People v. Randall

• Decision Date: 30 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-2092,78-2092
• Citation: 89 Ill.App.3d 406,411 N.E.2d 1017,44 Ill.Dec. 651
• Parties: , 44 Ill.Dec. 651 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1017

411 N.E.2d 1017

89 Ill.App.3d 406, 44 Ill.Dec. 651

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-2092.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Sept. 30, 1980.

[44 Ill.Dec. 652] James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County (Mary T. Woodward, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant

Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County (Marcia B. Orr, Wesley H. H. Ching, Dale F. Weigand, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

ROMITI, Justice.

The defendant, seeking to have a bond forfeiture set aside, filed a letter with the court. The letter stated he had been hospitalized on the date of the forfeiture. The court, after examining the letter, concluded that the letter was a forgery and, after a continuance, but without granting a hearing or receiving any evidence, found the defendant guilty of contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail. The defendant appeals, contending that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was denied due process of law. We agree with both contentions and reverse.

The defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of burglary. He posted bond, but on December 7, 1977 failed to appear in court. The trial judge ordered the bond forfeited and a warrant for defendant's arrest was issued. Subsequently judgment was entered on the bond forfeiture. On March 28, 1978, defendant, having been arrested on the warrant issued on December 7, 1977, appeared in court. He filed a sworn petition to vacate the bond forfeiture and accompanied the petition with a photocopy of the following letter:

"Cermak Memorial Hospital

2800 South California Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60608

Telephone 312/847-5600

MEDICAL VERIFICATION

March 22, 1978

Presiding Judge

Criminal Courts Building

2600 South California Avenue

Chicago, Illinois

Dear Sir:

Records received from this hospital from Cook County Hospital indicate that Mr. Louis Randall was entered into that hospital on December 4, 1977 to March 10, 1978, for the purpose of spinal and lower back injuries. Subject was released from Cook County Hospital on March 10, 1978 with the stipulation that he confine himself to total bed-rest for a period of two (2) weeks.

Due to the nature of this type injury, this amount of time is required to determine the success of the therapy.

His condition at this time has improved; with proper therapy we feel there should be no further complications.

May the above mentioned information serve the Court in Mr. Randall's behalf. If additional information is needed please feel free to contact our department.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Elisworth E. Hasbrouck, M.D.

/s/ Elisworth E. Hasbrouck, M.D."

Below the heading was a line running two thirds across the letter. Below the words "Medical Verification" was a smear apparently due to an erasure. There were smudges on the paper, especially below the typed portion of the letter.

The judge, remarking that he was not a fool, asked where the original of the letter was. The public defender responded that he presumed that the Presiding Judge had it. The judge then stated that the petition was entered and continued until he received the original of the letter. He added that he wanted to see some doctors and he wanted it (the letter) notarized. He stated that if the court was being presented with a phony certificate they were going to have some problems. The judge pointed out that the letter indicated that defendant had been at Cermak, the prison hospital, and defendant had not been at the prison hospital. Defendant responded that "I was in the Cook County Hospital and I got that from the social worker, see, because when I was arrested the paramedic, he wrote me up on the treatment for my back and I'm taking physical therapy at Cermak now."

The public defender had asked for thirty days to get the records from the hospitals. The court, however, set the case for April 7, 1978, ten days later.

On April 7, 1978 the court, without benefit of a hearing, held defendant to be in direct contempt of the court due to the "patently fraudulent" nature of the letter. He pointed out that he knew from his experience relative to copying that the smudge beneath the words "Medical Verification" and underneath a portion of the address were due to an obliteration of some writing. He added that "Elisworth" is not spelled "Elisworth" but "Ellsworth" and that Ellsworth was a member of the Governing Commission of the Cook County Hospital Association but was not a member of the Cermak Hospital staff. The judge continued:

" * * * an effort has been made to fool this court by submitting to the Court what is a patently fraudulent document, and this Court does not purport to overlook that, as such conduct on the part of any person before the court would tend to bring the administration of the law into disrepute, disrespect and disregard, and such conduct is in derogation of the majesty of the law and of the integrity and of the authority of this court.

It is axiomatic in the law, of making false representation before a court and to a court, constitutes direct contempt, and for that reason even false swearing by a witness or person before a court constitutes direct contempt, and the court cannot overlook this. Such would bring this court into great disrespect, and this court wants the world to know that this court will not stand to have disrespect and contemptuous actions like this taken before this court without actions being taken by the Court."

Upon questioning by the public defender the judge repeated:

"Counsel, the court is not a judge for no reason at all, and the court is able to discern certain things.

For instance, when a person is telling a lie; when an instrument is authentic; when it is patently non-authentic.

I have never seen a worse purported communication. And I have seen a lot of them."

He stated that his conclusion was based on the appearance of the letter, that it had some bad grammar, that unless there was a flaw in the machine, one could not get a line such as appeared on this copy below the heading. He repeated that Dr. Ellsworth's name was misspelled and that persons familiar with the operation of the Governing Commission of Cook County Hospital knew he was a member of it. He added that he would have known that the letter was fraudulent without any knowledge of Ellsworth's name since "all the court needs to do is look at the format of that, the court can tell you this is a fraudulent communication."

Upon inquiry the judge acknowledged that he did make independent inquiry at Cermak Hospital concerning Dr. Hasbrouck but stated that those determinations did not constitute the basis of his findings, the basis of his findings went back to when the communication was presented to the court.

The court in its formal order gave the following reasons for its conclusion that the letter was a forgery:

"1) Manner in which the letter head appears on the stationery above a line which line the court concluded on March 28, 1978, to have been from two pages being used on a copying machine in order to have copy from both pages imprinted a single page.

2) Medical verification which is typed in capital letters at the top right portion of the copy is typed over what the court concluded on March 28, 1978 to have been an eradication of some print or type which was previously on that part of the stationery before the copying.

3) The first sentence of the letter reads: 'Records received from this hospital from Cook County Hospital indicate * * * ' and this court considered it to be improbable that Dr. Hasbrouck would write 'received from this hospital from Cook County Hospital' on Cermak Memorial Hospital stationery.

4) Ellsworth is both mispelled (sic) in the purported signature and in what purports to be the typing of the name under the signature in that the name is spelled Elisworth (sic) and the court knew on reading the signature that a person does not misspell his or her name when handwriting the same.

5) Exceedingly significant is the fact that what was presented to this court on March 28, 1978, was a document which was obviously a copy of what purported to be a letter addressed to the presiding Judge but the copy is so bad and obvious that it was suspect to the court on sight."

(Emphasis added.)

The defendant has appealed contending that he was not proven guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was denied due process of law. We will take the contentions in inverse order.

I.

Contempt of court has generally been defined as conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute. (People v. Jashunsky (1972), 51 Ill.2d 220, 282 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied 409 U.S. 989, 93 S.Ct. 332, 34 L.Ed.2d 256 and Caref v. Illinois, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 333, 34 L.Ed.2d 249; People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 55, 7 Ill.Dec. 63, 364 N.E.2d 50, 7 Ill.Dec. 63, cert. denied 434 U.S. 1023, 98 S.Ct. 750, 54 L.Ed.2d 771.) Contempt may be either direct or indirect; however, the mere fact that a contempt is labeled direct does not necessarily mean that evidence is not required. As discussed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Jashunsky (1972), 51 Ill.2d 220, 223, 224, 282 N.E.2d 1, 3, 4, cert. denied 409 U.S. 989, 93 S.Ct. 332, 34 L.Ed.2d 256, and Caref v. Illinois, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 333, 34 L.Ed.2d 249:

"This court discussed direct and indirect contempts in People v. Howarth (1953), 415 Ill. 499, 114 N.E.2d 785, observing: 'A direct criminal contempt is one which takes place in the very presence of the judge, making all of the elements of the offense matters within the personal knowledge of the judge and tending directly to obstruct and prevent the administration of justice, and...