People v. Ramirez
| Decision Date | 27 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 51859 |
| Citation | 236 N.E.2d 284,93 Ill.App.2d 404 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Manuel RAMIREZ, Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago, Elmer C. Kissane, James A. Stamos, Asst. State's Attys. of counsel, for appellee.
JUDGMENT
After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term of 14 to 20 years.
(1) The evidence was insufficient to establish defendant's guilt.
(2) The prosecutor made prejudicial arguments to the jury.
(3) The court erred in instructing the jury.
(4) The totality of the circumstances surrounding the taking of an unsigned statement by defendant demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights.
Dr. James W. Henry, for the State.
He was the chief pathologist for the Coroner of Cook County. He examined the remains of decedent (Julio Fazio) on October 18, 1965. Death was caused by asphyxia from suffocation, which, in turn, could have been caused by the gag in decedent's mouth. In his opinion, it was difficult to determine the time of death because of the body's having been in the water. It could have been there for as long as three days. Death could have occurred at a location other than the quarry (referred to by other witnesses).
William Mitchell, for the State.
He was a Sheriff's detective who helped raise the corpse from the water in Lemont quarry on October 17, 1965. The hands and feet were bound with wire. A piece of cloth tape secured a man's sock in the mouth of the corpse.
At about 2:30 P.M. on October 19, Mitchell and Sgt. Harmon went to the apartment of Robert Bradford. Bradford, defendant, and two women were in the apartment at that time. Wire, similar in appearance to the wire which bound the body, was found in the apartment, and it was learned that the wire belonged to Bradford.
Bradford was taken to the police station. Although not arrested, defendant was asked to go along to the station. Defendant, accompanied by the two women, complied with this request.
Jerome Harmon, for the State.
He was a Sergeant in the Sheriff's Police on October 19, 1965, when he and two other officers were admitted to Bradford's apartment. His testimony substantially corroborated Mitchell's description of the events occurring in Bradford's apartment on the occasion of the officers' visit.
Defendant arrived at the police station at 3:00 or 3:30 P.M. 1 He remained in the waiting room until about 1:30 A.M., when he was informed that he was under arrest. Defendant was allowed to phone a lawyer and a member of his family. His lawyer told defendant that he was not to say or sign anything. The interrogation of defendant was continued until 4:00 A.M., when he was charged with murder.
Robert Ericson, for the State.
He was a Sheriff's detective on October 20, 1965. At 12:30 A.M., he and Detective Repiczak talked to defendant in the police station. At 1:15 or 1:30 A.M., the interview was interrupted to inform defendant that he was under arrest and to allow him to call his lawyer and his family, which he did. Ericson identified an unsigned, typed statement as one which he typed to record an oral statement made by defendant. The statement was typed at about 4:00 A.M. (The statement was also identified by Mitchell and Repiczak and was admitted into evidence.)
George Repiczak, for the State.
The substantially corroborated Ericson's testimony, and testified that defendant's oral statement was made in his and Ericson's presence at about 2:30 A.M.
Unsigned, typed statement identified by the police officers as having been made by defendant.
he didn't want us to get involved. I told him, 'Well we were tired and we just wanted to lay down somewhere.' So he said alright come in. We went into the Kitchen and Kay and Bruce were sitting at the table drinking. We went and sat down and started drinking. Bob said that his wallet was missing and that the fellow in there knew where it was. I told him I didn't want to know anything about it. We stayed taling about my being in the House of Correction. About 5 minutes Judy passed out at the table. I asked Bob if it was alright if I layed her down. He said it was alright so I carried Judy in the front room and laid her on the couch. I seen a man sitting under the window tied. I went back to the kitchen, we talked a little more, then I went in and laid down with Judy. I went to sleep.
Manuel Ramirez, defendant.
Defendant denied the charges against him. He denied ever seeing anyone bound or gagged in Bradford's apartment. Also, he denied making the oral statement identified by the police officers as having been made by him, and said that it did not speak the truth. Defendant did admit having been at Bradford's apartment from October 14 until Bradford's arrest on the 19th.
OPINIONThe fact of Fazio's death and the fact that it was caused by the criminal agency of someone are clearly established by the evidence. However, in order to sustain the conviction of this defendant (who was not shown to have performed the killing), the State must also have adduced sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is legally accountable for the murder. 2 The State correctly notes that the oral statement quoted above, which defendant denies having made, is the only evidence adduced in support of the State's accountability theory.
In order to bring an accused within the purview of the statute, three propositions must be established: (1) that he solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another person in the planning or commission of the offense; (2) that this participation on his part must have taken place either before or during the commission of the offense; and (3) that it must have been with the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. The issue here...
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... ... People v. Freeman (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1014, 57 Ill.Dec. 393, 428 N.E.2d 1073; People v. Ramirez (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 404, 236 N.E.2d 284.) Although mere presence at the scene of an offense or mere acquiescence in another's actions is ordinarily insufficient to establish accountability, one may be held to aid and abet without physically participating in the overt act. (People v. Gray ... ...
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... ... The State's burden is met if the evidence demonstrates that the accused "shared the criminal intent of the principal or that there was a community of unlawful purpose." (People v. Ramirez (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 404, 411, 236 N.E.2d 284.) Community of purpose or common design may be shown by the spontaneous and joint participation of a group in the commission of an offense. (People v. Hill (1977), 53 Ill.App.3d 280, 11 Ill.Dec. 163, 368 N.E.2d 714.) ... "The requisite mental ... ...
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