People v. Rankins

• Decision Date: 22 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35209,35209
• Citation: 18 Ill.2d 260,163 N.E.2d 814
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Clayton RANKINS, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 814

163 N.E.2d 814

18 Ill.2d 260

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Clayton RANKINS, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 35209.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1960.

Junie L. Sinson, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Grenville Beardsley, Atty. Gen. and Benjamin S. Adamowski, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., Francis X. Riley, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, and James R. Thompson, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DAILY, Justice.

Defendant, Clayton Rankins, prosecutes this writ of error to review his conviction in the criminal court of Cook County on two charges of armed robbery. The sole question presented is whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for discharge predicated on the ground that defendant had not been tried within four months of commitment as provided in section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal Code. Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 38, par. 748.

The record indicates defendant was arrested on November 18, 1956, and committed to jail. By separate indictments, returned on December 12, 1956, he was jointly indicted with other persons on two charges of armed robbery, and, when arraigned on the same day, the public defender was appointed to defend him after he had informed the court he was without counsel. Upon the court's own motion the causes were then continued to December 20, 1956, after which they were continued to January 15, 1957, 'on motion of defendants,' then, successively, to March 4, March 21, and April 8, 1957, by order of the court. On the latter date the public defender advised the court that defendant had refused to speak with him a few days earlier, and that a conflict of interest existed between defendant and a codefendant who was also represented by the public defender. At the same time defendant stated to the court he had neither requested nor authorized the public defender to represent him, that he wished to be represented by counsel appointed from the Chicago Bar Association, and that he was petitioning for discharge inasmuch as he had neither been tried nor admitted to bail within four months from the date of his arrest and confinement. The latter motion was denied.

On April 12, 1957, the court appointed an attorney from the bar association to represent defendant; however, 18 days later, on April 30, 1957, that attorney expressed his concern about being able to conduct the defense and the cause was continued to May 14, 1957, by order of the court. When the latter date arrived defendant made a request that his counsel withdraw from the case, which was denied, and presented a motion for a change of venue, which was granted. The same day defendant appeared before the chief justice of the criminal court, who granted the motion for discharge of counsel, appointed new counsel, and reassigned the causes for trial. On June 12, 1957, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty as to one indictment, entered a plea of guilty, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than five nor more than ten years. He waived a jury trial under the remaining indictment and, after a bench trial held July 10, 1957, was found guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than three nor more than fifteen years, to run concurrently with his prior sentence.

Section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 38, par. 748) provides that any person committed for a criminal offense, and neither admitted to bail nor tried within four months from the date of incarceration, shall be discharged upon petition unless the delay is occasioned by the prisoner, or unless an extension of not more than sixty days has been granted to the State for the procuring of additional evidence. We have repeatedly held that where a defendant has sought and obtained a continuance within the period in question (People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E.2d 698; People v. Lindner, 262 Ill. 223, 104 N.E. 329; People v. Witt, 333 Ill. 258, 164 N.E. 682), or when he asks for and receives a change of venue (People v. Iasello, 410 Ill. 252, 102 N.E.2d 138) or by his own action he has otherwise caused the delay, the right to be tried within the four-months period is temporarily suspended (People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810; People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133, 96 N.E.2d 449; People v. Hotz, 261 Ill. 239, 103 N.E. 1007), and the statute does not apply until a new four-months period has elapsed. People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E.2d 698; People v. Niemoth, 409 Ill. 111, 98 N.E.2d 733.

In the present case the record clearly shows that on December 20, 1956, an attorney for one of the codefendants requested a continuance until January 15, 1957, and that the public defender, then the duly appointed counsel for defendant and certain other codefendants, announced as follows: 'Let the record show that the public defender, on behalf of the total number of these defendants I have, I have talked to them and the total number of the defendants want some additional advice, so we will join in the motion of defendant.' By joining in this request for continuance, which was subsequently granted in both cases, defendant consented to the delay and therefore waived his right to be tried within four months from November 18, 1956, the date of his arrest and commitment. People v. Niemoth, 409 Ill. 111, 98 N.E.2d 733; Healy v. People, 177 Ill. 306, 52 N.E. 426. The statutory period, which would have expired on March 18, 1957, was thus recommenced on January 15, 1957, so as to expire on May 15, 1957. However, by...