People v. Ramsey

Citation89 Mich.App. 468,280 N.W.2d 565
Decision Date16 April 1979
Docket NumberDocket No. 77-3680
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bruce RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. 89 Mich.App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

[89 MICHAPP 470] Frederick W. Lauck, Southfield, for defendant-appellant; Daniel J. Henry, Jr., Detroit, of counsel.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, App. Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P. J., and R. B. BURNS and KAUFMAN, JJ.

R. B. BURNS, Judge.

Defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife. M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Defendant presented an insanity defense at his bench trial. The trial court found him guilty of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, but mentally ill, M.C.L. § 768.36; M.S.A. § 28.1059. Defendant appeals.

Evidence presented at trial indicates that defendant stabbed his wife to death, and then attempted suicide by stabbing himself three times. From defendant's testimony and corroborating evidence it could be inferred that defendant believed his wife was possessed by a demon and that, when he stabbed her, he believed that she was already dead, and that he was attempting to cut the demon out and restore her to life. A psychiatrist who testified for the defense concluded that defendant was suffering from acute schizophrenia at the time of the incident and had been insane. Two psychiatrists,[89 MICHAPP 471] called by the prosecution in rebuttal, expressed contrary opinions.

The primary thrust of defendant's argument on appeal is factual: that the trial court erred in finding defendant sane at the time of the homicide. The argument rests in part on several erroneous arguments concerning the law, raised in related issues. Thus, we will first discuss the related issues before reaching the primary issue on appeal.

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced in the presentation of his defense by the trial court's failure to grant his pretrial motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder because the trial court was inclined thereby to reach a compromise verdict. Defendant relies upon the preliminary examination and trial transcripts to argue that the evidence of mental illness was compelling and asserts that a person who is mentally ill is incapable of "wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing". M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548.

The issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to hold defendant for trial for first-degree murder was one addressed to the magistrate's discretion and reviewable only for abuse of discretion. People v. Karcher,322 Mich. 158, 162-163, 33 N.W.2d 744, 746 (1948). Review is limited to the preliminary examination transcript; testimony taken at trial cannot be considered. People v. Walker, 385 Mich. 565, 572, 189 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1971). While there was evidence presented at the preliminary examination from which it could be inferred that defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, there was also evidence from which it could be inferred that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. It does not necessarily follow that a person with a "substantial disorder of thought or mood which [89 MICHAPP 472] significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life", M.C.L. § 330.1400a; M.S.A. § 14.800(400a), is incapable of deliberation and premeditation. We find no abuse of discretion.

Defendant argues that he should have been acquitted of second-degree murder because the trial court found that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense. The incorrect premise underlying this argument is that one who is mentally ill is incapable of forming the Mens rea of murder. Mental illness and malice aforethought are not mutually exclusive mental conditions. While mental illness may factually negate a finding of malice aforethought in a particular case, see People v. Lynch, 47 Mich.App. 8, 208 N.W.2d 656 (1973), it does not follow as a matter of law that a finding of mental illness necessitates a finding of not guilty of murder.

Defendant contends that M.C.L. § 768.36; M.S.A. § 28.1059, creating the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, is unconstitutional. First, defendant argues that the definitions of mental illness, M.C.L. § 330.1400a; M.S.A. § 14.800(400a), and insanity, M.C.L. § 768.21a; M.S.A. § 28.1044(1), are so vague and overlapping as to confer upon the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. See People v. Howell, 396 Mich. 16, 20, 238 N.W.2d 148, 149 (1976). A reading of the statutes refutes defendant's argument. Second, defendant argues that the evaluation and treatment provisions of the statute are illusory. This Court has previously held that such an argument is premature. People v. McLeod, 77 Mich.App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), Lv. granted, 402 Mich. 927 (1978). It would be inappropriate for this Court to possibly confuse the law [89 MICHAPP 473] by re-examining the correctness of the holding in McLeod where the issue is pending in the Supreme Court. We therefore do not reach the merits of the issue raised by defendant.

In an extensive review of the facts presented at trial, defendant argues primarily regarding the insanity issue that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. GCR 1963, 517.1. Defendant also raises a collateral issue, arguing that the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to aid review. GCR 1963, 517.1, People v. Jackson, 390 Mich. 621, 627, 212 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1973). Plaintiff, equating the scope of review of bench trial findings of fact with jury verdicts, asserts that, because there was conflicting evidence on the sanity issue, the trial court's conclusion may not be disturbed. See, E. g., People v. Palmer, 392 Mich. 370, 220 N.W.2d 393 (1974), People v. Szymanski, 321 Mich. 248, 32 N.W.2d 451 (1948), but see, People v. Beath, 277 Mich. 473, 482-483, 269 N.W. 238, 242 (1936). Additionally, plaintiff argues that the trial court's opinion indicates it was aware of the insanity-mental illness issue, resolved it, and a remand is not necessary to facilitate review. People v. Jackson, supra. Thus, the parties raise two procedural issues which we must resolve prior to reaching the substantive issue of sufficiency of evidence: the scope of review, and the degree of specificity required of the trial court's findings of fact to aid review.

GCR 1963, 517.1 requires the trial court, in actions tried without a jury, to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon". Fact findings are sufficient if "the court makes brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters without over elaboration of detail or particularization [89 MICHAPP 474] of facts". In addition to requiring findings of fact, the court rule sets forth a standard of review of those facts:

"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the application of this principle regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appeared before it."

Construing the court rule in the civil context, the Supreme Court has held that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed". Tuttle v. Dep't of State Highways, 397 Mich. 44, 46, 243 N.W.2d 244, 245 (1976). Under this standard of review, the evidence in a nonjury case is subjected to a more rigorous review than that in a jury case. Id. Schneider v. Pomerville, 348 Mich. 49, 54-55, 81 N.W.2d 405, 408 (1957).

Under GCR 1963, 517.1, as construed in Tuttle, this Court could be required to reverse even where there is conflicting evidence, if left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Thus, the standard of review under GCR 1963, 517.1 is broader than that stated in People v. Szymanski, supra, and advocated by plaintiff.

It is unclear whether the Supreme Court has held that the clear error standard of GCR 1963, 517.1 applies in criminal cases. In People v. Thomas, 387 Mich. 368, 197 N.W.2d 51 (1972), the Supreme Court split over whether GCR 1963, 517.1 applied through GCR 1963, 785.1(1) to criminal cases. The primary focus of the plurality opinion taking the negative view was upon whether the fact finding portion of GCR 1963, 517.1 should [89 MICHAPP 475] apply to criminal cases, and there was no discussion of whether the scope of review in criminal cases ought to be expanded. However, the opinion did equate the scope of review in bench cases with jury cases, in discussing the lack of need for findings of fact. In People v Jackson, supra, the Court referred to People v. Thomas, supra, stated that it was not binding under stare decisis, and held that in criminal cases, as well as civil cases, a judge who sits without a jury is obligated to articulate the reasons for his decision in findings of fact. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • People v. Ramsey
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • December 6, 1985
  • People v. Hayes
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • October 1, 1984
    ...We note that we are currently addressing the constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich.App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979), lv. gtd. 414 Mich. 864 (1982).5 See footnote 3.6 The Court of Appeals opinion stated:"The term 'cooperate' has been defined as fo......
  • People v. Hardesty
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • February 1, 1985
    ......6, Sec. 23, as amended 1968. . 1 The entire issue of the constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill verdict is presently on appeal in the Supreme Court and defendant will be free to take appropriate steps after that issue has been resolved. See People v. Bruce Ramsey......
  • People v. King
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • November 23, 1981
    ...magistrate to trial judge and jury.' "In accord: People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich.App. 226, 242 N.W.2d 465 (1976), People v. (Bruce) Ramsey, 89 Mich.App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979), and People v. Doss, "In view of the foregoing, we find that the magistrate exceeded the scope of his powers and t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT