People v. Ray

• Citation: 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,981 P.2d 928,21 Cal.4th 464
• Decision Date: 19 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. S071999,S071999
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 981 P.2d 928, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6712, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8545 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Andre Lamont RAY, Defendant and Respondent

Page 1

88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1

21 Cal.4th 464, 981 P.2d 928, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6712,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8545

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Andre Lamont RAY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S071999.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 19, 1999.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Acting Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Joan Killeen, Raymond A. Cardozo and Juliet B. Haley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cooper, Arguedas & Cassman and Ted W. Cassman, Emeryville, for Defendant and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

In the average day, police officers perform a broad range of duties, from typical law enforcement activities--investigating crimes, pursuing suspected felons, issuing traffic citations--to "community caretaking functions"--helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, assisting and protecting citizens in need--"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." (Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523.) When performing their law enforcement responsibilities, officers are required under the Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant before searching a house or seizing personal effects; ¹ or it must be established they acted pursuant to a recognized exception. In this case, we address the extent to which the Fourth Amendment operates when the police are discharging one of their community caretaking functions. We conclude under these facts that the officers acted reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property when they briefly entered defendant's residence without a warrant and then observed contraband in plain view. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal holding that the trial court should not have suppressed the evidence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

About 3:30 p.m. on Christmas Day 1996, Officers Tan and Cary of the Richmond Police Department received the following dispatch: "An open door at 4 Park Lane, number 4 Park Lane. PR [person reporting] says that the door has been open all Looking inside, Tan saw "clothing, paper, strewn on the ground, on the sofa. It was just a real mess inside; [it] looked like someone had gone through the house." In Cary's estimation, "the front room appeared to be ransacked as if someone went through it." Although there were no signs of forced entry, their observations heightened both officers' initial apprehension: "It appeared that someone might have been inside, a burglary attempt or in the progress, or the welfare [sic ] of the people inside." The officers knocked several times, loudly announcing their presence, but received no response. Increasingly concerned, they entered to conduct a security check "to see if anyone inside might be injured, disabled, or unable to obtain help" and to determine whether a burglary had been committed or was in progress. They found no one inside but did observe a large quantity of suspected cocaine and money in plain view. No interior doors or containers were opened, and they did not touch anything. Tan and Cary left the residence and informed their supervisor of their observations, which formed the basis of a subsequent search warrant. Evidence seized pursuant to the warrant led to charges against defendant of possessing more than 10 kilograms of cocaine (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11351, 11370.4), possessing cocaine base for sale (id., § 11351.5), and manufacturing a controlled substance (id., § 11379.6, subd. (a)).

                day and it's all a shambles inside.  It's unknown if anyone's home but the PR doesn't think so.  The PR can be contacted if necessary."   Tan arrived at the location within five minutes.  At the time, he "was concerned for possibly the life and property on the inside of the house, welfare of the people inside."   Cary arrived about two minutes later and observed the reporting person pointing to the residence in question.  The officers approached the front door, which was open approximately two feet.  In Cary's experience, this circumstance correlated to a "95 percent" likelihood they had encountered a burglary or similar situation
                

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence because the officers did not have a warrant when they initially entered his residence. The prosecution attempted to justify their action on exigent circumstances. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the superior court found: "This is one of those types of situations where I don't believe that the police officers acted improperly in the sense that they were performing a community service or community value. That's what they are there to do. And when doors are open, we will hope that they will take some steps to find out what is going on. [p] ... [p] The testimony which has been presented to me would indicate that these officers were aware that a door had been open all day. That the person[s] who were the occupants of the premises had not been there, and that the place was in shambles. Those are the major portions of the information they had. [p] ... [p] ... [p] I don't feel on the facts of this case, there was sufficient information [that] would justify the officer to believe that an exigent circumstance was taking place at that point.... [p] It's one of those situations, I think, where it's not uncommon where people leave their doors open. And we commend the officers for at least doing their community service to try to protect people and help people. But there are going to be situations where in fact in doing that they are going to come inside and discover evidence of a crime. And it's going to turn out unfortunately it is not admissible. And I think this is one of those situations. [p] I do not in any way think that the officers were necessarily wrong in what they did, but if we are going to get into a situation where you are going to prosecute somebody for a crime in this situation, I think they needed to get a search warrant. Motion is granted."

On appeal, the controversy centered on whether the warrant exception for exigent circumstances required a showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Reviewing pertinent case authority, the Court We granted defendant's petition for review.

                of Appeal struck a balance in favor of reasonable suspicion.  "While probable cause is too onerous a standard, a warrantless entry justified by a reasonable suspicion of exigency permits a balance between the need for prompt action and the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."   Since the record established "the officers reasonably suspected that an exigency existed requiring their immediate warrantless entry," the court reversed the suppression ruling.  In reaching this conclusion, it noted the tension between the trial court's finding that "the officers were acting properly in their roles as community caretakers and had done nothing wrong" and the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence.  (See, e.g., United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 918-921, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.)
                

DISCUSSION

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal analyzed the facts and law under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (see, e.g., Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908; McDonald v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153), reaching different conclusions as to the standard by which exigency should be assessed. On review, the Attorney General urges this court to affirm the Court of Appeal on the basis of the "emergency aid" exception, which he characterizes as a variant of exigent circumstances. ² (See 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed.1996) § 6.6(a), p. 390, fn. 5 (3 LaFave).)

Under the emergency aid exception, police officers "may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance." (Root v. Gauper (8th Cir.1971) 438 F.2d 361, 364-365.) " 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' [Citation.] And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. [Citations.]" (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392-393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Wayne v. United States (D.C.Cir.1963) 318 F.2d 205, 212; see generally, 3 LaFave, supra, § 6.6(a), p. 390.)

Contrary to the view of the Attorney General, however, the emergency aid doctrine is not a subcategory of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, it is a subcategory of the community caretaking exception, a distinctly different principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "When the police act pursuant to the exigent Professor LaFave discusses at some length the distinction between entering premises with the intent of investigating suspected or known crimes and entering for other reasons. "Preceding sections of this Chapter have been concerned with the entry of private premises by police for the purpose of arresting a person thought to be within or for the purpose of finding the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of some past crime. Although it is entries for those purposes which most often give rise to a motion to suppress, requiring a ruling upon the validity of the entry and subsequent conduct of the police, quite clearly police have occasion to enter premises without a warrant for a variety of other purposes. The police have 'complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses'; by design or default, the police are also expected to 'reduce the opportunities for the...