People v. Quarles

• Decision Date: 18 November 1982
• Parties: , 444 N.E.2d 984 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Benjamin QUARLES, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 520

458 N.Y.S.2d 520

58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Benjamin QUARLES, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 18, 1982.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty. (Steven J. Rappaport, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for appellant.

Steven J. Hyman and Wayne Brody, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 85 App.Div.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 should be affirmed.

It was only after defendant had been frisked and his hands handcuffed behind his back that, in consequence of the discovery of an empty shoulder holster, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. Pointing to a liquid soap carton several feet away, defendant replied, "The gun is over there." At the time defendant was surrounded by four police officers whose guns had been returned to their holsters because, as Officer Kraft testified, "the situation was under control". Nothing suggests that any of the officers was by that time concerned for his own physical safety.

Inasmuch as defendant's response to the police interrogation occurred while he was in custody, before he had been given the preinterrogation warnings to which he was constitutionally entitled, the courts below properly suppressed defendant's statement and the gun which Officer Kraft had found on reaching into the liquid soap carton to which defendant had pointed. Similarly, the statements made by defendant only minutes later after he had been given his preinterrogation warnings were properly suppressed as having been tainted by the seizure of the gun and defendant's prewarning statement as to its location.

Even if it be assumed that an emergency exception to the normal rule might be recognized if the purpose of the police inquiry had been to locate and to confiscate the gun for the protection of the public as distinguished from their desire to obtain evidence of criminal activity on the part of defendant--a proposition as to which it is not necessary in this case to express an opinion--there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the police interrogation was prompted by any such concern. Nor, so far as appears from the record, was any such theory advanced by the People at the suppression hearing. Undeniably neither of the courts below, with fact-finding jurisdiction, made any factual determination that the police acted in the interest of public safety.

The two cases on which the dissent would rely are inapposite. In People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29, 390 N.Y.S.2d 843, 359 N.E.2d 353 the question was put to the defendant while the police were engaged in a general investigation of possible criminal activity b before they were aware that any crime had been committed and was framed as a threshold inquiry seeking general information only ("What are you doing back here?") rather than calculated to elicit evidence of criminal activity ("Where is the gun?"). In People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 409 N.E.2d 958, cert. den. 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 582, 66 L.Ed.2d 479 where the defendant's challenge was based primarily on his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution rather than his constitutional right to preinterrogation warnings, although the defendant and his companion were lying prone on the ground and the officers were standing over them with their guns drawn, the defendant had not been reduced to a condition of physical powerlessness as here, i.e., the situation was not yet "under control", and the police question was found to have been prompted by the officers' concern for their personal safety. We noted that the absence of any constitutionally mandated preinterrogation warnings did not call for suppression inasmuch as there was no custodial interrogation.

WACHTLER, Judge (dissenting).

In my view, under the circumstances, the police responded to an emergency situation in an entirely reasonable manner and, therefore, suppression of the weapon and defendant's statements cannot be justified on the ground that he was subjected to "custodial interrogation" in violation of his Miranda rights.

On September 11, 1980 at approximately 12:30 a.m. Officer Frank Kraft and his partner, Officer Sal Scarring, were on road patrol on 47th Avenue at Francis Lewis Boulevard, Queens, when a young woman approached and requested assistance. She stated that she had just been raped by a man she described as a black male, approximately six-feet tall wearing a black jacket with the name "Big Ben" in yellow letters on the back. She indicated that her assailant had entered the nearby A&P supermarket on Francis Lewis Boulevard, and that he had a gun.

The officers drove the woman to the supermarket where Kraft approached the front of the store on foot while Scarring radioed for assistance. Kraft then observed the defendant, who matched the description given by t woman, approaching the checkout counter. Defendant then fled to the rear of the store with Kraft, who lost sight of the defendant for several seconds, in pursuit. Kraft told defendant to stop and put his hands over his head. Other officers who had arrived in the interim surrounded defendant while Kraft frisked him, discovering an empty shoulder holster.

Kraft handcuffed defendant's hands behind his back and asked him where the gun was. The defendant looked in the direction of a stack of cartons and responded "the gun is over there". The gun was not visible but Kraft reached into one of the cartons and retrieved a loaded revolver. He placed defendant under arrest and advised him of his Miranda rights. Kraft then asked defendant if he owned the revolver and received an affirmative reply. In response to another question posed by Kraft defendant indicated that he purchased the weapon in Miami, Florida.

Criminal Term suppressed the statement "the gun is over there" because defendant had not yet been informed of his Miranda rights, and also suppressed the revolver and postarrest statements as tainted evidence (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441). The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion. In my view neither the letter nor the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 was violated under these circumstances, and, accordingly, I dissent and vote to reverse.

In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at p. 471, 86 S.Ct. at 1626 the Supreme Court held that statements obtained as the result of a custodial interrogation of a defendant may not be used at trial absent some demonstration that procedural safeguards were employed to secure the defendant's privilege against self incrimination. The court recently interpreted the meaning of the term "interrogation", as used in this context, as including not only express questioning but also its functional equivalent, defined as "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" (Rhode Island...