People v. Raymond

Decision Date20 June 1969
Docket NumberNo. 41091,41091
Citation42 Ill.2d 564,248 N.E.2d 663
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert J. RAYMOND, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Karen W. Ferguson, Chicago, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and James R. Kavanaugh, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

In July of 1962, a jury in the circuit court of Cook County found Robert J. Raymond guilty of rape and robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for not less than 20 nor more than 40 years for rape, and not less than 15 nor more than 20 years for robbery. His writ of error from this court was transferred to the appellate court, which affirmed. 57 Ill.App.2d 292, 206 N.E.2d 740.

On May 20, 1965, he filed a Pro se post-conviction petition alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the procedure by which he was identified and that the prosecution had suppressed a police crime laboratory report of a microanalysis performed on his clothing which revealed no evidence of spermatozoa or other extracts. The petition was poorly drawn and not verified. The public defender, who was appointed counsel for defendant, made no motion to amend and the State's motion to dismiss was granted. No appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.

On March 27, 1967, the petitioner, leave of court having first been obtained, filed a second post-conviction petition again alleging that the prosecution had suppressed evidence favorable to him. This petition was supported by the petitioner's affidavit, and accompanied by an abstract of the record at his trial including portions of the transcript of the testimony. The State filed a motion to dismiss this petition on the grounds that if failed to raise a constitutional question and that dismissal of the earlier petition was Res judicata. The motion was allowed and the present appeal is from the order dismissing that petition.

The representation of the petitioner by his appointed attorney in connection with his first post-conviction petition was so clearly inadequate that the dismissal of that petition can not be regarded as Res judicata of the claim advanced in the petition before us. (People v. Ford, 40 Ill.2d 440, 240 N.E.2d 620; People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566; People v. Polansky, 39 Ill.2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374.) We are also of the opinion that although the suppression issue might properly have been raised on direct appeal, fundamental fairness precludes application of the doctrine of waiver. (Cf. People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456). The claim here is that upon the trial the prosecution withheld evidence that was favorable to the petitioner. The evidence in question was a report of the result of an examination of petitioner's clothing by a microanalyst of the Chicago Police Department which stated that no spermatozoa or extracts were found on defendant's clothing. The report was not offered in evidence upon the trial but when the motion for a new trial first came on for hearing the State asked that it be made a part of the record. Defendant had written to the laboratory, after the verdicts of guilty were returned, asking for a copy of the report. His letter stated: 'The clothes was brought to the Lab. for test in a possible rape case. I was told they would be analized (sic) and a report made. Well I went to court and was found guilty of this crime. Now I need proof of my innocense (sic).' In an oral statement that the petitioner made to the court at the first hearing on his motion for a new trial, he said: 'And now, this report in from my pants, I gave those of my own free will, I gave them to take to the laboratory, I gave those of my own free will. I knew I did not do it, and they could get the report from the analyst from the laboratory, and prove out the fact I did not have nothing to do with her.'

Subsequent to the submission of this cause for our decision, petitioner acknowledged by affidavit that the commander, at the police station where he was held after arrest, told him: 'The results of the test on your clothing came back and proved negative, but this don't clear you.' The affidavit also stated: 'I never mention the clothing for I the petitioner thought the state would produce.' From these statements, petitioner's letter and oral statement, it is clear that he knew, prior to his trial, that his...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • UNITED STATES, EX REL. RAYMOND v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILL.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 24 d1 Janeiro d1 1972
    ...Court of Cook County on June 8, 1967 and that denial was upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois on June 20, 1969, People v. Raymond, 42 Ill.2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 2, 1970 challenging the constitutionality of his convict......
  • US ex rel. Nelson v. De Tella, 91 C 4244.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 2 d5 Agosto d5 1996
    ...People v. Polansky, 39 Ill.2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374 (1968); People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968); People v. Raymond, 42 Ill.2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969)). In the present case, Nelson was represented by counsel during his post-conviction proceedings, including on appeal to......
  • United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 20 d1 Agosto d1 1973
    ...attorney had refused such requests; and petitioner had been denied leave to present these issues pro se on appeal; People v. Raymond, 42 Ill.2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969), where the petitioner alleged in his post-conviction petition that the state had knowingly suppressed evidence at trial ......
  • People v. Owens
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 30 d5 Novembro d5 1990
    ...petition where the petitioner denied any assistance of counsel on an arguably meritorious first petition); People v. Raymond (1969), 42 Ill.2d 564, 566, 248 N.E.2d 663 (permitted successive petition in the interest of fundamental fairness where representation on the first petition was "so c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT