People v. Ratliff

• Decision Date: 03 April 1986
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 715 P.2d 665 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James RATLIFF, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 22348.

Page 705

224 Cal.Rptr. 705

41 Cal.3d 675, 715 P.2d 665

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James RATLIFF, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 22348.

Supreme Court of California.

April 3, 1986.

Gary M. Sirbu, Oakland, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow, Susanne C. Wylie and Carol Wendelin Pollack, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

BY THE COURT: ^*

Defendant James Ratliff appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder, attempted murder, robbery and burglary (two counts). (See Pen.Code, §§ 187, 211, 459, 664; further statutory references are to this code.) The jury found that defendant personally used a firearm while committing his offenses ( §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5), and that the attempted murder count involved intentional infliction of great bodily injury ( § 12022.7). The jury also found that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, thereby constituting a special circumstance under the 1978 death penalty law ( § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).

As will appear, we have concluded that the attempted murder conviction must be reversed, the special circumstances finding set aside, and the penalty of death vacated, due to instructional errors including the failure of the trial court to instruct regarding the necessity of finding an intent to kill. (See Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862.) In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment.

I. FACTS

In the early morning on Monday, November 3, 1980, Los Angeles police officers were summoned to a San Pedro gas station to investigate a robbery and murder. Attendant Estrada had been shot to death and his associate Castro wounded. Someone had managed to scribble a license plate number on the counter inside the cashier's booth, evidently in accordance with station manager Gomez' earlier directions to jot down the number of any "suspicious" vehicles. Gomez, upon arriving at the scene, estimated that between $175 and $200 were taken, including several $1 bills. Victim Castro described his assailant as a male black, about 6 feet tall, 200 pounds, wearing a dark blue security guard's uniform.

The license number was traced to defendant, living in Compton. The officers went to defendant's home at 6 or 6:15 a.m. and observed a car bearing the license number in question in an unfenced yard next to the house. The officers approached the house and confronted defendant's father, who confirmed that his son was a security guard and was asleep inside. The officers entered the house with Mr. Ratliff who called to defendant. When defendant appeared, he was told that the officers were investigating a murder.

Defendant subsequently consented to a search of his car. (The facts surrounding the search and defendant's consent thereto are discussed in greater detail below.) The search produced certain incriminating evidence, including $199 in loose currency (mainly $1 bills) in the car's trunk, and a time card identifying defendant as a security guard. The trunk search also revealed three hanging lamps later identified as stolen during the weekend of November 1 and 2 from two homes located at a San Pedro construction site. (These lamps formed the basis for the burglary charges against defendant; they were seized along with other items, discussed below, when the officers conducted a second search supported by a search warrant.)

At trial, victim Castro positively identified defendant as the robber/assailant at the gas station. According to Castro, after demanding money from his victims, defendant fired his gun twice at close range, killing Estrada and wounding Castro. Defendant's former employer verified that defendant had been employed as a security guard and occasionally had worn a navy blue uniform. Dolores Cook, an acquaintance of defendant, testified that on Sunday, November 2, 1980, around 6 p.m., defendant told her that he was going to San Pedro; he was then carrying a firearm. Cook confirmed that defendant's security guard uniform was dark blue in color.

The prosecutor also called Rossie Kendrick who testified that defendant accompanied her to a drive-in movie on one evening of the weekend preceding his arrest (apparently, the weekend of November 1 and 2), that she saw defendant put some money into a box in the trunk of his car, and that she saw no lamps in the trunk. The couple returned from the movie and sat together outside her house until 12 or 12:15 a.m.

Defendant did not testify in his defense. Instead, he called witnesses who testified that (1) his hands bore no detectable gunshot residue following his arrest, and (2) he had been paid $1,337.67 a few months earlier in settlement of a personal injury action.

At the penalty phase, the prosecutor introduced evidence of a prior robbery conviction and several misdemeanor acts of violence committed against a former girlfriend. Defendant introduced expert testimony regarding his mental state, retardation and impaired judgment under stressful conditions. Defendant's mother and minister also testified regarding defendant's background and character.

The present appeal is automatic. ( § 1239.)

II. CONTENTIONS

A. Unlawful Search

Defendant first contends that the warrantless car search conducted by the officers immediately following defendant's arrest was illegal and that the fruits of that search should have been ordered suppressed. (See § 1538.5.) According to defendant, his supposed consent to the search was involuntary, being merely an act of submission in the face of authority. He also disputes that the officers had probable cause to search the car and its trunk without his consent and without first obtaining a search warrant. Finally, he argues that the second car search, which produced various items of evidence, was invalid because it exceeded the permissible scope of the warrant issued to authorize that search.

1. Consent to Search.

The arresting officers testified that as soon as defendant's father awakened him defendant exited the bedroom door in a highly excited state, waving his arms and jumping up and down. Accordingly, one of the officers placed handcuffs on defendant after telling him to calm down. Although defendant's father testified that the officers had drawn their guns when they approached the bedroom, the officers could not recall doing so. Defendant thereafter was taken to the living room and was seated on a couch but not formally placed under arrest. After a few minutes of interrogation, Officer Burkman asked defendant if he objected to a search of his car. According to the officer, defendant replied "I don't care. Go ahead and look. The only thing in there is my money and my lamps."

Defendant describes the following scenario as supporting his theory that he did not voluntarily consent to the search: He was abruptly awakened by uniformed police officers with drawn guns, handcuffed, interrogated without Miranda warnings, and told that unless he consented to a car search the officers would simply obtain a warrant and break into the trunk. In combination, these or similar facts might well lead a trier of fact to conclude that a purported consent to a search was involuntary. In the present case, however, the evidence supporting defendant's version of the event was by no means as clear or uncontradicted as defendant would suggest. As we shall see, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding of voluntariness, there was ample substantial evidence to support that finding. (See People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135 ["On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise" of trial court's power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence and draw inferences, and its findings "must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence"].)

Assuming that the officers initially drew their weapons, the evidence did not indicate that any of them kept their guns drawn when, in the living room, the actual request for consent to search was made. (Cf. People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 782, 186 Cal.Rptr. 458 ["Consent to search given in response to a request by an armed officer whose gun is drawn is suspect"].) Defendant relies on People v. Fields (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 972, 975-976, 157 Cal.Rptr. 578, where the officers first drew their weapons and then holstered them before requesting a trunk search. But in Fields, the court invalidated the search on the primary ground that the officers failed to request permission to search--they merely asked defendant's passenger to open the trunk. As Fields states, "There is a world of difference between requesting one to open a trunk and asking one's permission to look in a trunk." (P. 976, 157 Cal.Rptr. 578.) In the present case, Officer Burkman asked defendant if he objected to a search, thereby clearly indicating to defendant that his permission was being requested. We decline to hold that as a matter of law, a consent to search is invalid solely because the officers originally drew their guns when confronting defendant.

We have held that the failure to give Miranda warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary. (People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 114-115, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) Similarly, the fact that defendant was handcuffed when his consent was sought does not demonstrate that his consent to a search was involuntary. Instead, that fact is to be weighed in the balance along with all other circumstances bearing on this issue. (Id. at pp. 109- 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) As we stated in James, quoting an earlier case, defendant's restraint by handcuffs " 'is but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is...