People v. Quill

Citation11 Misc.2d 512,177 N.Y.S.2d 380
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. QUILL, Defendant.
Decision Date14 January 1958
CourtNew York County Court

Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn, for plaintiff.

Paul O'Dwyer, New York City, for defendant.

NATHAN R. SOBEL, Judge.

The complainant, in a statement read into the record, has requested that no further proceedings be had in this indictment for the reasons stated therein.

The indictment in question charges criminal libel. The indictment was returned on February 11, 1954.

I shall consider complainant's request solely in connection with my power and duty under section 671 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section provides that: 'The court may, either of its own motion, or upon the application of the district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action, after indictment, to be dismissed.'

It is settled that sole discretion to dismiss an indictment in the interest of justice is vested in the court. The District Attorney may join in such an application but his consent is not necessary. A study of the history of section 671 will make clear why it was decided to vest such discretion in the court and not in the District Attorney. See Report of Comrs. on Pleading and Prac.--Code Crim.Pro., dated Dec. 31, 1849, p. 343; People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483.

Section 671 is a statutory enactment of the former power of nolle prosequi. The power to discontinue prosecution of a crime vested by that section in the court has little or nothing to do with the legal or factual merits of the charge. Nor is it concerned with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a dismissal, is concerned, as the statute states, solely with principles of justice. See State v. McDonald, 10 Okl.Cr. 413, 137 P. 362. The complainant in his statement requests that the prosecution be discontinued. He states that he did not request either the Grand Jury or the District Attorney to find this indictment nor did he consider that he had been libeled by the defendant's statement. He adds that the statement was made by the defendant in the heat of a labor dispute without malice toward himself but for the obvious purpose of gaining advantage for his union in the negotiations.

Ordinarily a complainant in a criminal action has no right to withdraw a complaint. For it is the public, not he, who has been injured by the commission of a crime. It is, therefore, inconceivable that this court could ever dismiss a robbery or burglary prosecution at the request of a complaining witness. On the contrary, such a refusal to proceed or testify, would result inevitably in the institution of contempt proceedings against such a reluctant or recalcitrant witness.

But criminal libel is a special kind of crime. Criminal prosecutions are infrequent. The theory, in simplest terms, is that when an individual is libelled, he has an adequate remedy in a civil suit for damages. The public suffers no injury. Vindication for the individual and adequate compensation for the injury done him may be obtained as well in the civil courts. Thus the rule has always been, that the remedy of criminal prosecution should only be sought where the wrong is of so flagrant a character as to make a criminal prosecution necessary on public grounds.

This rule found its earliest expression in a quotation by Hawkins (1 Hawk.P.C., ch. 28) later adopted by Lord Coleridge in 1844. 'The Court will not grant this extraordinary remedy by information, nor should a grant jury find an indictment, unless the offense be of such signal enormity that it may reasonably be construed to have a tendency to disturb the peace and harmony of the community.' Also quoted in Regina v. Labouchere, 50 L.T.N.S. 177, 181 [1884].)

As stated in Kennerly v. Hennessy, 68 Fla. 138, 139, 66 So. 729, 19 A.L.R. 1468: 'At common law a criminal prosecution for libel is warranted only when the alleged libel affects the public, as when it corrupts the public morals, or incites to violations of the criminal law or when the necessary or natural effect of the alleged publication is to cause an injury to a person or persons of such a nature and extent as to render a breach of the peace imminent or probable.' (See Odgers on Libel and Slander [5th ed.], 455, 803; 1 Bishop on New Criminal Law, § 540.)

It is interesting to note that both at common law and in our very earliest statutes, criminal libel was defined as a ...

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27 cases
  • Hill v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1972
    ... ... State v. Boggs, 181 Iowa 358, 164 N.W. 759 (1917); People v. Lowe, 209 App.Div. 498, 205 N.Y.S. 77 (1924). Consent given after the offense is complete does not destroy the criminality of the act or prevent ... People v. Wallace, 78 Cal.App.2d 726, 178 P.2d 771 (1947); People v. Vario, supra. See also, People v. Quill, 2 Misc.2d 72, 149 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1956), writ of prohibition on jurisdictional grounds denied, 3 A.D.2d 717, 159 N.Y.S.2d 312, motion for leave to ... ...
  • State v. Starrish
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 11, 1975
    ... ... Page 211 ... situations to avoid prosecution. People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 71, 533 P.2d 193 (1975); People v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 491, 505, 72 Cal.Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138 ... Camp, supra 67 Wash.2d at 375, 407 P.2d at 832 (Finley, J., dissenting). In People v. Quill, 11 Misc.2d 512, 177 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1958), for example, the court held that the purpose of the criminal libel law, to avert violent retaliation by the ... ...
  • People v. Joseph P.
    • United States
    • New York Justice Court
    • October 22, 1980
    ... ... An order for dismissal in the interests of justice has little or nothing to do with the legal or factual merits of the charge or with the guilt or innocence of the defendant; the Court is solely concerned with the principles of justice. People v. Quill, 11 Misc.2d 512, 177 N.Y.S.2d 380 ...         The criminal procedure process has over thirty-five (35) provisions for determinations to be made in the interests of justice. See People v. Williams, 97 Misc.2d 24, 31, 32, 410 N.Y.S.2d 978. The dismissal in the interest of justice has a ... ...
  • People v. Rao
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 20, 1976
    ... ... Quill, 11 Misc.2d 512, 513, 177 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382), but rather for an allegedly defective Grand Jury proceeding, pursuant to CPL 210.35 (subd. 5), or alleged legal insufficiency, pursuant to CPL 210.30. Although the former--interests of justice--disposition may be made Sua sponte (see CPL 210.40, subd ... ...
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