People v. Ramos

• Decision Date: 26 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 68701,68701
• Citation: 561 N.E.2d 643,149 Ill.Dec. 273,138 Ill.2d 152
• Parties: , 149 Ill.Dec. 273 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Daniel R. RAMOS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 643

561 N.E.2d 643

138 Ill.2d 152, 149 Ill.Dec. 273

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v.Daniel R. RAMOS, Appellee.

No. 68701.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 26, 1990.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Marshall E. Douglas, State's Atty., Rock Island (Robert J. Ruiz, Sol.Gen., Terence M. Madsen and Michael J. Ditore, Asst. Attys.Gen., Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, Office of the State's Attys.App. Pros., Ottawa, of counsel), for people.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Stephen Omolecki, Asst. Defender, Office of the State App. Defender, Ottawa, and Shari D. Goggin-Ward, of Urbana, for appellee.

Justice MILLERdelivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Daniel R. Ramos, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Rock Island County to the offense of residential burglary and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.Following his arrest on that charge, defendant had been released from custody on a $50,000 recognizance bond with home detention a condition of the bond.In imposing sentence, the trial judge denied defendant's request, made pursuant to section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections(Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-7(b)), that he be granted credit for the period of home detention and that the length of the prison term be reduced accordingly.The appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that defendant was entitled to credit under the statute.(181 Ill.App.3d 1062, 130 Ill.Dec. 792, 537 N.E.2d 1121.)We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal(107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

By complaint filed November 12, 1987, defendant was charged with the offenses of residential burglary and theft (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 16-1(d)(1), 19-3).Defendant's pretrial motion for bail was granted, and he was released from custody on November 17, 1987, under a $50,000 recognizance bond.As a condition of the bond, defendant, who was then 17 years old, was to remain in the home of his mother and stepfather; defendant was not to leave the residence unless he first obtained permission to do so from either the court or the probation officer to whom defendant's case was assigned.During the 168-day period between defendant's release on bond and the entry of his guilty plea, defendant was allowed to leave the home on only three occasions.He was permitted to appear at his arraignment on February 4, 1988, to go to his attorney's office for a consultation on March 14, 1988, and to accompany his girlfriend to the hospital for the birth of their child on March 30, 1988.Defendant was escorted by his mother on each occasion.Defendant was not permitted to attend high school or to go to work during the period of home detention, and the probation officer denied a request that defendant be allowed to visit the dentist.

Pursuant to the parties' agreement, defendant pleaded guilty on May 3, 1988, to the offense of residential burglary and the theft charge was dismissed.The trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of four years' imprisonment.Defendant asked that his prison sentence be reduced by the 168 days he spent in home confinement following his release on bond.Defendant based that request on the provision in section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections that guarantees to an offender day-for-day credit against a prison sentence "for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed"(Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-7(b)).The trial judge denied defendant's request for sentencing credit, explaining that defendant was freed from custody once he was released on bond and that the condition of home confinement could not be equated with custody.Defendant's subsequent motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea was also denied.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, held that section 5-8-7(b) did entitle defendant to have the period of home detention credited against his prison term. (181 Ill.App.3d 1062, 130 Ill.Dec. 792, 537 N.E.2d 1121.)Believing that our earlier decision in People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff(1974), 58 Ill.2d 91, 316 N.E.2d 769, had left unresolved the question whether credit is required in the circumstances here, the appellate court compared the bond conditions imposed on defendant with the restrictions imposed in several cases where credit was denied.SeePeople v. Thompson(1988), 174 Ill.App.3d 496, 124 Ill.Dec. 125, 528 N.E.2d 1016(condition of bond that defendant remain at home subject to electronic monitoring, but defendant was beyond range of monitoring system on numerous occasions and therefore free to go where he chose);People v. Tillery(1986), 141 Ill.App.3d 610, 95 Ill.Dec. 875, 490 N.E.2d 967(condition of bond that defendant remain in residential treatment center with leave for employment and daily 15-minute shopping trip);People v. Willer(1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 63, 87 Ill.Dec. 393, 476 N.E.2d 1385(condition of bond that defendant remain in hotel, with leave for employment, counseling, and medical purposes);see alsoPeople v. Freeman(1981), 95 Ill.App.3d 297, 50 Ill.Dec. 846, 420 N.E.2d 163(condition of probation that defendant participate in residential drug treatment program, where, after orientation period, residents were free to leave facility unescorted, residents were not physically restrained, and doors to facility were never locked).

In the appellate court's view, the bond conditions imposed in the present case were more restrictive than the conditions imposed in Thompson, Tillery, Willer, and Freeman.The appellate court specifically noted that defendant was permitted to leave home only with the prior consent of the trial court or probation officer, that the few occasions on which defendant was allowed to leave the residence were instances in which his presence elsewhere was required, and that defendant was not permitted to work or to attend school during his period of detention.The appellate court concluded that defendant's home confinement amounted to custody within the meaning of section 5-8-7(b), and the court therefore held that defendant was entitled to credit for the 168-day period of home detention.The dissenting justice would have denied defendant's request for credit.Stating that "[c]onfinement in one's own home is a far cry from institutional confinement," the dissenting justice did not believe that the legislature had intended to allow a sentencing credit in such circumstances.181 Ill.App.3d at 1065, 130 Ill.Dec. 792, 537 N.E.2d 1121(Scott, J., dissenting).

Section 5-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections governs the calculation of terms of imprisonment.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-7.)The provision at issue here is section 5-8-7(b), which states:

"The offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed, at the rate specified in Section 3-6-3 of this Code."(Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-7(b).)

Under the applicable rate, a defendant is to receive one day of credit for each day previously served in custody.The question before us is whether the period spent by defendant in home confinement following his release on bond was "time spent in custody" for purposes of section 5-8-7(b).

The State contends that the phrase "time spent in custody," as used in section 5-8-7(b), does not include the period of time during which a defendant is released on bond, regardless of the restrictions that might be imposed as conditions of release.Relying on this court's decision in People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff(1974), 58 Ill.2d 91, 316 N.E.2d 769, the State argues that the legislature intended in section 5-8-7(b) to distinguish institutional custody from release on bond and to allow sentencing credit for only the former.The State maintains that defendant was released from institutional custody when he was admitted to bond and that home detention was merely a condition of release and did not constitute custody within the meaning of the statute.We agree.

In Morrison this court considered a similar request for sentencing credit under section 5-8-7(b).There, an inmate sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Corrections to reduce his prison term by the five-month period during which he was released on bail prior to his conviction and incarceration.This court denied the inmate's request, ruling that the period of pretrial release was not "time spent in custody" within the contemplation of section 5-8-7(b).In addressing the inmate's claim, the court acknowledged that the term "custody" has been used in various contexts to denote both confinement in a penal institution (seePeople v. Anderson(1973), 53 Ill.2d 437, 442, 292 N.E.2d 364(speedy trial)) and time spent outside an institution (seePeople ex rel. Johnson v. Pate(1970), 47 Ill.2d 172, 174, 265 N.E.2d 144(parole)).The court believed, however, that for purposes of section 5-8-7(b) the inmate's pretrial release on bond was not "custody" within the meaning of the statute.

The Morrison court first looked to several companion measures found in the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections.The court noted that in those instances the term "custody" refers to confinement in a penal institution (seeIll.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8-5, 1005-8-6(b), (e)(offender sentenced to term of imprisonment is to be committed to "custody" of appropriate authority)).The court also examined the bail provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and found that "the terms 'custody' and 'bail' are not used synonymously."(Morrison, 58 Ill.2d at 94, 316 N.E.2d 769.)In those provisions, the legislature has defined the term "bail" as the security necessary "for the release of a person in custody in order that he will appear before the...