People v. Ramirez

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSON; LILLIE, P.J., and FRED WOODS
• Citation: People v. Ramirez, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 6 Cal.App.4th 1583 (Cal. App. 1992)
• Decision Date: 02 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. B054084,B054084
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick Curtis RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 529

8 Cal.Rptr.2d 529

6 Cal.App.4th 1583

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick Curtis RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B054084.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

June 2, 1992.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Review Denied Aug. 13, 1992.

[6 Cal.App.4th 1585] Conrad Petermann, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Acting Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Patrick Curtis Ramirez, appeals from a judgment of conviction for robbery following a jury trial. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellant, Patrick C. Ramirez, was convicted after a jury trial of the November 12, 1989, robbery of a Radio Shack electronics store in Culver City. The jury found true the special allegation appellant used a firearm during the commission of the robbery.

Prior to trial, appellant made two motions relevant to this appeal. The first was his request for self-representation. After a series of delays and continuances, the court rescheduled trial for June 11, 1990. On that day, appellant formally moved for a substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44. After a hearing on the matter, the court denied appellant's Marsden motion. The court then notified the parties the case would be held over until Monday, June 18th. Appellant immediately made an impromptu request for self-representation. The court denied the request after appellant stated he would not be prepared to proceed to trial on June 18th.

The second motion was appellant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. ¹ Appellant sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to warrantless searches of his car and home. Appellant contended he did not personally consent to the search of his car and his wife did not voluntarily consent to the search of the family home.

The original hearing on appellant's suppression motion took place over the course of the three days preceding the actual commencement of trial. On the second day of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his car. On the third day, the court suppressed evidence seized from appellant's home on the ground the People had not established by "clear and convincing evidence" Mrs. Ramirez voluntarily consented to the search. On the very next day, the People moved for reconsideration of the issue, arguing the court applied the wrong standard of proof to the issue of consent. The court reconsidered the motion under the correct standard and denied the motion to suppress evidence seized from the home.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation and in reconsidering its ruling suppressing evidence.

DISCUSSION

I. IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO DENY APPELLANT'S REQUEST TO PROCEED IN PRO. PER. ^**

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECONSIDERING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHERE THE COURT SOUGHT TO CORRECT ITS OWN CLEAR LEGAL ERROR AND DID NOT REWEIGH THE FACTUAL BASES FOR THE RULING.

Appellant contends the trial court erred by reconsidering its pretrial ruling suppressing evidence seized from his home. In order to fully address appellant's contention, a play-by-play description of the lengthy suppression hearing is required.

The trial court began hearing argument on the motion on June 26, 1990. On the morning of Wednesday, June 27th, the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence seized from appellant's car finding sufficient evidence of appellant's consent to the search.

That afternoon, the trial court began hearing argument on the legality of the home search. Argument continued on Thursday, June 28th. On the afternoon of the 28th, the trial court granted appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized in his home, finding insufficient evidence appellant's wife consented to the search. In making its ruling the trial judge stated, "the problem is that in this situation, quite frankly, ... the People have convinced me by a preponderance, and that's not enough. You've got to go beyond that and convince me by clear and convincing evidence...."

On Friday, June 29th, the People requested the court reconsider its ruling suppressing evidence seized from appellant's home on the ground the court had applied the wrong standard of proof for determining consent to the search. On the afternoon of June 29th, the court vacated its partial grant of the suppression motion for the purpose of determining whether it had jurisdiction to reconsider the issue. The jury was sworn in later that day.

On the morning of Monday, July 2d, and before proceedings commenced before the jury, the court determined it had jurisdiction to reconsider the motion. The court further determined reconsideration was proper because it had applied the wrong standard of law in its ruling. ²

The court allowed the parties to reargue the issue under the correct standard of proof for the remainder of the morning. The court ultimately denied the motion, finding the People established Mrs. Ramirez consented to the search of the family home by a preponderance of the evidence. Opening statements and the taking of evidence did not commence until the afternoon of Monday, July 2d, 1990.

Appellant does not contest the correctness of the "preponderance" standard, nor does he contend the trial court erred in finding consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant's sole contention on appeal is simply this: the trial court, having once granted the motion, was without jurisdiction to reconsider the issue to correct its own legal error.

In support of this contention, appellant relies on the language of section 1538.5, subdivision (j), and the California Supreme Court's interpretation of that section in Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.

Section 1538.5, subdivision (j) limits the relitigation of motions to suppress evidence. It states in pertinent part:

"If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by complaint and the defendant's motion for the return or suppression of the property or evidence ... is granted at a special hearing in the superior court, the people, if they have additional evidence relating to the motion and not presented at the special hearing, shall have the right to show good cause at the trial why such evidence was not presented at the special hearing and why the prior ruling at the special hearing should not be binding, or the people may seek appellate review as provided in subdivision (o), ..."

The California Supreme Court had occasion to interpret section 1538.5, subdivision (j) in Madril v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33. In Madril, the trial court granted the defendant's suppression motion after a special hearing. One week later, the People moved to "reopen and reconsider" the motion arguing "through haste and inadvertence" the People failed to present additional evidence in its possession at the earlier hearing. The court granted the People's motion to reconsider, and after considerable delay, reversed itself by vacating its original order and denying the suppression motion. (Id. at p. 74, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Defendant sought a writ of mandate.

The Supreme Court issued the writ and ordered the trial court to suppress the evidence in accordance with its original ruling. The court quoted the language of section 1538.5, which allows the People to seek reconsideration of the issue at trial, "if they have additional evidence ... not presented at the special hearing," upon a showing of "good cause at the trial why such evidence was not presented at the special hearing and why the prior ruling at the special hearing should not be binding...." (Madril, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 75, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33, italics in original.) The court held "haste and inadvertence" did not constitute the requisite good cause for the People's failure to present the additional evidence at the special hearing.

The court rejected the notion trial courts have the inherent power to reconsider section 1538.5 rulings during the 30-day period for review by writ, as suggested in People v. Leighter (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 389, 393-395, 93 Cal.Rptr. 136, and in dictum in People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal.3d 357, 363-364, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262. The court concluded the purpose of the statute, namely, to reduce time spent in relitigating the legality of a search, would be better served by following the decisions in People v. Superior Court (Green) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 477, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223, and People v. Dubose (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 43, 94 Cal.Rptr. 376, in which the courts announced a strict rule of law with respect to a defendant's right to only one pretrial motion to suppress. ³

The Madril court went on to pronounce "determination of a 1538.5 motion at a special hearing in the superior court--whether in the defendant's or in the People's favor--deprives that court of jurisdiction to reconsider the matter unless the People, pursuant to subdivision (j), seek to reopen the matter at trial upon a showing of good cause." (Id. 15 Cal.3d at pp. 77-78, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33, italics in original.) ⁴

However, we find neither the language of section 1538.5 nor the rule of Madril operates in this case to prohibit the immediate reconsideration of a suppression motion, where the trial court applied a clearly erroneous legal standard in its original ruling.

The statutory language of section 1538.5 does not prevent the trial court from correcting its own legal error before trial....