People v. Quevreaux

Decision Date21 September 1950
Docket NumberNo. 31543,31543
Citation407 Ill. 176,95 N.E.2d 62
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE v. QUEVREAUX et al.

James H. Bandy and McRoberts & Hoban, all of East St. Louis, for plaintiffs in error; and Ralph Quevreaux, pro se, on rehearing,

Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, and Richard T. Carter, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

CRAMPTON, Justice.

Plaintiffs in error, Ralph Quevreaux, Arthur Hines and Marcus LeRoy, seek review of a judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County, convicting them of the crime of rape. The punishment of Ralph Quevreaux was fixed at 15 years in the penitentiary, and that of each remaining defendant was fixed at 10 years in the penitentiary.

The evidence discloses that at about nine o'clock on the evening of June 3, 1949, the prosecuting witness, a girl 16 years of age, and three other young women went for an automobile ride with the defendants and a young man named Donald Frawley. They drove from East St. Louis to a resort several miles to the south known as Falling Springs, Illinois, where they remained in the vicinity of a tavern for approximately an hour. The entire party then proceeded back toward East St. Louis, driving along a country road. At about eleven o'clock they reached a place known as the Mullins Creek Bridge, where they stopped, got out of the automobile, and stood near the bridge conversing with one another. From this point there is some conflict in the testimony as to what occurred.

Two of the girls testified that defendants Hines and LeRoy then dragged or pulled the prosecuting witness across the bridge, that soon thereafter Quevreaux went across; and that screams were heard coming from the direction in which prosecuting witness had been taken. One such witness further testified that before prosecutrix was taken over the bridge, defendant LeRoy announced they were going to rape her, and that when she and defendants later returned to the car, she was crying and her clothes were torn. The third young woman is a sister of defendant Marcus LeRoy. She testified on behalf of the State that Hines and LeRoy took prosecutrix across the bridge, followed later by Quevreaux; that she did not hear prosecuting witness scream but did hear her crying; that when she returned to the automobile, she was crying and complaining of having lost her glasses. At this point in the testimony of this witness the prosecution claimed to be surprised by her statements and requested that the court make her a court's witness, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. The court granted the motion, over objection of counsel for defendants. On cross-examination by the prosecution the witness admitted having previously stated she had heard prosecutrix scream while she was across the bridge and that she went across the bridge against her will.

The prosecuting witness testified that defendants took hold of her and pulled her across the bridge against her will; that she fought them and tried to get away; that after Quevreaux joined them across the bridge, defendants pushed her to the ground, and each in turn forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while the other two held her arms and legs; that she screamed and at no time consented to the acts.

The prosecuting witness' mother, whose name was not endorsed on the indictment, testified for the prosecution that her daughter arrived home at 3 o'clock on the morning of June 4 and related what happened; that she was highly nervous, her clothes torn, and her body and lips badly bruised. A physician testified that he examined prosecuting witness on June 4 and found bruises on her shoulder and both thighs, that her lips were swollen, the sexual organs were in a swollen and red condition, and the hymen had been recently ruptured.

Each of the defendants testified on his own behalf. Quevreaux denied that he had sexual intercourse with complaining witness or assisted in dragging her across the bridge. He further stated that he saw her cross the bridge with the other defendants; that he did not hear her scream and that he went across the bridge only to help find her glasses. Each of the other defendants admitted that he engaged in sexual intercourse with prosecuting witness, but stated that it was with her consent and encouragement. According to their testimony she willingly accompanied them across the bridge. Defendant Hines then turned back and waited on the bridge while she and defendant LeRoy engaged in sexual intercourse by mutual consent. When LeRoy returned alone Hines went over to the place where prosecuting witness had remained, whereupon she told him that 'Marcus did it, and you might as well, too.' Sexual intercourse with Hines then followed without objection or resistance by the prosecuting witness. Donald Frawley, the only male member of the party not a defendant, was called as a witness for defendants. He testified he paid no attention to the others, did not see them crossing the bridge, and did not hear any scream or outcry.

Further evidence showed that after the defendants and prosecutrix had returned from across the bridge, the entire party drove back to East St. Louis and stopped at a house where one of the girls occupied a room, arriving there at about 1 o'clock A. M. Defendants Quevreaux and LeRoy then drove away in the automobile. The four girls went upstairs to this room for a short time, and thereafter, together with Donald Frawley and defendant Hines, walked to a nearby Masonic temple and sat on the steps of the building. At around 2:30 o'clock some police officers stopped where the group was sitting and advised them to go home. No complaint was made to them by the prosecutrix. She returned to her companion's room and then went for an automobile ride with some of the latter's friends, arriving home about 3 o'clock. Prosecutrix denied having been with the group on the steps of the Masonic temple when the police stopped, and the testimony of one of the other girls tended to corroborate her in this.

Defendants contend the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, that the convictions are based upon uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness, and that her failure to make any complaint until some four hours after the alleged rape renders improbable her testimony as to the defendants' use of force. There is no merit in this position. The jury heard and saw the witnesses, and, from their appearance, candor, and demeanor, had opportunities not possessed by this court for accurately estimating their credibility. The weight to be accorded their testimony is for the jury, and its verdict will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so improbable as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt. A mere conflict in the evidence is not sufficient to raise such reasonable doubt. People v. Leach, 398 Ill. 515, 76 N.E.2d 425. The testimony of the prosecuting witness does not stand uncorroborated but, on the contrary, is amply supported by other evidence that she was dragged across the bridge by force, that she screamed after defendants had taken her across, that when she returned she was crying and her clothing was torn, and that her physical condition shortly thereafter was that of a person subjected to violence and sexual intercourse. It is true, the record may justify some doubt as to whether complaint by prosecutrix was made as soon as practicable after the occurrence and without any inconsistent delay. If such complaint were the only evidence relied upon for corroboration, a question might arise as to its sufficiency. But here there is other more direct evidence as to circumstances and events at the time of the acts in question, which provides adequate corroboration of prosecutrix' version of what happened.

It is further urged that the court erred in refusing to grant a continuance to enable an attorney, appointed by the court for defendant LeRoy, to prepare a defense. It appears from the record that on November 29, 1949, the day the case was called for trial, the attorney who had originally been appointed to represent Marcus LeRoy was not present in the circuit court but was engaged in arguing another case then pending before this court; that the court thereupon...

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33 cases
  • People v. Ford
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1960
    ...does not place the accused at an unfair disadvantage, the burden of establishing this unfairness being upon the defense. People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill. 176, 95 N.E.2d 62; People v. Strosnider, 264 Ill. 434, 106 N.E. 229; Gore v. People, 162 Ill. 259, 44 N.E. 500; People v. Weil, 243 Ill. 208......
  • People v. Marino
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    ...if he is lying.' Defendants' contention in connection with Sgt. McLean's redirect examination is without merit. See also People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill. 176, 95 N.E.2d 62; People v. Rongetti, 344 Ill. 278, 176 N.E. Defendants next claim that they were prejudiced by newspaper publicity before ......
  • Cherb v. State
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    • November 2, 1971
    ...v. United States, 67 F.2d 943, 946 (10th Cir. 1933); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2nd Cir. 1925); People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill. 176, 95 N.E.2d 62 (1950); Baum v. State, 60 Tex.Cr.R. 638, 133 S.W. 271 (1911). Also see Anno. 74 A.L.R. In the instant case, there was no showing o......
  • People v. Pardo, 79-23
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    • April 22, 1980
    ...the overall purpose of the discovery rules, to prevent surprise or unfair advantage, was not thwarted. E. g., People v. Quevreaux (1950), 407 Ill. 176, 184, 95 N.E.2d 62, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 938, 71 S.Ct. 485, 95 L.Ed. Defense counsel cross-examined Blanch and was allowed by the trial co......
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