People v. Raider

• Citation: 490 P.3d 1079
• Decision Date: 07 January 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 17CA1896
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles RAIDER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

490 P.3d 1079

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Charles RAIDER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 17CA1896

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

Announced January 7, 2021

Rehearing Denied January 28, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Laura E. H. Harvell, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ

¶ 1 Anyone who drives a motor vehicle in Colorado is deemed to have consented to the provisions of the Expressed Consent Statute. § 42-4-1301.1(1), C.R.S. 2020. Those provisions include consent to take a blood or breath test when requested by a law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe the driver is under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. § 42-4-1301.1(2)(a)(I), (b)(I). If the driver refuses such testing, that refusal is admissible into evidence at a trial for driving under the influence (DUI) or driving while ability impaired (DWAI). § 42-4-1301(6)(d), C.R.S. 2020. A driver's refusal will also result in revocation of his or her driver's license for at least a year — and longer for successive instances of refusal. § 42-2-126(2)(h), (3)(c)(I), (4)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 2 But the Expressed Consent Statute permits a law enforcement officer to force a driver to take a blood test, notwithstanding the driver's refusal, if the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has committed one of four listed offenses. The statute provides that

[n]o law enforcement officer shall physically restrain any person for the purpose of obtaining a specimen of such person's blood , breath, saliva, or urine for testing except when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed criminally negligent homicide pursuant to section 18-3-105, C.R.S., vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106(1)(b), C.R.S., assault in the third degree pursuant to section 18-3-204, C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205(1)(b), C.R.S., and the person is refusing to take or to complete, or to cooperate in the completing of, any test or tests, then, in such event, the law enforcement officer may require a blood test .

§ 42-4-1301.1(3) (emphases added). Evidence acquired through such a forced blood test is admissible in a prosecution for any of the four listed offenses or for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or underage drinking and driving. § 42-4-1301(6)(e).

¶ 3 This case presents an issue of first impression under these provisions: whether the Expressed Consent Statute provides the exclusive list of circumstances under which officers may obtain forced blood draws of DUI or DWAI suspects, or whether officers may obtain forced blood draws in other circumstances so long as they secure a warrant. Defendant, Charles Raider, Jr., contends that the statute permits officers to require testing of DUI or DWAI suspects in only four specified circumstances, and obtaining a warrant is not one of those circumstances. The People, conversely, contend that the statute provides for searches under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and, thus, that the statute's limitations do not apply when an officer has secured a warrant authorizing a test.

¶ 4 We conclude that under the plain language of the Expressed Consent Statute, law enforcement officers may not force a driver suspected of DUI or DWAI to take a blood test except in the four specified circumstances — that is, when the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has committed criminally negligent homicide, vehicular homicide, third degree assault, or vehicular assault — even if the officers obtain a warrant authorizing the test. We also conclude that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the results of Raider's illegal forced blood test at his trial for DUI and obstructing a peace officer and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial on both charges.

I. Background

¶ 5 Officer Jason Lang of the Fort Collins Police Department responded to a call one evening about an unauthorized car in a handicapped parking space. When he approached the car, Raider was sitting in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. Upon interacting with Raider, Officer Lang noticed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Raider produced an expired handicapped placard, explained that he had come to pick up a friend, and, when questioned, denied having consumed any alcohol or taken any drugs. Officer Lang asked Raider to perform some roadside maneuvers, but he declined.

¶ 6 Officer Lang advised Raider that he was under arrest for DUI. Both Officer Lang and a second officer to arrive at the scene, Officer Kenneth Koski, advised Raider about the Expressed Consent Statute. Raider initially didn't provide a definitive response, but ultimately he refused any testing.

¶ 7 After learning that Raider had several prior DUI convictions, Officer Koski applied for a search warrant to conduct a blood draw.¹ Meanwhile, Officer Lang transported Raider to the hospital. After about an hour, the officers received a signed warrant authorizing them to draw a sample of Raider's blood for testing and to use reasonable and necessary force to obtain it. Because Raider refused to cooperate with the blood draw, hospital personnel put him in four-point leather restraints and several officers held him down while a technician drew his blood. Testing revealed that his blood had an alcohol content of .188 and contained the active components of marijuana.

¶ 8 The prosecution charged Raider with felony DUI (three or more prior convictions) and obstructing a peace officer. Before trial, Raider sought to suppress evidence from the forced blood draw. The trial court denied the request, concluding that the Expressed Consent Statute doesn't apply where, as here, a blood draw is authorized by a warrant. After a trial at which the prosecution presented evidence of Raider's blood test results and refusal to cooperate with the blood draw, the jury found Raider guilty of both charges. The court found Raider had five prior DUI convictions, making his conviction a felony, and sentenced him accordingly.²

II. Analysis

¶ 9 We first consider Raider's argument that the forced blood draw violated the Expressed Consent Statute. Because we conclude that it did, we also consider what is the appropriate remedy for the violation (we conclude that the test results must be suppressed) and whether the erroneous admission of the test results requires reversal of Raider's convictions (we conclude that it does).

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Our review of the trial court's ruling on suppression issues presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Simpson , 2017 CO 25, ¶ 12, 392 P.3d 1207. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by the record, but we assess the legal effect of those facts de novo. Id. We also review de novo the trial court's interpretation of the Expressed Consent Statute. See People v. Smith , 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 11 We consider whether preserved nonconstitutional errors require reversal under the harmless error standard. Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d 116 ; see also Crim. P. 52(a). Under this standard, we reverse only if an error affects the parties’ substantial rights — that is, if it "substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings." Hagos , ¶ 12 (quoting Tevlin v. People , 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986) ).

B. The Expressed Consent Statute

¶ 12 We first consider whether the Expressed Consent Statute provides the exclusive list of circumstances under which officers may obtain forced blood draws of DUI or DWAI suspects, or whether officers may obtain forced blood draws in other circumstances so long as they secure a warrant.

¶ 13 In construing a statute, our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379. To do so, we focus primarily on the language of the statute, recognizing that " ‘a court should always turn first’ to the plain meaning rule ‘before all other[ ]’ rules because ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ " Cowen v. People , 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d 215 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ). Thus, we give statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings, read those words and phrases in context, and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.

McCoy , ¶ 37. We also endeavor to effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme, reading that scheme as a whole, giving consistent effect to all of its parts, and avoiding constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results. Id. at ¶ 38.

¶ 14 If the statutory language is unambiguous, we effectuate its plain meaning and look no further. Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725. But if the language is ambiguous, in that it is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations, we may consider other tools of statutory construction. Id.

¶ 15 The parties agree that the Expressed Consent Statute does not refer to warrants. But "[a] statute's silence on an issue does not necessarily mean that the statute is ambiguous." Hansen v. Barron's Oilfield Serv., Inc. , 2018 COA 132, ¶ 10, 429 P.3d 101 ; see also In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury , 97 P.3d 921, 924-25 (Colo. 2004) (statutory silence on an issue didn't create an ambiguity). In fact, it may be prudent to refrain from finding ambiguity in silence, as "a statute's silence on a particular issue easily could be used to manufacture ambiguity where...