People v. Rath Packing Co.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1974 |
| Citation | 44 Cal.App.3d 56,118 Cal.Rptr. 438 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The RATH PACKING COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant, C. B. Christensen, as Director of Agriculture of the State of California, Intervenor and Respondent. Civ. 13705. |
This is an action by the government to enjoin a national meat processor from selling allegedly short-weight packages of bacon at the retail level. From a summary judgment granting the injunction, the packing company appeals.
We hold the court erred in deciding the case summarily. Factual issues exist which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
In February 1972, the County of Riverside ('People' or 'County') brought suit in the Riverside Superior Court to enjoin The Rath Packing Company ('Rath') from engaging in 'short-weighting' marketing practices. The gist of the complaint was that Rath was selling packages of bacon to retailers which weighed less than the labeled weight at the time of sale to consumers. In addition to injunctive relief, the People sought civil penalties for false advertising (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17500) and unfair competition (Civ.Code, § 3369).
Rath answered and denied the allegations of short-weighting. It also claimed that the field of meat processing, including Rath also filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief contending that its practices conformed with the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 (21 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.) and that the Act preempted the field of meat product inspection; it requested that the court declare it met federal standards; that Riverside County be enjoined from the imposition of any other than federal inspection requirements; and that the County be enjoined from ordering its bacon 'off-sale.' 1 The County answered the cross-complaint, denying the claim of preemption and allied contentions.
the packaging and weighing of meats, had been subject to federal preemption.
In July 1972, C. B. Christensen, the Director of Agriculture of the State of California ('State'), entered the litigation upon behalf of the People by filing a complaint in intervention and an answer to the cross-complaint. The state's pleadings contained the same allegations as those of the county, charging Rath with false advertising and unfair competition, denying preemption, and praying for an injunction and civil penalties.
In November 1972, Rath's Cross-action was dismissed as the result of motions filed by the county and the state and Rath appealed.
In April 1973--four months after the judgments of dismissal were entered in the Riverside action in connection with Rath's cross-complaint--the United States District Court ruled (in consolidated actions similar to the Riverside action) that Los Angeles County and Riverside County could not enforce certain state consumer protection laws and regulations for the purpose of ordering Rath's bacon off-sale. (Rath Packing Company v. Becker (C.D.Cal.1973) 357 F.Supp. 529.)
On January 3, 1974--while the first appeal in this court was still pending--a summary judgment on the Complaints was entered in favor of the county and state in the Riverside action, enjoining Rath from violating sections 12024, 12024.5 and 17500 of the Business and Professions Code, and section 3369 of the Civil Code and assessing Rath $100 in civil penalties. (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17536.) It is from this summary judgment that the appeal now before us arose.
In April 1974, this court held, in connection with the first appeal dismissing Rath's cross-complaint, that Becker was Res judicata and that it settled the question of the legality of certain California laws and regulations pertaining to short-weight meat products. Consequently, we determined that Rath was entitled to bring the cross-action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of invalid state laws and we reversed the judgment dismissing Rath's cross-complaint. (People v. Rath, 4 Civil 13176.)
Turning to the summary judgment now before us, the motions in support thereof were based on declarations to the effect that packages of bacon, manufactured by Rath and labeled one pound net weight, were inspected in accordance with state laws at various retail establishments in Riverside County and were found to weigh less than one pound. Rath's answer and declarations in opposition thereto denied the allegations of short-weighting and in effect stated that Rath's bacon was packaged in accordance with the best methods known in the trade and in full compliance with federal law.
The county's and state's motions for summary judgment were based primarily on the declaration of John LaRose, an inspector of the Riverside County Department of Weights and Measures. The statements contained therein are essentially as follows: Between September 1971--March 1972, he made 21 separate inspections of bacon packaged by Rath. These inspections were conducted at several retail outlets in Riverside County. His inspections resulted in a determination that the Rath's declarations were executed by its secretary, corporate director of quality control, and Los Angeles, California plant manager. The main points contained therein follow: The bacon in issue was prepared at Rath's establishments which are subject to inspection by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the terms of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 (21 U.S.C.A., § 601 et seq.); each label on a bacon package contains an accurate statement of its net weight, exclusive of the wrapper and packaging materials; Rath 'over-packs' its meat (including bacon) because it loses slight amounts of moisture (and, hence, weight) by evaporation; moisture loss varies according to the type of packaging materials used; weight loss occurs in the normal course of good distribution practice; the methods employed by Riverside's Department of Weights and Measures for determining whether there was short-weight in Rath's products were improper; the Riverside inspector never weighed the actual net contents of any package of bacon; he took the gross weight of the package and subtracted therefrom an estimated wrapper weight and thereby merely calculated a net weight; the inspector's estimated wrapper weight was of a wet wrapper whereas federal law prescribes a dry wrapper; a wet wrapper could result in a lesser calculated net weight; in short, the Riverside inspector's weighing procedures were improper and his conclusions were inaccurate; moreover, some of the bacon he weighed was not Rath bacon at all.
lots of bacon prepared and packaged by Rath were short-weight. The samplings were made in accordance with certain state standards.
California case law regarding the resolution of motions for summary judgment (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c) may be briefly stated as follows.
When a party moves for summary judgment, the trial court's function is to determine whether the case presents a triable issue of fact--issue finding, not issue determination, is the court's function at this stage in the proceedings. (Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441, 116 P.2d 62; Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal.2d 553, 555, 122 P.2d 264.) To be entitled to summary judgment the moving party must support his motion with affidavits containing facts sufficient to entitle him to judgment (Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal.2d 257, 261, 223 P.2d 244), provided, of course, that the other party does not introduce counter-affidavits sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. (Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 725--726, 299 P.2d 257.) The facts set forth in the movant's affidavits must be evidentiary in quality, and within the personal knowledge of affiants who could testify competently thereto. (Hayward Union etc. School District v. Madrid, 234 Cal.App.2d 100, 44 Cal.Rptr. 268.)
Summary judgment is a process designed to avoid needless litigation, and thus is a drastic procedure which must be used with caution. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal.2d 432, 437, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271.) Accordingly, all doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal.2d 412, 42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785; Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., Supra, 70 Cal.2d 432, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271.)
In the present case there is little doubt that the People's motion for summary judgment is supported by an affidavit containing evidentiary facts which, if uncontroverted, would entitle the People to judgment: Inspector LaRose declared that on a number of occasions he weighed Rath bacon packages which contained less than their stated weights. But Rath attempts to frustrate the People's motion with counter-affidavits which allege that LaRose somehow erred in his weighing of these Rath products. Hence, the issue of pivotal importance is whether Rath's affidavits are legally sufficient to counter the People's affidavits.
A movant's affidavits are strictly construed, and must show evidentiary facts This court could read Rath's counter-affidavits (which state only conclusions of ultimate facts regarding LaRose's alleged errors) in accord with the rule of liberal construction and find them sufficient. But such an application of this rule of construction would emasculate the statutory requirement of factual counter-affidavits.
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