People v. Ray, Docket No. 12187
Decision Date | 27 September 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 12187,1 |
Citation | 43 Mich.App. 45,204 N.W.2d 38 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tommy Lee RAY, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Leonard Meyers, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before V. J. BRENNAN, P.J., and McGREGOR and BRONSON, JJ.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to rob being armed (M.C.L.A. § 750.89; M.S.A. § 28.284) and was convicted of that charge by a jury in Detroit Recorder's Court. He was sentenced to a term in prison 10 to 20 years, and now appeals as of right.
At defendant's trial, the prosecution introduced testimony which tended to establish that the defendant was one of three men, who, while armed with hand guns, attempted to rob a small grocery market in the City of Detroit. The robbery was foiled by the owner of the store, and the three men were apprehended. The defendant who took the stand in his own behalf, maintained that he was an innocent bystander to the entire sequence of events, and was mistakenly taken into custody.
On appeal, the defendant raises four allegations of error. His first allegation is that the verdict of the jury should be declared void and set aside because it named an offense not known to the law of this state. The incident on which defendant bases this argument appears in the transcript as follows:
'MR. LaDUKE (Defense Counsel): If you please, sir.
'THE COURT: All right, poll the jury.'
(The jurors were polled by the Court Clerk.)
As the transcript indicates, the apparent misstatement (Supra, emphasized) may merely have been an error on the part of the foreman, and, furthermore, the verdict of the jury was clarified by the subsequent poll of the jurors. This does not constitute reversible error. People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951); People v. Allar, 19 Mich.App. 675, 173 N.W.2d 261 (1969).
Defendant's second allegation of error is that the trial court's definition and explanation of the reasonable doubt standard in its charge to the jury was inadequate. This alleged error was not preserved by objection below, and we do not consider it here. The defendant also alleges that the trial court erred by failing to instruct, Sua sponte, that 'attempted robbery being armed' was a lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob being armed. Such a charge was not requested below, and, in addition, no objection was made to the charge of the court.
Defendant's fourth and final allegation of error concerns a supplemental charge given by the court. After the jury had deliberated for a time, they returned to the courtroom and requested guidance on the manner in which they should conduct their deliberations. The court had previously charged the jury that there were four possible verdicts: guilty of the offense as charged, two lesser included offenses, and, of course, not guilty. The following excerpt from the transcript presents the incident in its entirety:
'What do you want to know?
'You can only find him guilty of one of those charges.
'If you find him guilty on the first charge, that's all of it.
The defendant contends that the emphasized portion of the court's instruction, by requiring unanimous agreement on defendant's innocence of the greater charge before they could consider the lesser charges was unduly coercive and deprived defendant of a fair trial.
The instruction the defendant complains of is unique and novel to the jurisprudence of this state. Furthermore, this Court has only been able to discover two similar cases. In State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929), the defendant advanced a similar objection to a supplemental instruction by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in reviewing this allegation of error, concluded the court's supplemental instruction did not require unanimity of the jury on defendant's innocence of the greater charge as a necessary condition for its discussion of lesser included offenses. But the Court's discussion of the...
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