. 1, § 7. Construing this language, the court concluded that all offenses are bailable, including capital offenses, as a matter of right. However, the court noted that the right to bail in a capital case could be limited upon a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great. Wheeler, 81 Nev. at 499, 406 P.2d at 715. Explaining that the accused is presumed innocent of the charged offense until proven guilty, the court held that the burden rests on the State to show that the right to bail is limited rather than absolute. Wheeler, 81 Nev. at 499, 406 P.2d...
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People v. Morgan
...forward with any evidence concerning the proof, or lack thereof, of any of the elements of the charged offense." People v. Purcell, 325 Ill.App.3d 551, 557 (2001). We add that "[i]t is a firmly settled proposition of law that the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant no matter what ......