People v. Rea, 153908.

• Decision Date: 24 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 153908.,153908.
• Citation: 500 Mich. 422,902 N.W.2d 362
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Gino Robert REA, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

500 Mich. 422

902 N.W.2d 362

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Gino Robert REA, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 153908.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 25, 2017

Decided July 24, 2017

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Jessica R. Cooper, Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas R. Grden, Appellate Division Chief, and Marilyn J. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Camilla Barkovic for defendant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Bernstein, J.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

This case concerns whether defendant, Gino R. Rea, may be charged under MCL 257.625 for operating a motor vehicle in his private driveway while intoxicated. We hold that, because defendant's conduct occurred in an area generally accessible to motor vehicles, the conduct was within the purview of MCL 257.625(1). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court's dismissal of the case, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early morning hours of March 31, 2014, police officers were dispatched three times to defendant's home because of a neighbor's noise complaints. On the third visit, Northville police officer Ken DeLano parked his patrol vehicle in the street in front of defendant's driveway, which is paved and straight. The driveway begins on the street, passes to the right of defendant's home, and extends to defendant's garage at the end of the driveway. The garage is detached from the home, and it is situated within defendant's backyard. There are no physical obstructions that block entry to defendant's driveway from the street.

As Officer DeLano walked up defendant's driveway to investigate the noise complaint, the overhead garage door opened, and defendant started to back his car down the driveway. After Officer DeLano shined his flashlight to alert defendant of his presence, defendant stopped his car, coming to a rest in the driveway, next to his house. When Officer DeLano approached defendant, who had remained in his car, the officer noticed a strong odor of intoxicants. Officer DeLano also observed that defendant's eyes were glassy and blood shot and his speech was slurred. Defendant suddenly put the car in drive and pulled forward into the garage, bumping into stored items in the back of the garage. Defendant then got out of the car and started to walk toward Officer DeLano, swaying as he walked. Officer DeLano asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests, but defendant refused. Defendant was then arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. A blood test later conducted at a hospital revealed a blood alcohol level of .242 grams per 100 milliliters of blood—three times the legal limit. See MCL 257.625(1)(b).

The Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney charged defendant with one count of operating while intoxicated (OWI), MCL 257.625(1). Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over to the Oakland Circuit Court, where he moved to quash the information. On October 30, 2014, the trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the case, finding that the upper portion¹ of defendant's driveway did not constitute an area that is "generally accessible to motor vehicles" for purposes of criminal liability under MCL 257.625(1). In a split, published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the upper portion of the driveway did not constitute a place generally accessible to motor vehicles because "[t]he ‘general public’ is not ‘widely’... permitted to ‘access' that portion of a private driveway immediately next to a private residence." People v. Rea , 315 Mich.App. 151, 157, 889 N.W.2d 536 (2016).

The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court. We scheduled oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address "whether the location where the defendant was operating a vehicle was a place within the purview of MCL 257.625." People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 871, 885 N.W.2d 302 (2016).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo. People v. Hill , 486 Mich. 658, 665–666, 786 N.W.2d 601 (2010). "Statutes ... are interpreted in accordance with legislative intent ...." People v. Mazur , 497 Mich. 302, 308, 872 N.W.2d 201 (2015). "[T]he most reliable evidence" of that intent is the plain language of the statute. Id . (citations and quotation marks omitted). When interpreting a statute, "we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." People v. Miller , 498 Mich. 13, 25, 869 N.W.2d 204 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nontechnical words and phrases should be interpreted "according to the common and approved usage of the language." People v. Dunbar , 499 Mich. 60, 67, 879 N.W.2d 229 (2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When a word or phrase is not defined by the statute in question, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word or phrase. People v. Feeley , 499 Mich. 429, 437, 885 N.W.2d 223 (2016).

III. ANALYSIS

The Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq. , prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Specifically, MCL 257.625(1) provides in pertinent part:

A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state if the person is operating while intoxicated.

Accordingly, MCL 257.625(1) prohibits operating a vehicle while intoxicated in three types of locations: (1) upon a highway, (2) in a place open to the general public, or (3) in a place generally accessible to motor vehicles. The issue before us is whether defendant's driveway was "generally accessible to motor vehicles."²

The crux of this dispute is the meaning of the phrase "generally accessible" in MCL 257.625(1). Because the Michigan Vehicle Code does not define the phrase "generally accessible," we consult the dictionary definitions of these words. Feeley , 499 Mich. at 437, 885 N.W.2d 223. The word "generally" is an adverb that modifies the adjective "accessible." "Generally" is defined as "in a general manner"; "in disregard of specific instances and with regard to an overall picture"; and "as a rule: USUALLY ." Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.).³ The term "accessible" means "providing access"; "capable of being reached: being within reach" and "capable of being used or seen." Id .⁴

Therefore, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "generally accessible" means "usually capable of being reached."

This phrase must be considered in its statutory context: "other place ... generally accessible to motor vehicles." MCL 257.625(1). The phrase "generally accessible" modifies the preceding noun phrase "other place." Accordingly, the prohibition in MCL 257.625(1) against operating a vehicle while intoxicated does not apply to every place.⁵ Instead, the statute's prohibition applies only to highways, to other places open to the general public, and to other places that are generally accessible—that is, usually or ordinarily capable of being reached.⁶ Finally, we must incorporate the phrase "to motor vehicles," which is an adverbial prepositional phrase that modifies "generally accessible." The Michigan Vehicle Code defines "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle that is self-propelled ...." MCL 257.33. Therefore, as a whole, the relevant statutory provision prohibits an intoxicated person from operating a vehicle in a place that is usually capable of being reached by self-propelled vehicles.

The Court of Appeals majority erred when it concluded that whether a place is "generally accessible to motor vehicles" depends on whether the general public "widely" or "popularly" has permission to enter the location.⁷ Rea , 315 Mich.App. at 155–158, 889 N.W.2d 536. This conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute in several respects. First, the Court of Appeals majority erroneously construed the term "generally" to mean open to an unrestricted number of users.

See id . at 157, 889 N.W.2d 536. But the use of the modifier "to motor vehicles" shows that the focus is not whether most people can access the area, but whether most motor vehicles can access the area. The Court of Appeals majority similarly erred by construing "accessible" to mean permission to enter. Id . An object, unlike an operator of the object, is not typically given permission to enter a location. We therefore read "accessible" to instead refer to whether motor vehicles have the ability to enter an unsecured private driveway, not whether their operators have permission to do so. Consequently, the Court of Appeals majority's statement that only a small subset of vehicles are permitted to use the upper portion of the driveway even though the public may access the lower portion of the driveway is simply irrelevant. See id . This arbitrary line-drawing between the lower and upper portion of defendant's driveway has no basis in the language of MCL 257.625(1).

Furthermore, to construe the phrase "generally accessible" as dependent on whether the general public has permission to enter the location would conflate the two phrases "open to the general public" and "generally accessible to motor vehicles." In MCL 257.625, these two phrases are separated by the disjunctive term "or," which indicates separate alternatives. See People v. Kowalski , 489 Mich. 488, 499 n. 11, 803 N.W.2d 200 (2011) (" ‘Or’ is ... a disjunctive [term], used to indicate a disunion, a separation, an alternative.") (citation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). For that reason, to similarly interpret ...