People v. Ray

• Citation: 431 Mich. 260,430 N.W.2d 626
• Decision Date: 01 December 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 80168
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel Edward RAY, Defendant-Appellee. ,
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 626

430 N.W.2d 626

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel Edward RAY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 80168, December Term, 1987.

Calendar No. 3.

431 Mich. 260, 430 N.W.2d 626

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 8, 1987.

Decided Sept. 8, 1988.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert E. Weiss, Genesee County Pros. Atty., Donald A. Kuebler Chief, Appellate Div., Mark Sanford, Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for plaintiff-appellant.

Terrance P. Sheehan, Flint, for defendant-appellee.

BOYLE, Justice.

Introduction

This Court granted leave to appeal in the instant case to resolve two questions. We are asked to determine first, whether statements made by a defendant during the course of a polygraph examination should be admissible at trial as a matter of state or federal constitutional law or public policy. Secondly, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in this case in imposing a duty on the trial court to hold a Walker ¹ hearing sua sponte in the presence of alerting circumstances.

We hold that neither state or federal law nor public policy requires the automatic suppression at trial of statements made by a defendant during the administration of a polygraph examination. We further hold that the facts of this case did not present an issue which required the trial court to conduct a Walker hearing sua sponte in order to determine whether the defendant made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. ²

I. Facts

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Genesee Circuit Court of arson of a dwelling. He was sentenced to serve not less than 160 months nor more than 240 months in prison.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of holding a Walker hearing to determine whether the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to the presence of counsel at a post-polygraph interrogation during which defendant made an allegedly incriminating statement. The Court of Appeals ordered that if the trial court were to find on remand that there was an ineffective waiver, defendant's confession should be suppressed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered. On a finding of a valid waiver, the defendant's conviction is affirmed.

The Court of Appeals summarized the testimony produced at trial as follows:

"The charge against defendant arose out of a fire which started in an apartment formerly occupied by two of defendant's friends. The evidence presented at trial revealed that the fire had been intentionally set. The evidence also revealed that on the day preceding the fire, defendant had assisted his two friends in moving out of the apartment. The landlord of the apartment had evicted defendant's friends for nonpayment of rent.

"A neighbor of defendant's friends testified that just before the fire started he observed a man flicking a butane lighter on the patio of the apartment where the fire started. The neighbor also testified that he had seen the man earlier in the day helping someone move out of the apartment. The neighbor went on to testify that he had reported his observations to the police and, in a photographic lineup conducted on the day following the fire, he had identified defendant as the man who had been flicking the lighter. As a vital part of his case, the prosecutor also offered the testimony of a state police sergeant that defendant had allegedly confessed to setting the fire, which testimony was admitted over the objection of defendant.

"Defendant testified at trial. He admitted that he had been in the general area of the apartment building when the fire started, but he denied any involvement in starting the fire. Through his own testimony, defendant went on to assert an alibi defense. He claimed that he and one of his friends who had just moved out of the apartment had been driving near the apartment building when they saw the fire. Defendant testified that after he and his friend saw the fire they went to the scene to watch. Defendant also denied that he had confessed." 156 Mich.App. 31, 34-35, 401 N.W.2d 296 (1986).

II. Should Statements Made by a Defendant During the Course

of a Polygraph Test Be Admissible at Trial as a

Matter of State or Federal

Constitutional Law or Public

Policy?

In People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 364, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977), this Court held that the results of a polygraph examination are not admissible at trial. The basic rationale for the Barbara Court's conclusion was that the polygraph technique had not received the degree of acceptance or standardization among scientists which would allow admissibility. Id. See also People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 370, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955), quoting People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 566, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).

The judicial concern with scientific consensus regarding the procedure is because " 'the quantity [the polygraph] attempts to measure--the truthfulness of a witness--is ... directly related to the essence of the trial process.' " People v. Barbara, supra, 400 Mich. at p. 404, 255 N.W.2d 171, quoting note, The emergence of the polygraph at trial, 73 Colum L R 1120, 1141 (1973). Thus, exclusion at trial of polygraph results rests upon the judicial estimate that the trier of fact will give disproportionate weight to the results and consider the evidence as conclusive proof of guilt or innocence. See also McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), Sec. 207, p. 507.

The question whether statements made before, during, or after the administration of a polygraph examination, as opposed to the results themselves, should be excluded from trial as a matter of law or public policy has never been specifically addressed by this Court.

The general rule in other jurisdictions is that statements are not inadmissible merely because they were made during the course of a polygraph examination. Anno: Admissibility in evidence of confession made by accused in anticipation of, during, or following polygraph examination, 89 A.L.R.3d 230. State v. Erickson, 403 N.W.2d 281 (Minn.App.1987). In general, a defendant will be unsuccessful in challenging the admissibility of an alleged polygraph-induced confession unless specific coercive conduct or a denial of constitutional rights can be shown, as opposed to a mere allegation that the polygraph examination improperly influenced the defendant's confession of the crime.

The defendant argues that because the polygraph test is scientifically unsound, it should not be used by police agencies and prosecutors as an investigative technique to secure admissions or confessions.

The fact that a test has not been deemed sufficiently reliable to authorize admission of the results in evidence does not support a logical inference that the defendant's statements made during or following the test are not reliable. The premise cannot support the defendant's conclusion because the statements made by an examinee during a polygraph examination can be disassociated from the underlying test.

By contrast, the rationale for excluding the results of hypnotically induced testimony extends to statements made after the examination, People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982). During hypnosis the subject is in a condition of altered consciousness marked by heightened suggestibility. Id., p. 623, 329 N.W.2d 743. Hypnosis contributes to the formation of memories, to a belief in the truth of those memories, and to the inability of the individual or any other person to distinguish between the real, but repressed, memories and those memories induced by the hypnosis. Id. Consequently, because the process of hypnosis "is not a reliable means of accurately restoring forgotten incidents," id., p. 626, 329 N.W.2d 743, and because posthypnotic testimony would unfairly denigrate the defendant's right to cross-examination, the testimony of witnesses is excluded. However, the use of hypnosis has not been foreclosed "as an extremely useful investigative tool," id., p. 627, 329 N.W.2d 743, and we also have held that statements made before hypnosis that are not associated with the process are not excludable. People v. Nixon, 421 Mich. 79, 364 N.W.2d 593 (1984).

The reliability of statements made during a polygraph examination does not depend on the validity of the polygraph test or the examiner's skill in conducting the test or interpreting its results, nor does the use of such statements improperly denigrate effective cross-examination. It follows, then, that a statement may be reliable and voluntary even though it was made during the course of a polygraph examination. See State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59, 60-63, 558 P.2d 105 (1976). The key inquiry is whether the statement ³ is voluntary, and such a determination is best made on the facts of each case.

The defendant further submits that there is confusion and ambiguity concerning the admissibility of statements obtained during the administration of a polygraph examination. We recognize a potential for confusion exists in a situation where a defendant may not knowingly and intelligently waive certain rights if the distinction between results of a polygraph examination and statements made before, during, or after a polygraph examination is not adequately explained to the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 421 Mich. 207, 364 N.W.2d 625 (1984). However, not every situation involving the administration of a polygraph examination will give rise to this potential confusion. Where the distinction is sufficiently explained and the defendant is capable of understanding the distinction, a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights is clearly a possibility. Accordingly, a claim by a defendant that such confusion prevented a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. ⁴

Therefore, we conclude, as have the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have...