People v. Rahn

Decision Date27 November 1974
Docket NumberNo. 46409,46409
Citation59 Ill.2d 302,319 N.E.2d 787
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Don Owen RAHN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

John F. McNichols, J. Daniel Stewart, Richard J. Wilson, Deputy Defender, and Bruce Stratton, Springfield, for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Walter F. Farrand, State's Atty., Virginia (James B. Zagel and John Patrick Healy, Asst. Attys. Gen., and John A. Beyer, of Circuit Atty. Project, Bloomington, of counsel), for the People.

SCHAEFER, Justice:

On April 21, 1971, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Don Owen Rahn, and two co-defendants for the crime of arson. The defendant was 16 years of age at the time the alleged offense was committed on March 8, 1971. He was arrested on March 12, 1971, and on that day statements were taken from him and his co-defendants. No delinquency petition concerning the defendant was ever filed with the juvenile court. A jury found the defendants guilty, and Rahn was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 3 nor more than 10 years. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed (15 Ill.App.3d 170, 304 N.E.2d 161), one judge dissenting, and we allowed leave to appeal.

In advance of the trial, the defendant's attorney had moved that the State's Attorney be required to seek leave under the Juvenile Court Act to prosecute the defendant as an adult. The trial court denied that motion on the ground that no petition was necessary since the State's Attorney had already decided to proceed against the juvenile under the criminal law and had obtained an indictment. The propriety of this ruling is the only issue raised in this court.

In the appellate court it was contended that this issue was not properly preserved for review. That contention is renewed in this court, but since the appellate court decided the merits of the issue we shall do so too.

The Juvenile Court Act specifies the duties to be performed by an officer who takes a minor into custody. Section 3--2 provides:

'A law enforcement officer who takes a minor into custody without a warrant under Section 3--1 shall immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent * * *; and the officer shall without unnecessary delay take the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer designated for such purposes in the county of venue or shall surrender the minor to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense is alleged to have been committed. The minor, if not released, shall be delivered without unnecessary delay to the court or to the place designated by rule or order of court for the reception of minors.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 37, par. 703--2.

Section 2--7 of the Juvenile Court Act describes the duties of the prosecutor and the judge with respect to the prosecution of a juvenile under the criminal laws. In 1971 it provided:

'(1) Except as provided in this Section, no boy who was under 17 years of age * * * at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State * * *.

(3) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an act which constitutes a crime under the laws of this State, the State's Attorney shall determine the court in which that minor is to be prosecuted; however, if the Juvenile Court Judge objects to the removal of a case from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, the matter shall be referred to the chief judge of the circuit for decision and disposition. If criminal proceedings are instituted, the petition shall be dismissed insofar as the act...

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23 cases
  • The City of Massillon v. Mark A. Kohler, 81-LW-2380
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • October 21, 1981
    ... ... saw, that particular night, concerning that particular ... defendant. And then you tell the people of the State of Ohio ... that he is not guilty ... Now you can not base your acquittal of this defendant by ... imaginary doubt, ... 2d 229, 282 NE2d 131, cert den 409 US 914, 34 L Ed 2d 175, 93 ... S Ct 247 and (ovrld on other grounds People v Rahn 59 Ill 2d ... 302, 319 NE2d 787) as stated in People v Pedrosa 36 Ill App ... 3d 207, 343 NE2d 649; Mooberry v State, 157 Ind App 354, ... ...
  • People v. Lewis
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1981
    ...Ill.2d 257, 261, 307 N.E.2d 161.) But what the majority did not mention was that this line of cases was abandoned in People v. Rahn (1974), 59 Ill.2d 302, 319 N.E.2d 787. Rather than perpetuating the mistaken notion that the prosecutor could unilaterally make a judicial decision, the court ......
  • People v. Moman
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 29, 1990
    ...could have been linked to defendant. (See People v. Rahn (1973), 15 Ill.App.3d 170, 304 N.E.2d 161, rev'd on other grounds (1974) 59 Ill.2d 302, 319 N.E.2d 787.) Faragoi did not identify defendant as the fourth person who fled from the car connected to the other armed robbery, and Crockett,......
  • People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez, s. 55050
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1982
    ...This standard had previously been applied by the appellate court in several cases, in view of this court's holding in People v. Rahn (1974), 59 Ill.2d 302, 319 N.E.2d 787, that the ultimate decision on transfer is a judicial one. See, e.g., In re Burns (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 361, 24 Ill.Dec.......
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