People v. Randall, Cr. 13934

• Citation: 83 Cal.Rptr. 658,1 Cal.3d 948,464 P.2d 114
• Decision Date: 30 January 1970
• Docket Number: Cr. 13934
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 464 P.2d 114 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M. A. RANDALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 658

83 Cal.Rptr. 658

1 Cal.3d 948, 464 P.2d 114

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M. A. RANDALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 13934.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Jan. 30, 1970.

M. A. Randall, in pro. per., James T. Lindsey, Santa Barbara, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Josef Dubiel, Long Beach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael L. Abrams, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant M. A. Randall was charged by an amended information with one count of grand theft. (Pen.Code, § 487, subd. 1.) ¹ After a jury trial he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

Defendant contends that his confession to the above charge was obtained in violation of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 and that its introduction in evidence over his objection constitutes reversible error. We have concluded that this contention has merit. We reverse the judgment.

Defendant was hired on September 25, 1967, as a desk clerk at the Alisal Guest Ranch, a resort near Solvang, California. His duties included those usual for such a position: aiding with the check-in and check-out procedures, arranging advance reservations, and collecting the money paid by departing guests. In the course of this employment, he had access to the cash register in the front office as well as to various cash boxes located elsewhere in the office complex. About noon on Sunday, October 1, 1967, defendant left the ranch in an automobile he had rented the previous day and did not return. He departed without speaking to his supervisor or any other member of the ranch staff, collecting the wages due him for the four and one-half days he had worked, or leaving an address to which these wages could be forwarded.

Shortly after 1 p.m., Mr. Harold Lavonn, the general manager of the ranch, was informed that the defendant, who was then scheduled to be on duty at the desk, had not returned from his lunch hour. Mr. Lavonn hastened to defendant's living quarters, provided on the ranch grounds as part of his remuneration, and discovered that defendant's personal belongings were gone. He immediately began an inventory of the cash on hand in the office area, which revealed that about $550 was missing from the cash register in the front office. The search was continued for another hour and additional losses, amounting to about $185, from cash receptacles in the adjoining auditor's office were discovered. Mr. Lavonn thereupon telephoned the Santa Barbara County sheriff's office in Solvang to report the loss of $765. ²

One month later, on November 2, 1967, defendant was arrested in his apartment in Los Angeles by Deputy Sheriff Ellson and Sergeant Kales, two officers of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Upon making the arrest, Officer Ellson advised defendant of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974. The officers did not question him during the brief drive from the apartment to the sheriff's department West Hollywood substation.

There is some conflict in the evidence as to what transpired during the time from the defendant's arrival at the stationhouse to the interrogation that produced the statement of guilt, the admissibility of which is in issue here. We set forth the two conflicting accounts.

Officer Ellson testified on Voir dire at the trial that after they arrived at the stationhouse he and Sergeant Kales interrogated defendant for about 15 to 20 minutes regarding an undescribed 'report' filed by defendant's female roommate which was in some manner related to his arrest. At some point during this questioning Sergeant Kales informed the defendant that he would be permitted to make two telephone calls. ³ Sergeant Kales then commenced the booking procedure in the course of which defendant completed his allotted phone calls. ⁴

Defendant was questioned further that evening by two other detectives, but Ellson did not see him again until the following morning when he and Kales again questioned him on matters not related to the instant proceedings. After this morning session of questioning, Ellson received a telephone call from the Santa Barbara County sheriff's office and learned for the first time of the warrant which had been issued for defendant in connection with the theft from the Alisal Ranch. That afternoon he and Kales once again questioned defendant and, after a reiteration of the admonitions required by Miranda and defendant's statement that he was willing to waive those rights, obtained his confession to the crime. No record, either stenographic or electronic, was made of this conversation and defendant did not sign a written confession or waiver form. Instead, Officer Ellson testified that he had made longhand notes of the defendant's statements and that a typewritten report was later prepared from these notes. His testimony on Voir dire relating the confession was substantially identical to that given later before the jury: 'Mr. Randall stated that he had worked at Alisal Ranch the previous month as a clerk. He stated that one day he was alone at the desk, that he left with about $750.00 of the ranch money and all his luggage.'

Defendant testified on Voir dire that he had informed one of the arresting officers that he wanted to talk to his attorney during the initial interview conducted immediately after arriving at the substation and that they discontinued the questioning at that point and took him over to the booking room. His account of the events in the booking room corresponds to that of Officer Ellson and, to the extent that it is more fully detailed than that of the officer, is uncontradicted. According to his testimony, he asked the uniformed deputy on duty at the booking desk to look up the correct spelling of Mr. Weiss' name and to place a call to his residence. During the ensuing conversation defendant informed Weiss of his predicament, Weiss advised defendant of his constitutional rights, assured him that he would begin proceedings to secure his release, and stated that he would talk to him later and advise him further at that time. While this discussion (and that with Righter on the subsequent call, see Ante, fn. 4) were proceeding, Sergeant Kales was present at the booking desk and listening to them.

Defendant's version of later periods of interrogation differs markedly from that presented by Ellson. Defendant corroborated the fact that three such sessions took place and that the interrogating officers warned him of his rights in substantially the same terms as they had previously done. However, he denied having made the confession and stated that he repeatedly informed the officers he wanted to talk to his attorney and that he never waived his rights to the presence of counsel.

The trial court found that defendant had been fully and adequately informed of his constitutional rights directly after his arrest and that the subsequent warnings (repeated before each period of questioning including the one at which the statement admitting guilt was made) coupled with the fact that he did make such a statement demonstrated that the waiver of his rights made before his confession was knowing and voluntary. It therefore held that the confession was admissible. ⁵

On this appeal we accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record. Thus, we must accept the testimony of Officer Ellson insofar as it is incompatible with that of the defendant and confine our review beyond such testimony to facts which are uncontradicted by the People. (People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 A.C. 598, 608--610, 75 Cal.Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74, petition for cert. dismissed, Sanchez v. California, 394 U.S. 1025, 89 S.Ct. 1646, 23 L.Ed.2d 743 (whether confession coerced or not); People v. Johnson (1969) 70 A.C. 504, 508, 511--513, 74 Cal.Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265 (whether waiver of rights under Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 was knowing and voluntary or not); People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Cal.2d 595, 598, 55 Cal.Rptr. 897, 422 P.2d 585 (whether confession was product of illegal search or not); People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, 583, 6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418 (whether confession was voluntary or not).) Viewed by this standard the admission of the confession was error.

Miranda, of course, is not satisfied by a mechanical recitation of its four required warnings, even if this recitation precedes each of several interrogations of a suspect held in police custody. 'Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. (Fn. omitted.) At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' (Italics added.) (Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473--474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627--1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974.)

We have interpreted these directives of the high court as imposing upon the police a duty to respect the right of a suspect once in custody to decide to defer questioning, preclude it...