People v. Ransome

Citation180 Cal.App.2d 140,4 Cal.Rptr. 347
Decision Date20 April 1960
Docket NumberCr. 6930
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lloyd Allen RANSOME and Albert Mason Dean, Defendants, Albert Mason Dean, Appellant.

Virgil V. Becker, Pasadena, under appointment by the District Court of Appeal, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and S. Clark Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

FORD, Justice.

This is an appeal by Albert Mason Dean from a judgment of conviction of the crime of grand theft. (Pen.Code, § 487, subdiv. 1) and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The allegation in the information with respect to a prior conviction of the appellant of the crime of robbery, for which he served a term of imprisonment in the state prison, was found to be true. His codefendant, Lloyd Allen Ransome, was acquitted of the charge of grand theft.

Three issues are raised by the appellant. He contends that he was subjected to an unlawful arrest. He further asserts that there was an illegal search and seizure of property at his place of residence and that, therefore, his objection to the introduction of evidence which was obtained as a result thereof should have been sustained. Finally, he questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.

The appellant duly waived a trial by jury. Pursuant to stipulation, the case was submitted to the trial court upon the evidence set forth in the transcript of the preliminary hearing and on certain other testimony offered on behalf of the appellant at the trial. The evidence pertinent to the issues raised will be summarized.

The automobile of Kevan Del-Grande was parked near his residence in Los Angeles at about 8:30 p.m. on March 14, 1959. In the automobile were two photocopy machines and some boxes of paper. The next morning the articles were missing.

The appellant and Ransome were arrested on March 17, 1959, at about 9:50 p. m. in an industrial section of Los Angeles. At that time, the arresting officers had no knowledge of the theft of the photocopy machines. The officers, who were in an 'undercover' car, first saw appellant and Ransome earlier in the evening. About ten minutes later they again saw the automobile being driven by the appellant. He was driving slowly 'and appeared to be looking in doorways and business fronts.' Later, the officers saw that the lights of the automobile were out and Dean and Ransome were pushing the vehicle to the curb. It was thereafter determined that the battery had failed. There had been a number of recent burglaries of business establishments in the vicinity. The two men were arrested without a warrant and booked on 'suspicion of burglary.'

Sergeant King, one of the investigating officers, had a conversation with the appellant on March 18. He asked Dean as to property taken to his house on the preceding day and of what the property consisted which Ransome had helped him take upstairs. Dean stated that it consisted of tools which were taken there to be given to his brother. When the officer asked the appellant if he would like to go over there with the police and point out the tools, the appellant stated that he did not care to speak any further on the subject.

Thereafter, before he learned of the theft of the photocopy machines, Sergeant King went to the appellant's place of residence in Los Angeles. It was a small apartment on the third floor of an 'old-style house.' The officer had no search warrant and had not asked the appellant for permission to search the premises. The person who answered the door identified hereself as Dean's sister-in-law. She stated that the appellant and his wife lived with her. Sergeant King identified himself and Officer Shelley and told her that he had come for the property that was brought there the evening before by Dean and Ransome. He informed her and the appellant's wife that the appellant was under arrest and in custody. The sister-in-law said, 'Come in. It's right where they left it.' The officers entered the room and she indicated a closet adjacent to the sitting room. In the closet were two photocopy machines, one being covered with a brown tarpaulin and the other with a gray blanket. Six bundles of paper were also found.

On March 23, Sergeant King again talked to the appellant in the county jail. The appellant said that Ransome had just carried the paper and that he, Dean, had carried up the two machines. The officer asked him if he cared to tell him about the machines. The appellant said that he did not and that it could all be explained later.

The evidence thus far summarized is found in the transcript of the preliminary hearing and, except for proof of the prior conviction alleged, constituted the case in chief against the appellant. The court denied his motion to strike the testimony theretofore given which motion was made 'on the grounds that the arrest was without probable cause, and was in itself illegal.'

The first witness called on behalf of the appellant was his sister-in-law, Verna Dean. The witness and the appellant and his wife were living in the same place, having rented it together. About March 18, some police officers, King and Shelley, came to the residence. They only came on one occasion. When Officer King went upstairs and she introduced him to appellant's wife, King stated that the appellant had been arrested. The appellant's wife was disabled and was in bed. The witness further testified: 'Well, Helen asked him did they have her husband in jail, and they said yes, and then they said yes, it was a robbery charge, or something like that, and they asked us if he had brought anything there, and we told him yes, and Helen and I told him it was in the closet there. And they said yes, they had Mr. Dean, and they had talked to him, and he had said it was there, too.' In response to a question as to whether the officers said anything about having the appellant's permission to go into the premises and remove anything, she stated, 'I don't know if anyone said anything about permission. After we told them it was in the closet, they said that they had talked to Mr. Dean, and he had said it was there.' She was then asked whether she let the officer into her premises. She answered, 'Well, they are detectives, and we see no reason why we couldn't, I mean. You just naturally let a policeman in.'

The appellant testified in his own behalf. When Officers King and Shelley said that they were going over to his house, he said nothing and did not give them permission to do so.

The motion of the appellant to suppress the evidence of the articles seized at his place of residence, Made at this point in the trial, was denied.

The appellant later resumed the witness stand. He testified that on the evening of March 15, 1959, Herschel Foyt, who was a partner in a body and fender shop, told him that he had obtained possession of the photocopy machines as security for a body and fender and paint job he had done but that the man who had left the machines had not returned to pay for the work. The appellant then continued: 'He just said that he had left them there, and that he was going to sell them to realize his money back off of the job, and he told me, he said, 'We decided to come over and see you, because you are a printer. You would probably know where we could sell them.' He said, 'I've got a hundred and ninety dollars invested.' And my brother Earl had loaned me fifty dollars previously and he said I could help pay off the fifty dollars I owed him.' The machines were transferred from Foyt's automobile to the back end of appellant's automobile. In response to a question as to whether he was told, 'We've got a deal for you, but you might want it all,' the appellant answered, 'I believe Earl made that statement in regards to money that he owed me. He made the statement because he knew that he owed me fifty dollars, and he would have to pay the fifty dollars.' Foyt told the appellant that he would do body work on the appellant's automobile for the appellant's help in the sale of the machines. In addition, if the appellant helped Foyt in sanding and masking the car, Foyt would paint it for him. On March 17, Ransome offered to help him carry articles from the automobile to appellant's apartment. The articles in question were taken upstairs into the apartment. Some tools belonging to the appellant's brother were carried upstairs by Ransome by mistake and they were returned to the automobile. The appellant denied that he had stolen the machines and the paper from an automobile. When the officers discovered the articles at his place of residence, they came back and talked to him in jail but he did not tell them anything. He did not tell them where he obtained them '[b]ecause I didn't know exactly what was the matter, and I wanted the advice of some attorney before I said anything.' He told them, 'I want to talk to my attorney before I say anything.' He covered the machines 'because they were glass and we didn't want them to get broken.' The appellant testified that he had had his sister-in-law attempt to contact Foyt and she had been unable to do so.

Although the matter of the arrest will be discussed at a later point herein, we turn first to the contention that the evidence obtained as a result of the search of appellant's place of residence was not admissible. Such search was clearly not incidental to the arrest. People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 781, 291 P.2d 469; Hernandez v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.2d 20, 299 P.2d 678. The propriety of such search must, therefore, rest upon the determination of whether the trial court was warranted in reaching the conclusion that the appellant's sister-in-law could and did consent thereto. People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 49, 301 P.2d 241.

It was clear from the evidence that the appellant's sister-in-law was one of the...

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