People v. Ranes, Docket No. 16949

• Decision Date: 10 February 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 16949,No. 3,3
• Citation: 227 N.W.2d 312,58 Mich.App. 268
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Arthur RANES, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 312

227 N.W.2d 312

58 Mich.App. 268

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Arthur RANES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 16949.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

Feb. 10, 1975.

Released for Publication April 4, 1975.

Danny Arthur Ranes, in pro per.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Donald A. Burge, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before T. M. BURNS, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and CARLAND, ^*, JJ.

T. M. BURNS, Presiding Judge.

On March 2, 1973, defendant Danny Arthur Ranes was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and first-degree murder in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape, M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. On March 26, 1973, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on count one and life imprisonment in solitary confinement at hard labor on count two, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals his convictions as of right.

Since defendant's allegations of error relate to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and other procedural matters, a detailed recitation of the facts of this case is unnecessary, and thus only those facts pertinent to our discussion of the issues will be presented.

While defendant was absent from his jail cell taking a shower, the cell was searched by police. A deputy found some torn-up paper in the toilet. These pieces of paper, when put together, read as follows:

'Do you know any married woman who could use $500 for taking the stand and saying she was with me on the night of the Howk killing? One who would have a reason to remember that (whatever the reason was) night that will stand up in court and also remember that I had a bandaid on my left cheek and told her I scratched it while tearing down a garage. It has to be a Saturday night I was with her. She must be strong so the cops can't break her down no matter what they say or do. Also she will have to go to the newspaper office (Gazette) and look in the past issues for the date and all the back pictures of me so she will know me when she sees me. Let me know as soon as you can as all visits and phone calls in new jail are to be taped. If you know of anyone at least get me her address so I can handle the mail through Contos. The money will come when my feet hit the streets.'

This note was not introduced in the prosecution's case in chief, but to rebut the testimony of defendant's alibi witnesses. Defendant now claims this note was improperly admitted into evidence by the trial court. We disagree.

In People v. Moore, 51 Mich.App. 48, 52, 214 N.W.2d 548 (1974), a letter sent by the defendant to another prison inmate proposing shady trial assistance and reciprocation was intercepted by the prosecutor and offered in evidence. In holding the letter admissible, this Court stated:

'Defendant's credibility had been brought into the trial by other witnesses. The letter and its contents were material on this issue. We adhere to the rule that the materiality and relevancy of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and an appellate court will not interfere unless there is an abuse. People v. Sheehy, 31 Mich.App. 628, 188 N.W.2d 231 (1971); People v. Doane, 33 Mich.App. 579, 190 N.W.2d 259 (1971). On the question presented we find no reversible prejudice or abuse of judicial discretion.'

Such is the case here. Here a note was intercepted before it reached any third party. Defendant's credibility had been brought into the trial by alibi witnesses and the note and its contents were material to the alibi issue. Under these circumstances, we do not feel that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the note into evidence.

Defendant also argues that the note was inadmissible because it constituted evidence of an entirely separate crime, unrelated to his case, namely, the procurement of perjury.

Recently, this Court in People v. Hooper, 50 Mich.App. 186, 199, 212 N.W.2d 786 (1973), lv. den. 391 Mich. 808 (1974), considered this same question, although testimonial evidence rather than a writing was challenged. We consider the Court's statement to be dispositive of this issue:

'The grounds on which this evidence is admissible has been commonly termed as being 'consciousness of a weak case.' In 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 278, p. 120, the rule is stated as follows:

"It has always been understood--the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in human experience--that a party's falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct, is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit.'

'Michigan has long followed this rule and held that evidence that a defendant has attempted to suppress testimony or induce perjury is admissible. People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.W. 936 (1903); People v. Adams, 162 Mich. 371, 127 N.W. 354 (1910); People v. Randall, 294 Mich. 478, 293 N.W. 725 (1940). This Court recently reaffirmed this longstanding rule in People v. Casper, 25 Mich.App. 1, 7, 180 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1970), wherein the rule was stated as follows:

"Michigan authority appears uniform in holding that actions by the defendant such as flight to avoid lawful arrest, procuring perjured testimony and attempts to destroy evidence, while possibly as consistent with innocence as with guilt, may be considered by the jury as evidence of guilt.'

'Thus, in the instant case there was no error in allowing this testimony since it was proper evidence for the jury to consider.'

Defendant's next assertion of error is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence photographs of the deceased, taken at the scene. Since probative value outweighed prejudice, no abuse of discretion occurred. Defendant contends that since the defense was alibi, the photographs were unnecessary and merely calculated to inflame the jury, citing People v. Falkner 389 Mich. 682, 209 N.W.2d 193 (1973). The prosecutor argues that the photographs were material to prove premeditation and deliberation, a condition notably absent in Falkner. Furthermore, the prosecutor points out that while the defense in this case is alibi, the underlying circumstances are...