People v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 01 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-03-0268.,4-03-0268. |
| Citation | 839 N.E.2d 1093 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Timothy J. Huyett, State's Attorney, Lincoln, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Charles F. Mansfield, Staff Attorney (argued), State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
Daniel D. Yuhas (Court-appointed), Judith L. Libby, Assistant Defender (argued), Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Charles Ramsey.
In October 2002, the State charged defendant, Charles Ramsey, with unlawful possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, unlawful possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine. In December 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. In March 2003, the trial court granted defendant's motion.
On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.
In October 2002, the State charged defendant by information with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)), alleging he knowingly and unlawfully possessed with intent to deliver more than 15 grams but not more than 100 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. The State also charged defendant with single counts of unlawful possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)), unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)), and unlawful possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)). Defendant pleaded not guilty.
In December 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging he was unconstitutionally seized when the arresting officer asked him for consent to search his vehicle. In February 2003, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Logan County Sheriff's Deputy Aaron Pickett testified he initiated a traffic stop of defendant's vehicle on October 8, 2002, based on a broken windshield. Prior to stopping the vehicle, Pickett received a call regarding a motorist in need of assistance. He then received "a message on the computer," indicating a vehicle matching the description of the truck had been seen in the area and "was possibly involved in methamphetamine production." A detective had indicated the vehicle had been noticed "several times in the past weeks" and farmers had complained about the vehicle in the area.
Pickett approached the vehicle, and defendant handed him his driver's license and proof of insurance through a vent-glass window because the driver's-side window could not be lowered. Deputy Pickett returned to his vehicle as he had already decided to write defendant a warning ticket. He also ran a warrant check and confirmed defendant's driver information. Pickett wrote a warning ticket and approached defendant's vehicle again. He then handed defendant his driver's license and insurance card, and defendant reached through the vent-glass window to grab the items. Picket also handed defendant the written warning and explained he had 45 days to comply with the warning ticket and fix the windshield.
Deputy Pickett testified that while he handed defendant the warning, he asked him if he could "check" or "search" his vehicle. Defendant responded, "`No problem.'" Defendant stepped out the passenger-side door because the driver's side was broken. As Deputy Pickett walked around the vehicle, he noticed a broken window on the rear passenger side. Pickett "immediately noticed the smell of ether" and saw a can of Prestone "starting fluid with the cap off" behind the rear passenger compartment. Pickett patted down defendant and then searched the interior of his vehicle. Between the driver's seat and the center console, Deputy Pickett "pulled out a white plastic bag" that let off "a white puff of smoke" that turned out to be methamphetamine. He exited the vehicle and called the fire department for assistance.
The State played a videotape of the traffic stop taken from Deputy Pickett's squad car. Pickett testified he had been certified in methamphetamine production and awareness. When asked if defendant exhibited any physical characteristics that were consistent with methamphetamine users, Deputy Pickett indicated defendant had a "concave face" and "rotten teeth." He also stated defendant was "very skinny at the time of the stop."
On cross-examination by defense counsel, Deputy Pickett testified the only reason he stopped defendant's vehicle was for the broken windshield. Based on the videotape, Pickett agreed he asked defendant if he had anything unusual in his vehicle and defendant's answer was no. Pickett then asked if defendant minded if he searched the vehicle, and defendant consented. After he handed defendant the warning, his driver's license, and his insurance card, Deputy Pickett stated defendant would have been free to leave. After receiving consent to search the vehicle, Pickett noticed the smell of ether and the can of starting fluid.
In March 2003, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The court found Deputy Pickett had reasonable grounds to make the traffic stop based on the cracked windshield. However, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court found that "once the officer handed over the ticket the purpose of the stop had been completed." The court concluded that anything beyond that "basically exceeds the scope of the stop" and granted the motion to suppress. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and appealed the court's ruling pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)).
On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We agree.
In reviewing a motion to suppress on appeal, we are presented with mixed questions of law and fact. People v. Smith, 214 Ill.2d 338, 347, 292 Ill.Dec. 915, 827 N.E.2d 444, 450 (2005). A trial court's assessment of witness credibility and factual determinations will be reversed only if manifestly erroneous. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill.2d 194, 200-01, 260 Ill.Dec. 632, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). However, the ultimate determination of whether the evidence is suppressed is entitled to de novo review. See People v. Gipson, 203 Ill.2d 298, 304, 272 Ill.Dec. 1, 786 N.E.2d 540, 543 (2003).
On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful (725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2002)). "`However, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intrusion.'" People v. Reatherford, 345 Ill.App.3d 327, 334, 280 Ill.Dec. 415, 802 N.E.2d 340, 347-48 (2003), quoting People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill.App.3d 212, 220, 250 Ill.Dec. 542, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution affords citizens with "the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessions against unreasonable searches[][and] seizures." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6. Our supreme court has interpreted the search and seizure clause of section 6 in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court's fourth-amendment jurisprudence. See Smith, 214 Ill.2d at 349, 292 Ill.Dec. 915, 827 N.E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 513, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220, 224, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill.2d 165, 176, 271 Ill.Dec. 245, 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill.2d 166, 178-79, 258 Ill.Dec. 538, 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 196, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill.2d 302, 314, 220 Ill.Dec. 369, 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d 211, 219, 209 Ill.Dec. 41, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill.2d 133, 146, 107 Ill.Dec. 214, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (1987); People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 245, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (1984).
When a police officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 433, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001). A temporary detention of an individual during a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of his person within the fourth amendment, even if the stop is brief and for a limited purpose. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996); People v. Bunch, 207 Ill.2d 7, 13, 277 Ill.Dec. 658, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003) (). Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d at 95.
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