People v. Rainey
| Decision Date | 27 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-16-0187,1-16-0187 |
| Citation | 438 Ill.Dec. 457,146 N.E.3d 211,2019 IL App (1st) 160187 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vidal RAINEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Tiffany Boye Green, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and John E. Nowak, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant Vidal Rainey twice waived his right to counsel and, for a time, went pro se . He revoked his first waiver after a month of going it alone; his second waiver, after two weeks. When defendant demanded to represent himself a third time, on the eve of trial, the judge said no. With his trial imminent, and his unwanted public defender at the helm, defendant pleaded guilty to a raft of serious offenses, charged in 19 separate cases, all arising from his alleged crime spree in the summer of 2012.
¶ 2 Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. Those pleas were involuntary, he argued, because his request for a third go at self-representation was improperly denied, thus saddling him with the choice between pleading guilty or putting his trial in the hands of an attorney he didn't trust and didn't want. The trial court denied the motion and explained, in a written post-plea order, why it had denied defendant's request for self-representation. On appeal, defendant contests that ruling and asks us to vacate his guilty pleas.
¶ 3 Defendant tested the limits of the trial judge's forbearance with antics that were, by turns, dilatory, obstructionist, and deeply offensive. We commend the judge's patience and scrupulous concern, through it all, for defendant's sixth-amendment rights. And while defendant correctly argues that some of the rationales offered in the court's post-plea order violate settled sixth-amendment principles, we find that the record amply supports the denial of his third request for self-representation. Indeed, the trial court made factual findings in the post-plea order that justify its ruling, even if defendant is correct that those factual findings were not always properly tied into the court's (sometimes flawed) legal analysis.
¶ 4 For one thing, we agree that defendant's request was one more example of his "constant efforts to delay the proceedings" and throw a monkey wrench into his prosecution. His pattern of temporarily waiving counsel, only to ask for counsel back at the very next court date, made clear that he had no intention of seeing his own representation through. The inevitable result, if not the point, of his request was to delay his impending trial—just as he had done before. What's more, defendant's disruptive, recalcitrant, and offensive behavior whenever he represented himself in a hearing betrayed his inability to conduct his own trial with civility and decorum. Because defendant's request was properly denied, he cannot show that his guilty pleas were involuntary.
¶ 6 Defendant racked up 19 indictments, charging him with aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, numerous armed robberies, attempted home invasion, residential burglary, battery of a police officer, and other offenses. For the first year or so of proceedings in the trial court, defendant was represented by private counsel. When that relationship soured, in August 2013, the trial court granted private counsel's motion to withdraw and appointed the public defender's office. Assistant Public Defender (APD) Armando Sandoval took over defendant's cases.
¶ 7 APD Sandoval had defendant evaluated by a forensic psychologist. The parties stipulated that defendant was found fit to stand trial in January 2014. At the same hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. (That plea is not at issue in this appeal.) But he rejected the State's offer of an aggregate, below-the-minimum sentence of 40 years, in exchange for his guilty pleas in his remaining cases, which are at issue here. And he complained that his attorney had not shared any discovery with him. APD Sandoval explained that he had tried to visit the day before, but he was unable to locate defendant in the jail at that time. He assured defendant that he would visit again to review the discovery. Unassuaged, defendant invoked his right of self-representation.
¶ 8 The trial judge warned defendant about the perils of self-representation; explained that defendant would not have standby counsel or be permitted to change his mind during trial; and admonished defendant about the charges and penalties in the State's elected case. Defendant said he understood all of this, and the judge accepted his waiver of counsel, finding it knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
¶ 9 Exactly one month later, at the start of the next status hearing, defendant told the judge that he "rethought [his] situation." He no longer wanted to represent himself, but he didn't want a public defender, either; instead, he wanted a "bar association lawyer." But as the judge explained to him, the court had no authority to appoint private counsel unless the public defender's office had a disabling conflict; and in this case, it did not. So defendant could have a public defender, or he could represent himself. He chose a public defender, and APD Sandoval was reappointed.
¶ 10 That appointment lasted about six months. On September 8, 2014, the parties appeared for a final pretrial conference. Defendant demanded a second fitness evaluation. In response to the judge's inquiry, APD Sandoval said that he did not see any bona fide issue as to defendant's fitness, nothing of note having changed, from his perspective, since the last fitness evaluation in January of that year. The judge denied defendant's request, and defendant immediately invoked his right of self-representation again.
¶ 11 As the judge noted, defendant purported to question his own fitness to stand trial, yet he now insisted on conducting his trial himself. And this after acknowledging, the last time around, that self-representation "wasn't going to be a good idea." Still, the judge obliged, while also reminding defendant that his right to change his mind was not without its limits: If defendant chose to represent himself again, he would have to do so until the "conclusion of trial at a minimum." Defendant held fast, and after a fresh round of admonishments, the judge accepted his second waiver of counsel.
¶ 12 Defendant's first move was to ask for a transfer to Cook County Jail. Apparently he did not have phone privileges in prison, which would make it that much more difficult for him to prepare his own defense. The judge denied his request, explaining that defendant was legally required, in his particular circumstances, to remain in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
¶ 13 With the trial date only three weeks away, and appointed counsel now out of the picture, the prosecutor tried to give defendant copies of the State's motions in limine and proposed jury instructions. But defendant up and left the courtroom. When security brought him back to the courtroom, defendant launched into an offensive and highly demeaning tirade against the judge, calling him a "ni**er," a "fu**ing fa**ot," and verbally abusing him in other ways that we will describe in more detail later on.
¶ 14 The trial court tried to complete the final pretrial conference a week later, on September 15, 2014. Defendant appeared pro se and in shackles. He filed another motion to appoint a private attorney, which the trial court denied. Defendant later announced that that he would hire a private attorney. That was fine, the judge said, as long as the attorney would be ready for trial as scheduled—on September 29, 2014, which was just two weeks away. Defendant objected that the judge was "forcing [him] to trial," and he demanded to have his case transferred to a different courtroom, where his request for an extension would be accommodated. The judge denied that request and reiterated numerous times that defendant's trial would commence as scheduled. Defendant insisted, at least as many times, that he would not start trial on September 29. And he continued to demand another fitness evaluation.
¶ 15 Defendant's conduct and attitude toward the judge, throughout the hearing, defies concise paraphrase. So we will describe it in proper detail later, as our analysis demands it. Suffice it to say for now that defendant continued to verbally abuse the judge, disrespect the court, and stonewall the proceedings by refusing to cooperate even minimally. And he purported to blame the judge for his alleged inability to cooperate, arguing that his wrist shackles made it impossible for him to access his papers, even though it was clear to the judge that he was perfectly capable of turning the pages when he wanted to. The judge warned him that his conduct was jeopardizing not only his right to represent himself but also his right to be present at trial.
¶ 16 Eight days later, on September 23, 2014—at what was supposed to be the final status hearing before trial—defendant asked the trial court to reappoint the public defender's office. The judge agreed and struck the impending trial date.
¶ 17 APD Sandoval renewed defendant's request for a second fitness evaluation, arguing that defendant's conduct at the September 8, 2014 hearing was so out of character that it raised new concerns about his mental status. The judge was skeptical that defendant's conduct had anything to do with mental illness, given that he suddenly started throwing "temper tantrums" shortly after his pro se requests (for a fitness evaluation and a transfer to the county jail) were...
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